

CONFIDENTIAL

NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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No. 45

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CONFIDENTIAL

Governmental Affairs

WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS
Washington, D. C., Thursday, October 4, 1973

More Intelligence Changes Considered

By Oswald Johnston
Star-News Staff Writer

In another phase of the administration's drastic shake-up of the intelligence establishment, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger is giving serious thought to abolishing the State Department's small but influential Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

Kissinger revealed this intention last month during a closed-door confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. According to informed intelligence sources, Kissinger has already begun to bypass his in-house intelligence bureau and has been giving the CIA assignments that the bureau normally would handle.

Kissinger's disclosure of his dissatisfaction with the intelligence bureau, known in the department as INR, came during a hearing Sept. 17 that otherwise concentrated on his role in initiating wiretaps on 13 government officials, including Kissinger aides, and four newsmen.

THE TRANSCRIPT, a declassified version of which was made available today, shows Kissinger musing out loud on whether INR should be abolished outright or merged with

existing geographical bureaus in the State Department.

"From what I have seen of the intelligence product of the State Department, the present function is not satisfactory," Kissinger told the senators.

The new secretary of State is widely believed to have held a similar opinion of the national intelligence estimates which had been prepared under a 23-year-old system by the Board of National Estimates, an elite group within the CIA.

Early last summer, in one of his first official decisions, newly installed CIA Director William E. Colby ordered the abolition of the 10-man board, and, according to reliable reports, forced its director, John W. Huizenga, into retirement.

THE CHIEF of the 335-man INR bureau at State, Ray S. Cline, is a veteran of the Board of National Estimates. He could not be reached for comment on Kissinger's remarks in the transcript.

Other sources in the intelligence community noted, however, that abolition of the bureau, if it takes place, would mark another breach in the wall between intelli-

gence analysts and the operatives whose job it is to carry out policies which are supposedly based on "clean" and unbiased estimates.

In other sections of transcript of the closed hearings on Kissinger's nomination, these points emerged:

- A confidential FBI report on the 1969-71 wiretapping, which has not been revealed in full even to the committee, shows that Kissinger and the current White House chief-of-staff, Alexander M. Haig, then an Army colonel on Kissinger's National Security Council staff, personally requested three specific targets for the taps. But Atty. Gen. Elliot L. Richardson, who also testified in the closed session, insisted that this overstated Kissinger's role. He emphasizes that Kissinger did not "originate" the taps. Kissinger himself insisted that the idea originated with then-FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and former Atty. Gen. John N. Mitchell and that the taps were ordered installed by President Nixon. At Kissinger's request, 49 consecutive pages dealing with the wiretap issue were deleted from the transcript.

- A top-level White House crisis team, the so-called Washington Special Action

Group, was convened as soon as news of last month's coup in Chile was received here. But according to Kissinger, the group decided to avoid any appearance whatsoever of U.S. involvement and passed the word so forcefully that "everyone was afraid even to express sorrow" at the death of Chilean President Salvador Allende, reportedly a suicide the day of the coup. This oversight was corrected the next day, but not before it brought the administration a worldwide bad press. WSAG decisions, Kissinger stressed, are personally approved by the President.

- Kissinger defended the decision-making procedures devised for Nixon administration foreign policy as "much more systematic than those of President Johnson." But he promised soon to bring the State Department into policy making in a major way by reinvigorating its policy planning staff and thoroughly shaking up the higher echelons. "Some rather drastic moves will be made to bring younger men into key positions more rapidly," Kissinger told the committee.

The one reorganization he discussed in detail, however, concerned the INR and its probable abolition.

NEW YORK TIMES

29 September 1973

Kissinger Gives Aides Pep Talk; Tells Them to Be 'Best in Town'

By DAVID BINDER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 28.—Secretary of State Kissinger gave a pep talk to about 1,000 State Department employees this noon, telling them he wanted their work "to be the best in town."

Speaking in a faint drizzle in the department's large courtyard, he said the United States was no longer in a position to "overwhelm every problem with resources" or "substitute resources for thought."

"We no longer have overwhelming margins of safety and we no longer have overwhelming margins of resources, and therefore we have to be good and we have to be thoughtful," he said.

Mr. Kissinger said that it was not enough merely to report on foreign policy issues and

that he expected "a clear-cut statement of choices" from the various bureaus. For a start he called for a report "by the end of next week" from every regional bureau on problems facing the United States in the coming year.

His air, he said is "to try to restore the State Department to its traditional role of advising the President on foreign policy, to achieve preeminence."

"With this attitude we can do great things together with some joy and some enthusiasm," he said, drawing applause.

As Mr. Kissinger spoke he faced a tall metal sculpture of a superhuman figure balancing two planets. The sculpture, by Marshall W. Frederick, symbol-

and mystery of the universe."

The Secretary got a chuckle when he said the courtyard gathering was "the closest thing to a Nuremberg party rally that could be organized" and another when he suggested that it might be the first and last time most of the employees would ever see him.

Trip to Europe Planned

WASHINGTON, Sept. 28 (Reuters)—Secretary of State Kissinger is expected to begin a visit to Europe in about two

weeks, the State Department said today.

The department spokesman, Robert McCloskey, said Mr. Kissinger would meet the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, and also hopes to talk with the West German Foreign Minister, Walter Scheel, and the French Foreign Minister, Michel Jobert.

There have been reports, denied by Mr. Kissinger, that President Nixon is considering canceling his plans for a tour of European capitals this year.

HOUSTON POST
17 SEPT 1973

Dr. Kissinger threw light on covert action reins

By DONALD R. MORRIS

Post News Analyst

During the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings to confirm Dr. Kissinger as Secretary of State, several of the senators touched on the Central Intelligence Agency. In doing so, they inadvertently brought out several points of the utmost importance, which — somewhat unfortunately for the public — were not picked up.

The first point during Senator Symington's questioning came out not as a query but as a forcible statement, to which Dr. Kissinger indicated a whole-hearted agreement. Symington, after mentioning in passing that he had been on the CIA sub-committee a matter of 15 years, said that in all that time, with a single exception, the agency estimates had been far more objective than the military ones, and that they had always proven accurate. He for one would sooner see the agency

abolished than to have its estimative function subordinated to political influence. In reply, Kissinger admitted the tendency of any intelligence estimate to deliver what the customer wanted, but indicated the tendency was hard to control in military estimates. The agency, he felt, was free of it, and he emphasized the pains to which he had gone not to exert pressure for specific estimates.

In subsequent questioning, Kissinger outlined the structure and functions of the "Forty Committee," which is almost unknown to the media and the public. Not because its existence is hidden, but because on the few occasions the name has been mentioned, its significance failed to register.

The Forty Committee, which one way or another has been in existence since 1947, consists of the deputy secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff —

and in recent years Chairman Kissinger. It considers all proposals for covert action abroad — from management of paramilitary operations in Laos to the clandestine intervention in the internal affairs of another country — and passes its recommendations directly to the President.

It is, in short, the precise mechanism of control for all our covert action abroad, and those who feel we should control such action more closely, modify it or simply abolish it would make far more progress were they to devote their attention to the Forty Committee rather than to the agency itself. Hounding the agency on that score is akin to hectoring patrolmen on the beat about the distribution of the beats, instead of going to the police commissioner.

The exact nature of the problem was splendidly illustrated moments later by Senator McGovern, who tried to get Kissinger to agree that the agency should do much less covert action — should, in fact, eliminate it entirely.

McGovern specified police training, assassinations and interventions in foreign domestic politics.

Kissinger in reply refused to agree that assassinations had ever been approved, agreed that police training was only justified under special circumstances, and then startled McGovern by stating it would be "highly dangerous" to abolish the other functions, which would best be discussed in closed session.

Throughout his reply, Kissinger did not talk about what "the agency" did or didn't do, but about what the "committee" did. The significance of that usage, which was quite unconscious, seems to have escaped Senator McGovern, as it has been escaping far too many people for far too long.

It is a point that should register, however, and that soon, for as long as it doesn't register all rational talk about our role in covert action abroad is at cross-purposes and counterproductive.

NEW REPUBLIC
8 Sept. 1973

Conversations in the Court

Reorganization of Intelligence

"C.I.A. to Undergo Major 'Overhaul'"

The New York Times, August 21, 1973

Lord Kissinger:

I've brought Sir William Colby by,
To tell us how our spies deploy, what word
They send by secret ways, and finally how
To use the stuff.

King Richard:

The latter, yes, my Lords,
For in my need to know what's happening
Beyond the realm each day,
I cannot spend forever browsing through
The stacks of yellow foolscap just to find
That wine from France is up in price,
That peasants wear no shoes in Greece,
That Chinese chopsticks take some time

To master.

Sir William Colby:

The very thing you've set your heart
Is my heart's chosen course. We winnow
Day and night by river bank to blow the chaff
From royal view, deliver whole the kernel of
The honest truth.

Lord Kissinger:

Well spoke, brave Will, we've had enough
Of those surveys which place six warts
On the left hand, and half a dozen on the right.
Cleave to the center true!

Sir William Colby:

As all work of mortal toil,
One imperfection's raised its head.

King Richard:

And what, pray tell, is that?

Sir William Colby:

No news today.

Robert J. Myers

HOUSTON POST
19 Sept. 1973

It's often incomplete

'Intelligence' can't tell all

By DONALD R. MORRIS
Post News Analyst

Probably no field of public affairs suffers as much from sheer misinformation as intelligence activities, and this is especially true of the reporting function — which is responsible for about 80 percent of all intelligence activity but which generates almost none of the publicity.

Everyone knows that the function of intelligence is to inform command — those responsible for devising and executing policy. And when policy goes wrong, the first cry from those who were executing it is "Bad intelligence!" From the Chinese crossing of the Yalu in the Korean War to the disaster at the Bay of Pigs, "wrong" intelligence has been used to lever responsible leaders off the hook.

"Intelligence" is practically

never wrong. It is, however, almost invariably incomplete.

To begin with, intelligence agencies do not collect information gratuitously. They only collect in response to "requirements" which are "levied" by the "customer." In short, ask the right questions and you will get the best answer possible (which will in no case be complete). Ask no questions, or the wrong ones, (or discard or fail to read the answers you do get), and intelligence will be of little service to you.

Intelligence, moreover, cannot tell you what will happen, it can at best tell you what happened, and the job of deciding what that means in terms of what will happen tomorrow is the customer's, not the collection agency's. The collection agency will not even evaluate the material as "true" or "false" — this too is the customer's job. What the collection agency will do is evaluate the chances that

the source of the report is passing on accurately the information he claims he received, and it will also provide an estimate of the source's track record for credibility. But what you make of all that is up to you.

Collection agencies, therefore, will not engage in "estimative" functions — that is your responsibility as a customer. The bane of their existence is a customer who doesn't understand this (a depressing percentage don't) and who then points to the reporting as an excuse for his fallible judgment.

There is an exception. The Office of National Estimates is housed in and chaired by the CIA, although the 10 or 12 people (assisted by a score of staff members) who compose it include representatives from all intelligence agencies. They have unlimited access to all intelligence sources, and perhaps 50 times a year they are called on to produce a "National Intelligence Estimate," usually in answer to a requirement from the NSC or

the White House. Some are standing requirements, others crash ones levied on an hour's notice. Any customer can have a gut feeling the ONE estimate is wrong, but it takes a brave (or a brash) statesman to ignore ONE estimates. JFK was notorious for it.

ONE estimates, even with qualifications, are not infallible, but they are the closest facsimile of a crystal ball the country is ever liable to get. They reflect the distilled results of the work of hundreds of sources (each professionally evaluated) and of hundreds of professional analysts. Most basic American foreign policy rests on these estimates, which is why policy is never reversed abruptly when the Outs replace the Ins. At most such a change effects the tactics of policy, rarely if ever the strategy.

This is a major reason for the fact that our course in Vietnam continued through an In-Out-Out-In succession.

TIMES, Kansas City
8 September 1973

Buffeted CIA Looks Back and Ahead

The Central Intelligence Agency has been under tough congressional scrutiny this summer because of its involvement, clearly unsought in the Watergate affair. The impression from testimony before two congressional committees is that CIA officials did not respond enthusiastically to White House contacts concerning a cover-up and did not want to have their organization involved in any way.

But it was, although not in terms of specific wrongdoing related to Watergate. Probably the most damaging information brought out about the CIA was that it unwittingly provided technical aid for the burglary of the office of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist. Apparently the worst that the CIA can be charged with is unquestioning compliance with a request by a high administration official without insisting on full information.

Now the CIA has a new director, William E. Colby, who is a professional in the field with 30 years of experience as an intelligence specialist. Except for a period when he directed pacification programs in South Vietnam, Colby and his activities have not been in the news. Undoubtedly he would prefer that both he and his agency receive little public notice in the future.

Ideally that is how it should be for this silent

arm of the government. The CIA has had intelligence successes since it was founded in 1947 but it is always better that these not be heralded. The CIA's failures do become known, as in the case of the Bay of Pigs blunder. Americans need to understand, too, that the CIA will often be blamed unfairly for developments that were not of its making. Tinchorn dictators around the globe have a habit of accusing the CIA when things go awry in a particular country regardless of what really occurred.

Contrary to several books that have sold well, the CIA is not an invisible government that acts without reference to national policy. Its function is mostly the gathering and analysis of military and political information. Cloak-and-dagger work is very much the lesser part of its operations.

But it is the clandestine business that can get the CIA notoriety if something goes wrong or can cause it to be denounced when it is innocent. Thus the CIA has had its troubles and probably will have more. But the disclosures of the past few months have reaffirmed that the CIA must keep its nose entirely out of domestic matters and stick to foreign intelligence. No large objective of the new CIA director can be more important than that.

RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.

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PROGRAM Jack Anderson Report STATION WAVA Radio
DATE September 19, 1973 5:05 PM CITY Washington, D.C.

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

JACK ANDERSON: Will the Central Intelligence Agency continue to provide reliable estimates? I'll have an exclusive report for you in a minute.

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ANDERSON: The late President Kennedy blamed the Bay of Pigs blunder on the Central Intelligence Agency. He declared afterward that he wanted to splinter the CIA in a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds. When he cooled down he called in White House adviser Clark Clifford who had drafted the legislation establishing the CIA. As Clifford remembers it, Kennedy said, "I made some bad decisions on the Bay of Pigs. I made these bad decisions because I had bad information."

Well, Kennedy appointed Clifford to head a civilian advisory board which recommended a great many reforms. To make sure the President got good information, a Board of Estimates was established. However, its estimates have angered President Nixon and his foreign policy adviser Henry Kissinger. They complained that the board was dominated by doves. My own White House sources say Kissinger got so upset that he refused to read the estimates from the CIA.

Now the new CIA chief, William Colby, is preparing to abolish the Board of Estimates. In its place he intends to choose a dozen experts from the different divisions of the CIA. They'll be known as national intelligence officers. Kissinger, meanwhile, has told the CIA that he wants his intelligence straight, without any ideological slant. He also wants to see the minority views.

Well, my CIA sources claim this is exactly what the Board of Estimates was sending to the White House. The elimination of the board, they say, is a signal that the White House really wants estimates which always support the President's policy.

WASHINGTON STAR

26 SEP 1973

**Ben Smith, 74;
Former Actor,
CIA Retiree**

II. Ben Smith, 74, who retired from the Central Intelligence Agency in 1961, died yesterday after a heart attack at his home on Foxhall Road NW.

Mr. Smith, an actor before World War II, appeared in many Broadway plays. During the war he

served with the Office of Strategic Services, a predecessor of the CIA, in London and China. He was awarded the Bronze Star and the Medal of Freedom.

Mr. Smith was born in Waxachie, Tex. He was a member of the Players Club of New York.

He leaves his wife, the former Roxana Stahl; a son, Patrick J., of New York; a daughter, Mrs. Susan Stewart of Washington, a brother, a sister and five grandchildren.

AIR FORCE TIMES
19 Sept 1973

WASHINGTON STAR
21 September 1973

Eaker's View

Rumblings in CIA

By LT. GEN. IRA C. EAKER (USAF, Ret.)

A HEADLINE in the Washington Star-News August 19 read, "Elite CIA Unit to Be Abolished." On August 21, a New York Times headline stated, "CIA to Undergo Major Overhaul."

The articles under these headlines expressed concern over a proposed plan to eliminate the Office of National Estimates, a prestigious branch of the CIA organization charged with preparing the National Intelligence Estimates.

Obviously, sound defense planning must be based upon accurate estimates of the capabilities and intentions of all other major powers, whether prospective enemies or allies.

The Office of National Estimates has led a deeply troubled existence for many years. Its critics accused it of imperfect forecasts of Soviet intentions; of being dovish about Kremlin motives; and of failing consistently to anticipate Russian advances in science, technology, weapons and capabilities.

There was also a widely held suspicion of bias. Some "Eastern Establishment" members of the Office of National Estimates apparently have long regarded themselves as the protectors, if not the initiators, of "detente." By watering down predictions of the Soviet threat they evidently hoped to reduce U.S. defense budgets and thus decrease Russian fears of U.S. military might. Their effort resulted in Russian numerical superiority of ICBMs. It also led to the agreement, in the first round of SALT, which now virtually assures Soviet scientific and military supremacy within a few years.

THIS OFFICE allowed ideological fervor to color its findings. It became a captive of State Department "doves," articulate civilian bureaucrats and self-styled intellectuals who tended to see the world through rose tinted glasses. Throughout, their true motives were obscured in volumes of rhetoric. The National Intelligence Estimates they produced often exceeded 100 pages. Finally, the parity preconditions to detente were achieved. The price was America's loss of her technical and strategic edge.

The National Security Council evidently found the intelligence estimates prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency of the Department of Defense much more reliable than CIA's effort. Increasingly, the national leadership has based its strategic decisions on intelligence provided by DIA and the National Security Council, disregarding CIA estimates.

Dr. James R. Schlesinger, in his brief service as director of CIA, tried to remedy all this. It was he who decreed the disbanding of the Office of National Estimates. With his transfer to Defense, the revolution at CIA has lost its chief architect. The old bureaucracy remains essentially intact and one now wonders what will replace the Office of National Estimates.

THE ARCHITECTS of intelligence organization in the future will do well to heed some lessons of the past. Intelligence deals with fundamental issues of survival. War, peace and the grey areas between involve a high order of uncertainty and risk assessment.

William E. Colby, nominated to succeed Dr. Schlesinger as head of CIA, is able and experienced in the intelligence field, having been with CIA since its founding and with its predecessor organization, the OSS of World War II.

But we shall have to wait to see whether Dr. Colby can meet the challenge. Whether, in an age of increasing centralization and bureaucratization of power, he can reform CIA's defective estimating process.

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SECURITY THREAT FEARED

CIA Wants to Cut Ex-Agent's Book

By Oswald Johnston
Star-News Staff Writer

Victor L. Marchetti, the one-time CIA agent who lost a court fight a year ago to write about his former employers without their approval, is facing a new problem.

After a three-week study of a 530-page manuscript on the activities of the agency, CIA lawyers have decided that nearly 100 pages must be deleted in the name of national security.

Marchetti, who was hoping to publish his book in time for the Christmas buying season, is now considering going to court again to contest the CIA's censorship.

AMERICAN Civil Liberties Union lawyer Melvin L. Wulf, who has represented Marchetti since the beginning of his struggle to publish his memories, yesterday disputed the CIA's contention that its demands are merely a matter of negotiation.

"We're going to negotiate in court," Wulf said, adding that an earlier offer to discuss the manuscript with CIA lawyers last month has been rejected.

Marchetti's earlier struggle to publish without CIA approval went all the way to the Supreme Court where his plea was rejected last December.

AS A RESULT, Marchetti was under court order to fulfill the pledge he signed

upon joining the agency in 1955 that he would never publish anything about CIA activities without prior clearance.

The 530-page typescript went to the agency Aug. 27, and reviewers there have shared it with State Department officials seeking to impose their own censorship of the book.

This is because a coauthor who joined Marchetti earlier this year, John D. Marks, a former Foreign service officer, has been under similar pressure from the State Department to submit the manuscript for clearance.

State Department lawyers until recently denied knowing that the book Marks was working on was already under court order to be submitted to the CIA for clearance.

LAST JULY, the State Department legal office formally requested that Marks submit the manuscript for review.

Marks, Marchetti and Wulf, concluding that in this case the State Department and the CIA were parts of the same government, decided to ignore that request. The State Department quietly acceded by making its own arrangement to look at the CIA copy.

The authors are still not sure what parts of the book the CIA wants to censor. General Counsel John Warner has promised to provide that information to Wulf next week.

NEW YORK TIMES

20 SEP 1973

The Katzenbach Paper

By Anthony Lewis

BOSTON, Sept. 19.—The United States should abandon all covert operations in foreign countries except the gathering of intelligence. That proposal is made by Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, the former Attorney General and Under Secretary of State, in an article just published in *Foreign Affairs*.

"Specifically," Katzenbach writes, "there should be no secret subsidies of police or counter-insurgency forces, no efforts to influence elections, no secret monetary subsidies. . . ."

The Katzenbach paper is a remarkable one apart from that striking recommendation. It comes from a man whom the left has criticized as too establishment-oriented but who in fact combines a highly original mind with careful and wise judgment.

What makes this article important is that it relates American foreign policy to the crisis of confidence in government, taking a large historical view. Katzenbach rejects the revisionist proposition that policy in the postwar years was built on bad motives. But he also rejects the notion, expressed wishfully by Henry Kissinger, that foreign policy can be separated from the domestic sickness of Watergate.

Since the war, he says, the making of foreign policy has become more and more secretive and concentrated. Katzenbach traces a number of the influences: the postwar atmosphere of crisis in opposing conspiratorial Communism, the growth of the military role, the tendency of the public when it feels endangered by the outside world to put its trust in the President.

"Unfortunately," Katzenbach notes dryly, "Presidents are inclined to think this blind trust in their wisdom is wholly justified." He adds the shrewd point that Presidents also became captives of public anti-Communist passion, so that they dared not "lose" any foreign territory and resorted to Presidential action unauthorized by the normal processes of law.

The Bay of Pigs is an example. Katzenbach notes that when that invasion of Cuba failed, President Kennedy took public blame only for the failure, not for the attempt: "He felt no need to apologize for undertaking so extensive a covert activity on Presidential authority alone."

Then came Vietnam. President Johnson followed the form of law by asking Congress for authority in the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. But there was no real candor; and as Congressional and public dissent made things increasingly difficult, secretiveness and deception increased.

That history suggests that the excesses of the Nixon years—the Watergate crimes, the secret bombing of Cambodia—had roots in the past. Secrecy had increasingly become, Katzenbach argues, a way "to avoid the difficulties inherent in our political system and hopefully to present the public with triumphant *faits accomplis*."

ABROAD AT HOME

Then what had happened gradually as a convenience "was converted into constitutional principle by Mr. Nixon." To an unprecedented degree the Nixon Administration excluded the public, Congress and even official Government channels from foreign policy consultation or information. Katzenbach concludes:

"Even without Watergate, personal diplomacy, conducted in secret, without public understanding or solid institutional foundation within the government, should be insufficient basis for a viable foreign policy. And if, as I believe, Watergate has destroyed confidence in the President's credibility, much more is now needed."

The remedies that Katzenbach suggests all are designed to restore confidence in American policy and policy-making. Their common theme is greater openness to discussion and criticism.

Congress is naturally one part of the problem. Katzenbach has no illusion that it can easily be made a par-

ticipant in foreign policy: It can be parochial, obstructive, uninterested. But he rejects even reliance on select committees and private consultation. Today, he says, "there can be no substitute for a general rule of openness with the Congress." There must also be "far greater openness within the executive branch itself," he says.

Katzenbach calls most strongly for reducing the whole role of secret information in foreign policy. The system of classifying documents has not worked and should be drastically cut back, he argues; "bloated concepts of national security" should be dropped. And then he urges the abandonment of covert operations abroad, saying that their usefulness is outweighed by the fears they arouse and the impossibility of controlling them.

"However difficult and complex our foreign policy may be," he concludes, "there is no license to free it from the mandates of the Constitution or the constraints of public views, interests and wants."

It is difficult to summarize all this in a newspaper column. The attempt seemed worthwhile because the Katzenbach paper provides an essential framework for the rethinking that Henry Kissinger—and all of us—must now do about the means and ends of American foreign policy.

The Washington Post/Potomac/September 23, 1973

Spooking the CIA

When we last tuned in on Victor Marchetti, ex-spook of the CIA, he was glad he'd quit, glad he'd written the novel about the guy who quit the CIA after giving terrible secrets to the Commies, and hopeful that the courts would rule he doesn't have to show everything he writes about intelligence to the CIA, before he publishes it.

The Supreme Court didn't come through. Marchetti has to show his new book to the blue-pencil squad in Langley—and the agency is terribly concerned with its public image these days, with all this Watergate business, you understand.

"A lot of ex-spooks have contacted me. They want me to write novels with their experience and my name behind them. I've got some good things going. I'm not so glad I quit when I look at the checkbook, and my wife had to go back to work, and I expect a lot of court action over this new book. . . ."

—Henry Allen

The New York Times Book Review
September 30, 1973

Hunt on the C. I. A. Give Us This Day

By E. Howard Hunt Jr.
365 pp. New Rochelle, N.Y.:
Arlington House. \$7.95.

By TRUMBULL HIGGINS

E. Howard Hunt Jr., of recent Watergate notoriety, has written a fascinating, highly personal and, at times, rather eloquent defense of himself and of the Central Intelligence Agency during the resounding bungle of the Bay of Pigs in April, 1961. It goes without saying that Hunt continues to justify the attempted overthrow of Fidel Castro's Government by the Kennedy Administration with an invading Cuban refugee brigade. Hunt's contempt is reserved, instead, for those who have "always cringed from American exercise of power in our national self-interest." In the wake of the far more monumental American fiasco in Vietnam, Hunt's basic assumptions will no longer win wide support.

Nevertheless his case is worth considering. Contrary to his disclaimer that the book contains no classified material of value to Castro, there is actually a great deal of fresh information on the Bay of Pigs, if, sometimes, between the lines of this account by a very active participant, the liaison man between the C.I.A. and the Cuban refugees. Indeed Hunt's involvement in the Cuban project went back to the days of its prototype, Operation El Diabolo, the misleadingly easy removal of the Leftist Arbenz Government in Guatemala by the C.I.A. in 1954. There is new light on such controversial figures as Frank Drecher—Frank Droller, according to Arthur Schlesinger—who was officially titled headquarters chief of action, Cuba Project, and who, under the code name of Bender, now emerges as too socialist a Central European refugee in Hunt's view to be effective at restoring the old regime in Cuba. In any event the Kennedy Administration from the President down, at least to the level of Kennedy's personal friend, Dick Bissell, the C.I.A. operations chief for the Bay of Pigs, proposed to replace Castro with a bona-fide liberal leader such as Manuel Ray rather than a conservative who might be contaminated in liberal Cuban and American eyes by previous association with Batista.

Unexpectedly, that hitherto curiously opaque figure, Lieut. Gen. Charles Cabell, Deputy Director of the C.I.A. in 1954, is portrayed as the true villain of Hunt's piece. For whatever reason, Cabell delayed a

Trumbull Higgins is a military historian at John Jay College, City University of New York.

WASHINGTON POST

21 SEP 1973

CIA Seeking to Eliminate 100 Pages of Upcoming Book

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency is seeking to expunge 100 pages of a 530-page book profiling the agency's operations in the United States and abroad, attorneys for the authors said yesterday.

The book, "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," was written by former CIA analyst Victor Marchetti and John Marks, a former State Department intelligence officer and U.S. Senate aide. It is to be published by Knopf.

Melvin Wulf, chief American Civil Liberties Union attorney on the case, said he was informed by a CIA official yesterday that the agency—acting under a court injunction—would seek to eliminate nearly a fifth of the manuscript.

Wulf identified the CIA official as John Warner, the agency's general counsel.

A spokesman for the agency acknowledged yesterday that

Warner is negotiating the terms of publication with Wulf, but said that details could not be disclosed. "There definitely are security problems," the CIA spokesman said.

Marchetti insisted yesterday that "there is nothing in this book that would jeopardize the national security of my country. There is nothing in the book that would jeopardize the lives of any agents, sink any ships or give away any codes."

Among the subjects with which the book deals are the CIA's role in the 1970 Chilean election, the disbursement of CIA funds to a number of world leaders, alleged misuse of the CIA director's contingency funds and internal U.S. operations of the CIA.

This is the first time, according to lawyers in the case, that a government agency has exercised prior restraint over a book under a court order.

The CIA obtained a re-

straining order in U.S. District Court in Alexandria in April, 1972, to prohibit Marchetti from circulating an outline of the book to publishers.

A trial was held in camera, and attorneys for the authors invoked the defense employed in the Pentagon Papers case: that censorship could be justified only if it could be shown that there might be immediate and irrevocable injury to the United States.

The court held with the CIA's argument that it could enforce the oath of secrecy that was a condition to Marchetti's employment by the agency, a decision that was appealed.

The federal appellate court found that the agency had a right to delete classified material from the book after a review prior to submission of the manuscript to its publisher. The Supreme Court declined to take jurisdiction of the matter.

planned second air strike upon Castro's still surviving air force long enough for the Administration to cancel it outright, to the consternation of its C.I.A. controllers. Unhappily for this standard charge against President Kennedy, there is no evidence that any number of additional air strikes would have enabled the 1,400-man refugee brigade to have conquered Castro's almost 200,000 Soviet-equipped militia, should this militia have fought for Castro.

Hunt is on surer ground when he says that the C.I.A. never planned to rely upon the leak-prone underground in Cuba. Hunt's basic conclusion, Kennedy apologists notwithstanding, namely that landing of the small brigade without following it up with open and massive American intervention made no sense, seems to this critic irrefutable. As Hunt put it: "The [offshore American] task force, in addition to the [aircraft carrier] Boxer, comprised Marine landing forces and logistic trainees. If the armada was not charged with ensuring victory, why else had it been assembled?"

Hunt's somewhat contradictory remarks leave us rather uncertain regarding the controversial role of the distinguished United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson. Whether the idealistic Stevenson actually suspected the Administration's covert sponsorship of the bombing of Cuba before his purportedly innocent deaths at the

United Nations of American involvement in the invasion is still open to speculation. But Stevenson's probably decisive influence in cutting back more air strikes against Castro is not sufficiently emphasized by Hunt.

Fundamentally, Hunt's job was to cajole the confusing kaleidoscope of the Cuban refugees, whom he liked for the most part, into some sort of coherent and usable front to conceal the American sponsorship of the Bay of Pigs operation. Here Hunt is replete with information.

Hunt winds up his account with a fairly well substantiated interpretation of the Kennedy Administration's attempt to blame the failure of the Cuban operation on the C.I.A. To be sure, as Hunt suggests, the Pentagon shared some of the blame, but Hunt appears to be almost entirely unaware of how Kennedy had gutted Eisenhower's National Security Council shortly after taking office, let alone how this institutional failure affected the operation. In short, Hunt could have made a more damaging attack upon his enemies among the Kennedy liberals had he concentrated more upon the higher-level Washington scene. But his job and his personal commitment was to the Cuban refugees in Miami and elsewhere and his bias and bitterness reflect their, rather than the American, interest. As a consequence, like so many others disappointed by the Bay of Pigs, Hunt does not understand that in military operations waged against a

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Hunt Told Colson Of Shielding Top Bugging Figures

By Lawrence Meyer and Peter A. Jay
Washington Post Staff Writers

Convicted Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt Jr. told former special counsel to the President Charles W. Colson that "we're protecting the guys who are really responsible for the Watergate break-in," according to a transcript of a November, 1972, telephone conversation.

The transcript was released by the Senate select Watergate committee as it resumed its hearings yesterday.

In the conversation, which was recorded by Colson, Hunt was repeatedly admonished by Colson not to tell him any specific details about the break-in and bugging of the Democratic National Committee's Watergate headquarters.

"It's just that the less specifics I know," Colson told Hunt, "the better off I am, we are, you are."

Hunt told the committee yesterday that he was unaware that Colson was recording the conversation, the transcript of which the committee obtained from Colson by general subpoena. "I might say that I feel, in retrospect I was set up on this one," Hunt told the committee.

Colson has consistently denied any prior knowledge of the Watergate break-in or involvement in the subsequent cover-up.

The thrust of the conversation between Hunt and Colson, which Hunt said took place on Nov. 24, was Hunt's complaint that he was having difficulty getting funds for legal fees and family subsistence that he had been promised would be paid to him and the other six Watergate defendants.

At the time of the conversation, the seven Watergate defendants were preparing for their January, 1973, trial. Hunt testified that after his wife's death in a December, 1972, plane crash, he decided to plead guilty in the case.

For the first time publicly, Hunt yesterday told how he became involved in both the Watergate affair and the break-in at the offices of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

Hunt, who appeared pale, thin and physically weak, told the committee that at the time he became involved in the Watergate break-in, "I considered my participation as a duty to my country." Hunt admitted receiving funds to cover his legal fees and

majority of the population of a country, no mere improvement in technique works very well. Blaming the techniques employed in Cuba, as in Southeast Asia, thus evades the point: Was the operation or war itself justified in the first place? With respect to Cuba, at least, like Kennedy before him, Nixon eventually decided that it was not. ■

family subsistence after his indictment and conviction but insisted that "I made no threats" in order to receive the money.

Although Hunt was testifying under a grant of limited immunity from prosecution extended by the committee, he is also under an admonition from Chief U.S. District Judge John J. Sirica to cooperate fully with any official investigative body that calls upon him for testimony.

Sirica last March sentenced Hunt provisionally to 35 years in jail and a \$40,000 fine for his admitted role in the Watergate affair. At the time of sentencing, Sirica made it clear that he would weigh the degree of Hunt's cooperation before giving Hunt a final sentence.

Hunt last week filed a motion with Sirica asking him to set aside Hunt's guilty plea and to dismiss all charges against him because, among other reasons, Hunt thought that top White House officials had approved the Watergate burglary.

Although Hunt was speaking for the first time publicly yesterday about "the events which have befallen me" as he put it, much of what he told the committee has already been reported as a result of the several appearances he has made before other committees in closed session and through the release of his grand jury testimony.

Hunt, and his attorney, Sidney S. Sachs, both referred to the burden that has been placed on Hunt under the provisions of the conditional sentence imposed by Sirica.

"Since being sentenced," Hunt said, "I have been questioned under oath on more than 25 occasions, often for many hours. I have answered thousands of questions by innumerable investigators, prosecutors, grand jurors and staff members of this committee."

"I am informed that such intensive and repeated interrogation is a most extraordinary procedure and of dubious legality. Even so," Hunt said, "urged by the court to cooperate fully, I have not contested the procedure. In fact, I have answered all questions, even those which involved confidential communications between my attorneys and myself."

A major portion of Hunt's

testimony yesterday concerned his dealings with his former lawyer, William O. Bittman. Hunt said Bittman received \$156,000 in legal fees from Hunt. Bittman withdrew as Hunt's counsel in August after he became a subject of scrutiny.

Hunt, 54, a CIA agent for 21 years before his retirement in 1970, also catalogued for the committee the troubles that have beset him since his sentencing, which he said may keep him imprisoned for the rest of his life. "I have been incarcerated for six months. For a time I was in solitary confinement. I have been physically attacked and robbed in jail. I have suffered a stroke. I have been transferred from place to place, manacled and chained, hand and foot. I am isolated from my four motherless children. The funds provided me and others who participated in the break-in have long since been exhausted. . . . Beyond all this, I am crushed by the failure of my government to protect me and my family as in the past it has always done for its clandestine agents."

Two of Hunt's four children, Lisa, 22, and St. John, 19, sat behind him as he testified. Hunt also has a daughter, Kevan, 20, and another son, David, 10.

Hunt first came to work at the White House as a \$100-a-day consultant in July, 1971, under the sponsorship of Colson, to work on declassifying the Pentagon Papers. Hunt quickly became part of the special investigative unit, popularly known as "the plumbers," established in July, 1971, by President Nixon to stop leaks of government information. It was the "plumbers" who, in September, 1971, conducted the break-in at the offices of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

According to a memo released by the committee yesterday without explanation or elaboration, Hunt was interviewed in 1969 by Colson, Jeb Stuart Magruder and Lyn Nofziger, all White House aides at the time, for a position involving public relations. Although Magruder, who has admitted his later role in the Watergate conspiracy, recommended Hunt for the position, Hunt apparently was not hired at that time.

In addition to helping plan and conduct the Ellsberg break-in, Hunt told the committee that with Colson's urging he attempted to fabricate State Department cables implicating the Kennedy administration in the assassination of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem, investigated Ellsberg's lawyer, Leonard Boudin, and released in-

formation to a reporter for a Detroit newspaper. Hunt also acknowledged an attempt to gather information on Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) to be used for political purposes.

Jerald F. terHorst, a Washington correspondent of the Detroit News, incorporated the material in a newspaper article, Hunt said.

TerHorst said yesterday that he was given an eight-page document on Ellsberg by Colson in August, 1972, but that it was five months before he wrote the article cited by Hunt.

He vigorously denied using the material without checking it, and said he did not use any of it verbatim. Most of the information in his article came right from Boudin, he said, and for Hunt to suggest otherwise "amounts to a slur on me and my paper."

The committee also released a July 28, 1971, memo from Hunt to Colson in which Hunt outlined a plan to destroy (Ellsberg's) public image and credibility." One of the items in the memo suggests, "Obtain Ellsberg's files from his psychiatric analyst." Hunt told the committee that at the time he wrote the memo he had not yet contemplated the means of obtaining the files.

A later memo, dated Aug. 27, 1971, from White House aide John D. Ehrlichman to Colson, stated: "On the assumption that the proposed undertaking by Hunt and (G. Gordon) Liddy would be carried out, and would be successful, I would appreciate receiving from you by next Wednesday a game plan as to how and when you believe the materials should be used."

Ehrlichman, once President Nixon's top presidential adviser, resigned under fire on April 30. He has been indicted by a Los Angeles County grand jury, along with Liddy and former White House aides Egil M. (Bud) Krogh Jr. and David R. Young, on charges of conspiracy and burglary in connection with the Ellsberg break-in.

After the Ellsberg break-in, which failed to produce the psychiatric files, Hunt said he tried to tell Colson about the incident. Colson, Hunt said, told him, "I don't want to hear anything about it."

Colson originally was to have been the first witness to appear before the Senate committee in this phase of its hearings. Colson's appearance was indefinitely postponed two weeks ago

after David I. Shapfro, Colson's lawyer, informed the committee that Colson was a target of a federal grand jury investigation the Ellsberg break-in. Colson last week appeared before the committee in executive session and invoked the Fifth Amendment in answer to all questions.

Hunt told the committee yesterday that he believes that Colson knew of plans by the Committee for the Re-election of the President to conduct an intelligence-gathering campaign against the Democrats in the 1972 campaign. Hunt did not say, however, that Colson knew specifically about the Watergate break-in.

Colson last April denied a report from highly placed sources in the executive branch that he had warned President Nixon in January that persons in his administration were obstructing justice. On three separate occasions, sources told The Washington Post, Colson recommended to Mr. Nixon that he "get rid of some people."

In his transcribed Nov. 24 conversation with Colson, Hunt said at one point, "... we're protecting the guys who are really responsible, but now that's that — and of course that's a continuing requirement, but at the same time, this is a two-way street and as I said before, we think that now is the time when a move should be made and surely the cheapest commodity available is money."

"I'm reading you," Colson replied. "You don't need to be more specific."

The committee has expressed its intention to expedite the hearings in order to attempt to complete them by Nov. 1. The pace of the hearings yesterday, however, was plodding.

Although the hearings attracted thousands of spectators during the summer, the Senate Caucus Room was not nearly as crowded yesterday as it had been before the Aug. 7 committee recess. Spectators found short waiting lines and empty seats inside the room.

In a clash reminiscent of those during the summer, Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.), committee vice chairman, and Sen. Edward J. Gurney (R-Fla.) yesterday argued momentarily with committee chief counsel Samuel Dash as Dash questioned Hunt on the fabrication of the State Department cables.

Gurney asked Dash to explain the relevance of the questioning to the committee's mandate to investigate the 1972 election. Dash explained that the fabrication

was an effort by Colson to "try to discredit the Kennedy administration and therefore the Democratic Party during the election and relating it to the assassination of Premier Diem and for that purpose attempting to bring the Catholic vote away from the Democratic Party, and to show that a Democratic President has a role in the assassination of a Catholic premier."

Baker, who clashed frequently with Dash before Aug. 7, then complained that Dash was reaching "conclusions," a job for the senators, rather than limiting himself to establishing facts.

When Baker was asked later by a reporter if he was trying to trap Dash in co-operation with Gurney, Baker replied: "I was just trying to speed up the questioning."

Hunt's testimony that he paid \$156,000 in legal fees to his former attorney, Bittman, touched off a long and ultimately unresolved discussion between Sachs and members of the committee on whether the witness had waived the right to confidentiality normally extended to conversations between attorneys and their clients.

Sachs maintained that although Hunt was under pressure from Sirica to co-operate with the committee and agreed to testify freely about his relationship with Bittman, he was not waiving any rights. And if Bittman

should be called to testify, Sachs said, he would still be bound by the attorney-client relationship not to reveal anything of his discussions with Hunt.

Bittman could not be reached yesterday to comment on the size of the fee he received from Hunt.

In earlier testimony before the committee, former Nixon campaign aide Frederick C. LaRue said he transferred a total of \$210,000 to Bittman with the understanding it would be given to the various Watergate defendants and their lawyers. Hunt's \$156,000 worth of fees were presumably not included in that amount.

Bittman withdrew as Hunt's attorney last month and was replaced by Sachs.

Hunt's testimony about the funneling of clandestine payments to Bittman closely followed that given by other witnesses earlier in the hearings.

After he had retained Bittman with a \$1,000 payment early in July, 1972, Hunt said, Bittman called him a few days later and said he had received \$25,000 — delivered anonymously to his office — as a further re-

tainer.

Anthony Ulasewicz, a retired New York City policeman used by Nixon administration and campaign officials as a courier, told the committee last summer how he left the money for Bittman in a telephone booth in Bittman's office building.

Later in 1972, Hunt said, Bittman told him that a package addressed to Hunt had been delivered to his office. The package contained \$20,000, Hunt said, which he turned over to Bittman as part of his fee.

Around the end of the year, Hunt went on, he received another anonymous package containing \$15,000. Of this, he said, he gave \$12,000 to Manuel Artime—a Cuban exile leader in Miami who helped organize the Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961—to be used in the defense of the four Cuban-Americans arrested in the Watergate burglary.

He kept the remaining \$3,000 to reimburse himself for money of his own that his wife had given to the other defendants, he said.

Hunt was not asked to give the details of how he received all the money he transferred to Bittman, but he said the total was \$156,000.

Later, he testified, the anonymous packages stopped coming and he called his friend Colson to ask that the financial support be renewed. Bills were accumulating, he said.

He did not say that Bittman was pressing him for additional fees, but "Mr. Bittman informed me of the current state of my deficit balance with him," he said.

"I did not interpret that as a demand for funds but rather he was keeping me informed of how much money was owed. At that juncture I was not considering debts owed to Hogan and Hartson (Bittman's firm) as being personal debts of mine although later I came to accept them in that spirit."

"I felt they should be paid by the people or groups who had sponsored (the) Gemstone program. And I encouraged Mr. Bittman to turn to others for the payment of his fees rather than myself."

Bittman and Colson met twice at his request, Hunt said, but he received nothing from Bittman as a result of those meetings except the assurance that Colson thought "I was a fine patriotic fellow and if worse came to worse he would take my children into his own home, that he was sorry I had ever become involved in this entire scheme."

Bittman, 41, had a distinguished career as a government prosecutor before he resigned from the Justice Department in 1967 to join

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HUNT LINKS COLSON TO PLAN THAT LED TO 1972 BREAK-IN

By JAMES M. NAUGHTON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 24—E. Howard Hunt Jr. told the Senate Watergate committee, as it resumed public hearings today that Charles W. Colson, the former White House special counsel, had been aware early last year of the "large-scale" intelligence scheme that led to the Watergate break-in.

Hunt, one of seven men who pleaded guilty or were convicted for their roles in the burglary and bugging of the Democratic party headquarters, said at the same time that he had no information to suggest that Mr. Colson had specific advance knowledge of the actual break-in on June 17, 1972.

The Senate hearings resumed today much as they had recessed seven weeks ago with the committee seeking to complete its inquiry into the Watergate espionage case so that it could move on to its examination of campaign sabotage and financing.

Tells of Undercover Work

Hunt, a former spy for the Central Intelligence Agency and author of a number of spy novels under pseudonyms, sat dispassionately at the witness table as he recounted—occasionally in a barely audible voice and frequently after hushed consultation with his lawyer, Sidney S. Sachs—the undercover activities that he had engaged in for the Nixon White House.

He said that a Sept. 3, 1971, burglary at the office of a California psychiatrist treating Dr. Daniel Ellsberg failed to produce material that could be used to discredit Dr. Ellsberg. He de-

scribed the fabrication, at Mr. Colson's behest, of a diplomatic cable in an effort to suggest complicity by President Kennedy in the assassination of President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam.

Hunt told the Senate panel of an aborted plan to steal political documents from the safe of a Las Vegas, Nev., publisher with the aide of associates of Howard Hughes, the reclusive billionaire.

He testified about a fruitless effort, using a disguise and false credentials supplied by the C.I.A., to obtain derogatory information about the Kennedy family from a one-time acquaintance of the family in Hyannis Port, Mass. He described his contacts last year with two undercover agents, one known to him only as "Fat Jack," who had been planted inside the headquarters of Democratic Presidential candidates by the Committee for the Reelection of the President.

And Hunt, sounding like the "burnt out case" of a Graham Greene character who had wandered into the plot of a Fletcher Knebel mystery, detailed the destruction of his life: He spoke of having been physically attacked and having suffered a stroke in his six months in jail; of concern for the "poor, motherless children" orphaned by his imprisonment and the death of his wife, Dorothy, in a plane crash last December; of the "enormous financial burden" of his legal defense, and of having been "crushed by the failure of my Government to protect me and my family, as in the past it has always done for its clandestine agents."

For all that, the Senate committee was preoccupied, in its first day-long interrogation of Hunt, with his recollections of his association with Mr. Colson.

Hunt testified that it was Mr. Colson who had enlisted him to work for the White House and to whom he had reported on most matters. He said that in January, 1971, he advised Mr. Colson that most of his time would thereafter be taken up at the President's re-election committee, where he was working with G. Gordon Liddy, one of the convicted Watergate conspirators, on a large-scale political intelligence plan.

According to Hunt, Mr. Colson "indicated that he was aware of the over-all intelligence plan and his only problem with it was that he would much prefer me, [to] see me heading it rather than Mr. Liddy."

Furthermore, Hunt told Samuel Dash, the committee's chief counsel, that sometime in February of last year he had introduced Liddy to Mr. Colson and that Liddy had subsequently said the meeting "may have done us some good" in

getting the intelligence plan under way.

David I. Shapiro, Mr. Colson's lawyer and law partner, said later today that there would be no immediate comment on Hunt's new allegations. The Senate panel had intended to call Mr. Colson as its first witness today, but consented last week to put off his appearance indefinitely because Mr. Colson said he had been advised he was a "target" of a Federal grand jury investigation of the Ellsberg burglary.

Hunt had told the Senate investigators in May that Mr. Colson was not connected to the Watergate case and the committee had obtained transcripts of conversations in which Hunt appeared to make the same point to Mr. Colson.

But Hunt testified today that he had only recently recalled the January, 1972 conversation linking Mr. Colson to advance knowledge of the Gemstone intelligence plan, as it was known.

He said that the discussion had been "brought back to my mind" by the line of questioning taken by Mr. Dash in one of a number of private interviews that preceded Hunt's testimony today.

The committee made public the text of an Aug. 9, 1972, letter from Hunt to Mr. Colson, in which the former spy expressed regret at "your being dragged into the case through association with me, superficial and occasional though the association was."

The panel also made a part of its record a transcript of a taped telephone conversation between the two, sometime in November of last year. Throughout the transcript, Mr. Colson advised Hunt not to give him details of his involvement in the Watergate case, saying that he could be of greater assistance by remaining "as unknowing as I am."

The November conversation was one of several Hunt overtures intended to get swifter, and more munificent, financial assistance for the Watergate defendants.

Hunt denied the allegation of several previous Senate witnesses that he had threatened to disclose details of his White House undercover assignments—"seamy activities," he called them today—unless more money and promises of Presidential clemency were forthcoming.

He testified, however, that he had described the activities to Paul L. O'Brien, one of the lawyers for Mr. Nixon's re-election committee, and to Mr. Shapiro. After meeting Mr. Shapiro in February, Hunt said, he received \$75,000 in cash in an envelope delivered anonymously to the home of his former lawyer, William O. Bittman.

Hunt told the committee that he had believed the Watergate break-ins, on May 27 and June 17 of last year, were "unwise"

Hogan and Hartson.

Among Bittman's government cases were the successful prosecutions of Teamsters president James R. Hoffa for pension fund fraud in 1964 and of former Senate Democratic aide, Robert G. (Bobby) Baker for income tax evasion, larceny and conspiracy in 1967.

Bittman's efforts to collect fees for legal services, rendered to Hunt above and beyond the first \$156,000, were unsuccessful, Hunt testified, and when the amount due reached \$60,000 he went to Hogan and Hartson to discuss the matter with Paul O'Brien of the Nixon re-election committee. Bittman arranged the meeting, Hunt said.

At that meeting, which Hunt said took place shortly before he was sentenced by Sirica last March 23, he urged O'Brien to pay the outstanding legal bills and to provide support for his family.

"I told him... I was very much concerned about the future of my family," Hunt said, and "that I would like to have the equivalent of two years' subsistence available to them before I was incarcerated."

He also told O'Brien, Hunt testified, "that I had engaged, as he might or might not know, in other activities which I believe I described as 'seamy activities' for the White House. I do not believe I specified them. However, I did make reference to them."

When asked by committee counsel Samuel Dash if he had intended to convey a threat to O'Brien that unless the money was paid these "seamy activities" would become public, Hunt said no.

What he meant was, he said, that "if anyone was to receive benefits at that time, in view of my long and loyal service, if not hazardous service, for the White House... certainly I should receive priority consideration."

He added, however, that "Mr. O'Brien might have assumed any number of things from our colloquy."

O'Brien told him, Hunt said, that "he was becoming less and less effective as an intermediary" with the White House in the matter, and urged him to get in touch with Colson, who had left the White House to practice law in Washington.

O'Brien told him, Hunt recalled, that "well, there are some of us who feel that Chuck stayed out of this too long, that it is time he got his feet wet along with the rest of us."

Hunt tried to see Colson, he said, but was rebuffed and was able to see only

Colson's law partner, David Shapiro. Shapiro, he said, "approached me rather aggressively and subjected me to a lengthy monologue which I considered to be highly self-serving."

Nevertheless, Hunt said, he did receive a final delivery of cash on March 20 or 21. He said he put the money, \$75,000, in a safe deposit box.

Eventually, he said, he paid Bittman's bills not with the \$75,000 in cash but with \$80,000 he had received from insurance policies held by his wife, who was killed in a Chicago plane crash last December.

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25 September 1973

An American Spy by Profession

Everette Howard Hunt Jr.

but "lawful." He said that they had been designed to obtain information that might support a rumored contribution of campaign funds from the Government of Premier Fidel Castro of Cuba to the Democratic party.

Adding to the previously known details of the burglary that went awry, Hunt testified that he proposed to "junk" the operation on June 17 after the conspirators discovered that tape they had placed on the door locks at the Watergate complex had been removed. But Hunt said that Liddy and another convicted conspirator, James W. McCord Jr., had decided to go ahead with the operation.

After the burglars were caught, Hunt said, he went to the White House and deposited in his safe some electronic equipment belonging to McCord and removed from the safe \$10,000 of "contingency" funds that he made available for bail bonds for the arrested burglars. He said that Liddy had told him to leave town and that he had gone to California after advising Mr. Colson's secretary that his White House safe "is loaded."

Hunt told Fred D. Thompson, the chief Republican counsel, that after five years in the military and 21 years in the C.I.A., "following orders without question," he had never thought to question the legality or propriety of the Watergate break-in.

In the prepared statement that he read to the Senators, peering at them over the top of reading glasses, Hunt voiced regret at having lacked "the wisdom to withdraw."

"At the same time," he continued, "I cannot escape feeling that the country I have served for my entire life and which directed me to carry out the Watergate entry is punishing me for the very thing it trained and directed me to do."

WASHINGTON, Sept. 24—Everette Howard Hunt Jr., today's lead-off witness at the Senate Watergate hearings left the Central Intelligence Agency in 1970 after 21 years of clandestine operations. But after the convicted Watergate conspirator left to take a more mundane public relations job, "he couldn't get over the fact," according to a friend, "that he'd been a C.I.A.

agent. You couldn't have a conversation with him for 10 minutes without him bringing it up some way or other. This was a romanticist who couldn't get over the fact that he had been a spy."

This was a role that Hunt relished, admitting to the committee today that "I was an intelligence officer—a spy—for the government of the United States." A role that also eventually led to his being hired as a White House consultant by a fellow alumnus of Brown University, Charles W. Colson.

It was a role that teamed Hunt with G. Gordon Liddy, another Watergate culprit, to organize the break-in at the office of the psychiatrist of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg because of Ellsberg's "peculiar background," and his leaking of the Pentagon papers.

It was a role that made Hunt consider breaking into the safe of a Las Vegas newspaper publisher to get presumably damaging evidence on the then candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination, Senator Edmund S. Muskie.

Led to His Conviction

And finally it was a role that contributed to Hunt's

conviction for conspiring to break into the Democratic national headquarters at the Watergate Complex. In the end, it was a career, that led Hunt to proclaim today:

"I cannot escape the feeling that the country I have served for my entire life and which directed me to carry out the Watergate entry is punishing me for doing the very thing it trained and directed me to do."

Hunt was born Oct. 9, 1918, N. Y., the only son of Everette Howard Hunt and Ethel Jean Totterdale. His father, a judge, practiced law at one time in Miami Beach. While a schoolboy Hunt visited Havana. Years later, in 1960, Hunt returned to Havana on a secret visit to observe life under Fidel Castro. As a result Hunt decommenced the assassination of Castro.

Hunt, known as Eduardo during his connection with the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, assumed a variety of aliases, including Edward Hamilton and Ed Warren, during his spy days. His many novels about spying were also written under pseudonyms like Robert Salisbry Dietrich, Gordon Davis, John Baxter and David St. John.

Fiction and Fact

In speaking of these books, one friend said, "Howard tried to act out his novels and his hidden emotional drives. You know, he wanted to be a hero of intelligence work and a sexually irresistible male."

While he wrote of spying smattered with a variety of sexual activities, friends report that his real romantic life was not as flamboyant. According to Cuban friends, Hunt spent a night with a certain young lady in a Miami motel. But, she later complained, "All he did was

to keep me up all night talking about his novels."

After Hunt was graduated from Brown in 1940, he volunteered for the Navy before the United States entered World War II. He was discharged after an accident at sea, subsequently worked as a movie scriptwriter and a war correspondent for Life magazine for the next two years.

In 1943 he joined the Office of Strategic Services, the forerunner of the C.I.A. He was stationed in Orlando, Fla., and Southern China until the war ended. He won a Guggenheim fellowship in 1946 and spent a year in Mexico writing and learning Spanish. Three years later he joined the C.I.A. and spent time in Paris, Vienna and Latin America, where he acquired a background that was used in his later novels.

Since Hunt was indicted a year ago in connection with the Watergate break-in, he has lost his public relations job and his wife, Dorothy, died in a plane crash last December.

During six months of imprisonment, Hunt said today, he has been in solitary confinement for a time, was physically attacked and has been robbed and transferred from place to place in manacles and chains. He has been "isolated" from his four children, Lisa, Kevan, Howard and David.

Hunt, who faces a provisional sentence of 35 years, said today that he was faced with "an enormous financial burden" in defending himself in various court suits.

"Beyond all this," Hunt said, "I am crushed by the failure of my Government to protect me and my family as in the past it has always done for its clandestine agents."

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26 September 1973

Hunt Feels Agent Trapped Bug Team

By Lawrence Meyer
and Peter A. Jay

Washington Post Staff Writers

E. Howard Hunt Jr. suggested yesterday that he and his fellow convicted Watergate conspirators were "trapped" by a "double agent" in their group who provided police with advance information about the Watergate break-in.

Hunt's statements about Alfred C. Baldwin III, a lookout during the break-in, were quickly rebutted by Sen. Lowell P. Weicker Jr. (R-Conn.), who drew what appeared to be a concessionary smile from Hunt.

Hunt noted among other things that Baldwin had once identified himself as the nephew of a Connecticut Democratic Party official. But Weicker quickly drew agreement from Hunt that Baldwin had misrepresented himself as the party official's nephew while visiting Democratic headquarters to get the layout of the party's offices for the Watergate conspirators.

The discussion brought out into the open a theory that the committee's other two Republicans — Sens. Howard H. Baker of Tennessee and Edward J. Gurney of Florida — have been toying with since the hearings began last May.

Baker has consistently questioned witnesses involved in the June, 1972, Watergate break-in and about intricate details of the discovery of the burglary. Privately, according to informed sources, Baker has discussed his suspicion that the arrest of five men inside the Watergate on June 17 was the result of a double agent.

Baldwin, the person named by Hunt as possibly being such a double agent, is a former FBI agent who worked for the Watergate conspirators monitoring telephone conversations in the Democratic National Committee's Watergate headquarters from a motel room across the street. During the Watergate conspiracy trial, he turned up as a key prosecution witness against the other conspirators.

Asked by a reporter what difference it would make to the Watergate investigation if Baldwin were a double agent, Baker replied, "Not a bit. It would just be a fact to know. It wouldn't militate one bit against what happened."

Hunt's testimony yesterday provided few new details about the Watergate break-in and bugging or other clandestine operations in which he participated. During his testimony yesterday, Hunt told the committee:

- He had never been offered executive clemency. In addition, Hunt denied that he had ever ordered or encouraged four of the other Watergate defendants, often referred to as the "men from Miami," to follow his example and plead guilty.

- He called Bernard L. Barker, one of the men from Miami, in May, 1972, prior to President Nixon's speech announcing the mining of Halphong harbor to ask Barker to organize a telegram campaign to support the President's decision.

- He spent about 4½ early morning hours interviewing ITT lobbyist Dita Beard in her hospital room in March, 1972. Hunt told the committee he used interruptions by the attending physician to call special counsel to the President, Charles W. Colson, for instructions.

Yesterday's hearings clearly were overshadowed by events elsewhere. In mid-afternoon, NBC-TV took advantage of breaks in Hunt's lackluster testimony to announce developments in the Justice Department's decision that a federal grand jury in Baltimore would begin hearing evidence against Vice President Agnew on Thursday.

At the end of the day, before committee chairman Sen. Sam J. Ervin Jr. (D-N.C.) had recessed the hearings, television coverage abruptly shifted to the splashdown of the Skylab II crew.

Hunt's testimony about Baldwin, who has denied being a double agent, was invited yesterday by Gurney. Gurney pointed out to Hunt that tapes placed on the doors in the Watergate the night of the break-in by the burglars had been removed by a security guard and then replaced again by convicted conspirator James W. McCord Jr.

"You, yourself, of course," Gurney said to Hunt, "testified that the second break-in did not make a great deal of sense and then after the tapes were discovered to have been removed, you thought it was certainly foolhardy to go ahead. Do you have any theories on whether there was a double agent here or not?"

"The series of events that night, taken in their totality, Sen. Gurney, have suggested to me for many months that we might have been, as it were, trapped by information having been provided beforehand to local law enforcement authorities by a member of our unit," Hunt replied. "I would have to indicate that the most likely subject would be Mr. Alfred Baldwin."

As supporting evidence, Hunt noted that Baldwin had been hired only shortly before the Watergate incident, that he was hired by McCord through a magazine advertisement, that Baldwin "had rather intimate ties to the Democratic Party in Connecticut," and that Baldwin had failed the night of the arrests to give advance warning when plainclothes police began their search of the Watergate office building.

Hunt said that Baldwin's "intimate ties" to the Democratic Party consisted of Baldwin's being the nephew of a Democratic judge and that Baldwin had once represented himself as being the nephew of Connecticut Democratic Party chairman John Bailey.

Weicker opened his questioning of Hunt by asserting, "The only relative that Mr. Baldwin has who is or has been a judge is former chief justice of the Supreme Court, State Supreme Court, in Connecticut who would be Raymond Baldwin who was also the Republican senator from Connecticut, who was also the Republican governor from Connecticut and who is generally looked upon as Mr. Republican in the state of Connecticut."

"You indicated also relative to Mr. Baldwin, that he had indicated ... a relationship with John Bailey. Saying that he was his nephew?" Weicker asked.

"I know he qualified that," Hunt replied. "I was given to understand by Mr. McCord that at the time the floor plan of the Democratic National headquarters was being compiled, Mr. Baldwin represented himself to the receptionist of the Democratic National Committee and said that he was a nephew of John Bailey and given the red carpet treatment."

"So if in fact you were going to case the Democratic National Committee headquarters, it would certainly be far more appropriate to identify yourself with John Bailey rather than Robert Dole (former chairman of

the Republican National Committee) or Clark MacGregor (former director of the Committee for the Re-election of the President), wouldn't it?" Weicker asked.

"Yes, Senator," Hunt replied with a fleeting smile.

Hunt also was asked by Sen. Daniel K. Inouye (D-Hawaii) whether, if Baldwin had notified the police in advance of the break-in, "did you consider that his actions were wrong or illegal in notifying the police of the burglary."

"My assumption, of course, Sen. Inouye, was that the project itself was legal," Hunt replied. "Now, Mr. Baldwin's actions in disclosing the project or setting up an entrapment really is another matter. Certainly, it was a matter of the greatest disloyalty to his employer and to those of us who comprised the entry group. The courts have yet to decide the legality or nonlegality of the operation itself."

During the morning session, Hunt gave the committee a detailed account of his visit in March, 1972, to interview lobbyist Dita Beard in a Denver hospital. He said he was sent on the assignment by Colson, then special counsel to the President, to determine whether a controversial memo attributed to Mrs. Beard was fraudulent.

The memo, reported by syndicated columnist Jack Anderson, alleged there was a direct connection between the Justice Department's settlement of antitrust cases involving the International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. and an ITT offer to help bring the 1972 Republican national convention to San Diego.

Hunt described yesterday how, wearing a disguise and using an assumed name, he interviewed Mrs. Beard, who was hospitalized at the Rocky Mountain Osteopathic Hospital and being treated for a heart ailment.

The interview took place one night between 11 p.m. and 3 o'clock the next morning, Hunt said, and whenever he was interrupted by an attending physician he would leave Mrs. Beard's room and put in a call to Colson in Washington.

Mrs. Beard was under heavy sedation, he said, and he never got a clear answer when he asked her if the memo was a forgery. (Mrs. Beard eventually did say the memo was "a hoax" and a forgery, some three weeks

after Anderson first reported its existence).

Mrs. Beard's son, Robert D. Beard, told reporters earlier this year that his mother had been visited in the hospital by a "very eerie" man who wouldn't give his name, and who had "a red wig on cockeyed, like he put it on in a dark car."

Richard Helms, former Central Intelligence Agency director, whose agency had furnished Hunt the wig, told the committee good-humoredly earlier this summer that the wig wasn't red but brown, and that the CIA technicians who provided it were indignant at the suggestion they would supply an ill-fitting red wig. Hunt cited Helms' testimony yesterday and said with a smile that, in fact, the wig was

brown.

Hunt said he was sent on the Beard mission by Wallace Johnson, then a member of the congressional relations staff at the White House, to whom he was referred by Colson.

Inouye noted that Colson, under oath, has testified elsewhere that the idea of interviewing Mrs. Beard was Hunt's. Hunt said it wasn't, and that he didn't know where the idea originated although it was Colson who brought him into the affair by sending him to Johnson.

In other questioning yesterday, Weicker sought to clarify what he saw as a discrepancy between the amount of money Hunt said he and the other Watergate defendants received from Nixon administration and campaign officials and the

amount other witnesses have mentioned.

Hunt has testified that he received a total of at least \$217,000 in various installments, \$156,000 of which was given his former attorney, William O. Bittman, in legal fees.

Former New York City policeman Anthony Ulasewicz and Nixon campaign aide Frederick C. LaRue testified that they distributed \$266,000 to Hunt's wife and to Bittman. Why, Weicker wanted to know, was there a difference between the amount of money Hunt remembered receiving and that which the other witnesses said they supplied?

Hunt was unable to give a clear answer and Weicker did not press the matter. The Connecticut senator did say that he found the \$156,000 in fees given to Bittman

to be "unusual," especially as the four Cuban-Americans who were codefendants with Hunt in the Watergate case had combined legal fees of only \$36,000.

During the day, Hunt said several times—as he did on Monday—that he felt "let down" by the White House's failure to support him and his codefendants more strongly. The Watergate break-in, he maintained, he still believes to have been a legal act carried out on the instruction of high government officials for legitimate national security purposes.

The committee remained in session later than usual last night to allow Hunt to complete his testimony. The hearings will resume today at 10 a.m. with White House aide Patrick Buchanan as the witness.

NEW YORK TIMES
26 September 1973

Text of C.I.A. Ellsberg Affidavit

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 25—Following is the text of an affidavit submitted to the Senate Watergate Committee by a Central Intelligence Agency staff psychiatrist concerning the psychological profile of Daniel Ellsberg:

AFFIDAVIT

I, Bernard Mathis Malloy, being first duly sworn, depose and say:

[1]

I was born on 2 September 1928, was graduated from Lambuth College, Jackson, Tenn., and Vanderbilt University School of Medicine, Nashville, Tenn., and have been employed by the Central Intelligence Agency since November, 1958. I have been in the Psychiatric Staff of the Office of Medical Services of the Agency since that time.

[2]

In the summer of 1971 the medical office was approached by the director of security concerning the preparation of a psychiatric study on Daniel Ellsberg, who had been accused of leaking the Pentagon papers. To the best of my recollection, it was my understanding from the Director of Medical Services that the D.C.I. was knowledgeable and had approved the director of security's visit and the request that was being made of the medical office. There was general reservation and concern expressed about such an effort involving as it did potentially controversial and highly speculative efforts. It was felt that such activity, involving as this did an American citizen, might be outside of the agency's purview. It was recognized that such efforts, while desirable in some quarters, could be misunder-

stood, misinterpreted, and mistakenly considered to have been derived from the doctor-patient therapeutic relationship which was in fact far from the case. An initial effort was prepared by Dr. Jerrold Post under the direction of myself based upon a review of magazine and newspaper articles containing biographical data about Ellsberg, as well as some F.B.I. documents consisting of interview reports by informants about Ellsberg.

[3]

On 12 August 1971, on instructions from the Director of Medical Services the writer met with Mr. David Young, Room 16, Executive Office Building, to discuss the matter of a psychiatric write-up on the case of Daniel Ellsberg. Mr. Young, at the time the appointment was made, had stated that there was more information which he wished to discuss. The meeting lasted for approximately an hour and Mr. Young was joined by a Mr. Linney (probably Liddy), who seemed to be an assistant. Mr. Young stated that the Ellsberg study had the highest priority and had been requested by Mr. Ehrlichman and Dr. Kissinger. Mr. Young also stated that the President had been informed of this study. He stated that it was a multifaceted approach and the psychiatric report would be only one facet. He stated that he understood that the Agency was uneasy about undertaking such a study and assured me that there had been no delineation as to how information derived from the study would be utilized, and if there were any utilization that great care would be given to make it nonattributable to the Agency. Mr.

Young was interested in knowing what kind of data would be needed in order to provide further study of the sort done on Fidel Castro. Later on Mr. Howard Hunt joined the group. Mr. Hunt recognized me, being a former Agency employee, and we greeted cordially. Mr. Hunt amplified on Mr. Young's comments and stated that it was his wish to 'try Dr. Ellsberg in public.' Other comments were made by Mr. Hunt or 'Mr. Linney' to the effect that the aim would be to render Dr. Ellsberg ineffective or to make him the object of pity as a broken man. Mr. Hunt stated that he wished to see data of the sort that 'psychiatrists found out about Barry Goldwater in 1964,' and he expressed interest in being able to refer in a knowledgeable way to Dr. Ellsberg's oedipal conflicts or castration fears and other similar points.

[4]

It seemed from Mr. Young and 'Mr. Linney' that there was considerable concern that Dr. Ellsberg had a great deal more sensitive information which it was feared he would from time to time periodically expose. 'Mr. Linney' stated that Dr. Ellsberg thought of himself as 'having the white hat and the President as having the black hat.'

[5]

A discussion was held with the group concerning the dangers of preparing such a study in isolation and without the opportunity for the free give-and-take discussions among experts, as had been the case in our other studies. I was informed that more biographic material was available. I was requested to give examples of the kind of information needed. I pointed

out that insofar as possible, "although possibly not available," data from early life from nurses or close relatives would be useful. I agreed with 'Mr. Linney' that school progress, including testing, would be helpful. In the same way, yearbooks, his years in college and in the military, comments from friends would be helpful. Mr. Hunt also stated that it would be useful for Dr. Ellsberg's first wife to be interviewed and he felt, 'you can easily arrange that under an operational alias.' It was pointed out that the first Mrs. Ellsberg would be cooperative.

[6]

Information was also offered by Mr. Hunt or 'Mr. Linney' to the effect that Dr. Ellsberg had been in analysis although times or location were not known for certain. 'Mr. Linney' pointed out that after Dr. Ellsberg gave the Pentagon papers away, he telephoned his analyst, stating, "Now I am free."

[7]

"Mr. Linney" and Mr. Young, with Mr. Hunt's assent, pointed out that the Ellsberg study was of the highest priority, even over the SALT negotiations. It was agreed that the further biographic information regarding Dr. Ellsberg would be sent to us and Mr. Hunt agreed to manage this. Mr. Hunt would also make arrangements whereby periodic conferences would be held as necessary. Mr. Hunt did, however, offer that he did not wish to come to the agency if he could avoid it.

[8]

At this point Mr. Hunt made some comments in the presence of the group based on his previous acquaintance—maintained behind and made some further comments expressing a desire that his presence and participation in the meeting not be mentioned at the agency. After ar-

27 September 1973

Kissinger Denies Any Role In C.I.A. Study of Ellsberg

Secretary of State Kissinger denied yesterday that he had had anything to do with the 1971 request for a psychiatric profile of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg by the Central Intelligence Agency.

On Tuesday, the Senate Watergate committee made public an affidavit submitted by Dr. Bernard M. Malloy, a staff psychiatrist for the agency, who quoted David M. Young Jr., a former White House official who once served in Mr. Kissinger's office, as having told him that the request for the profile came from Mr. Kissinger and John D. Ehrlichman, the former White House adviser on domestic affairs.

Mr. Kissinger, at a news conference at the United States Mission to the United Nations, said yesterday "I did not know of any request for a profile, I never saw this profile, and I never discussed the subject with David Young."

If Mr. Young used Mr. Kissinger's name, as reported by Dr. Malloy, "it was used without authority," the Secretary said.

Mr. Kissinger stressed that he did not, in fact, know if Mr. Young had made the request in the way cited by Dr. Malloy, asserting that he had only the affidavit to go on.

He repeated what he had told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Sept. 7, during the confirmation hearings on his appointment as Secretary: "I did not know of the activities of David Young after he left my staff" except

for a publicly stated assignment to aid in declassifying documents.

Dr. Malloy said that the request for the psychiatric profile of Dr. Ellsberg, who was responsible for making public the Pentagon papers on the Vietnam war, came on Aug. 12, 1971, during a meeting with Mr. Young and others.

In his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Kissinger said that in June, 1971, Mr. Young transferred from the National Security Council staff, which Mr. Kissinger headed, to the Domestic Council staff headed by Mr. Ehrlichman.

"At that time I was told that David Young would work on a project for three months concerned with changing the declassification procedures of the Government," Mr. Kissinger said. "I had no contact with David Young either by telephone or in my office or in any other way after he left my staff, although I continued to have a high regard for him."

Mr. Young, while working for Mr. Ehrlichman, became involved in the so-called "plumbers" group, set up to stem leaks of Government information. The group ultimately focused on Dr. Ellsberg's past in an apparent effort to discredit his anti-war views.

Mr. Kissinger said on Sept. 7, "In short, I did not know either from him [Mr. Young] or anyone else about the existence of the 'plumbers,' as I said, by this or any other name, or about his activities in connection with internal security matters."

"I think it was a deplorable event," Mr. Kissinger said of the break-in committed by members of the "plumbers" group into the office of Dr. Ellsberg's former psychiatrist during the Labor Day weekend of 1971.

living back at the agency I informed Mr. Hunt by telephone that it was not feasible for me to avoid reporting Mr. Hunt's presence at the meeting. Mr. Hunt expressed great regret that this was necessary, stating that he had adequate contact with General Cushman and was on good terms with the director. He was reluctant in agreeing to my statement that it was necessary to inform the director of medical services. Mr. Hunt wished to know if this could be treated as confidential medical information, but could not tell the writer in what way. I discussed the entire situation—the dangers and the reservations and the gravity of the situation with the deputy chief, psychiatric staff, the director and deputy director of medical services.

[9]

On 13 August, 1971, additional information was received from the White House. To the best of my knowledge this was from Howard Hunt and consisted of poorly Xeroxed classified F.B.I. reports and Department of State documents. This material proved additional data; and on 20 August 1971 the director of medical services and the writer met with the Deputy Director for Support concerning the White House request in the Ellsberg case and the continuing pressure and desire for a psychiatric study. The problems associated with developing the study and our continuing reservations were discussed in detail. In view of Mr. Hunt's enthusiasm, concerns existed about the checks and balances to actions based on a study if one were to be undertaken. To the best of my recall the Deputy Director for Support was in agreement with us. While the additional information furnished further suggested that Ellsberg was under emotional pressure it was not possible to arrive at any firm conclusions or comprehensive understanding of the man's personality. The additional information indicated that:

a. He had revealed quasi-secret information while still in the service when he was applying for a Ph.D. fellowship.

b. He had volunteered for the Vietnamese service for the State Department in 1965 while under the stress of obtaining a divorce from his first wife.

c. He had sought psychoanalytic treatment between the fall of 1968 and 1970 with a psychoanalyst (who was determined to be professionally qualified and reputable) in California.

d. He may have been involved in learning information about a South Vietnamese in 1970 while he was actually in psychoanalytic treatment.

To the best of my recollection it was agreed that the implications of the above data would be orally dis-

cussed by me with Mr. Hunt, Mr. Liddy and Mr. Young. It was also agreed that there would be the greatest reluctance to undertake any interview of the former Mrs. Ellsberg, and it was hoped that after this a written document would not be necessary.

[10]

The Deputy Director for Support considered advising the D.C.I., but it was decided that I would first visit Mr. Young and inform him that the additional material basically provided no further understanding. It was hoped that this would put an end to the situation but if further material was forwarded the matter would have to be dealt with at that time.

[11]

The Deputy Director for Support stated that after the meeting with Mr. Young, the D.C.I. would be brought up to date.

[12]

Following the meeting on Friday 20 August, and in accord with the discussions on that date, a call was placed on Monday, 23 August, to Mr. David Young at the White House. Mr. Young was informed that we had received the material which had been forwarded and that we had considered it, and would be available to discuss the data further. Mr. Young stated that he would have Mr. Hunt call me. He stated that Mr. Hunt's office was elsewhere in the building and he did not have his number immediately available. As of 27 August 1971 Mr. Hunt had not called me.

[13]

On 30 September 1971, there is a yellow memorandum of a telephone call to me from David Young at the White House with the message that Mr. Hunt suggested meeting Wednesday 27 October at 11:00 A.M. On 12 October 1971 I received some more data from Mr. Hunt at the White House.

[14]

On 27 October 1971 I met with Mr. Hunt and with Mr. Liddy and with Mr. Young at the Executive Office Building. The essence of the observations noted above in the 20 August 1971 discussions were orally presented. I was told to prepare the material in writing. On 3 November 1971 Mr. Liddy sent me further information on Ellsberg. On 1 November 1971 Mr. Young at the White House telephoned me requesting the report the following day and he was informed that the requested report was at that time in the hands of my supervisors for their evaluation. On 12 November 1971 the material was delivered by me to the White House and to Mr. Liddy, Mr. Young and Mr. Hunt. These men were interested in obtaining information which could be used to defame or manipulate Ellsberg. While it was never

expressed, it was my impression that the material and information provided were not of direct interest or usefulness to Hunt, Liddy or Young.

(signed) Bernard Matthias Malloy M.D. subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of May 1973 (signed) Virginia C. Long, Notary Public.

WASHINGTON POST
23 September 1973

Walter Pincus

Hearing Howard Hunt

When the Ervin committee resumes its public Watergate hearings on Monday, it will be worth watching whether the individual members and their staff counsels have coordinated and sharpened their questions so as to limit the repetition and confusion that often marked the first phase of the hearings. And the opening witness, convicted Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt Jr., will provide the acid test for any reform of the committee's approach.

Few witnesses before the Ervin panel participated directly in as many events in which the committee has taken an interest as did Hunt. He was in the "plumbers" unit, set up as an extra-curricular, perhaps extra-legal, White House investigative arm. He helped plan and supervise the break-in at the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist. He performed a variety of questionable tasks for former White House special counsel Charles Colson, ranging from clandestine interviewing

could lead them on a verbal chase through almost every aspect of the Watergate thicket.

It is thus all the more important that the committee keep track of the loose ends that Hunt is uniquely capable of clearing up. For example:

- For what use were materials in the office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist sought? Former White House aide John Ehrlichman testified that the break-in was part of a plan to get everything possible on the character of a man who posed a national security threat. Hunt has told a Washington grand jury that the break-in was planned to get information to determine the "prosecutability" of Ellsberg—how he would appear to the public in a major political trial during an election year. A memo to Ehrlichman shortly before the break-in appears to characterize the episode as part of a "game plan" to destroy Ellsberg's public image through leaks of discovered material to the press—a plan to be designed by Colson. Hunt, therefore, should be asked what the real purpose was. Did he have access to other material, in this effort, particularly the wiretaps on White House aides and newsmen that were in effect between 1969 and 1971 and delivered to Ehrlichman in July 1971, the same time Hunt took up his duties with the "plumbers"? Did Hunt read any wiretap transcripts relating to Ellsberg at that time?

- How was authorization given for the break-ins and buggings planned by Hunt and his co-conspirator, G. Gordon Liddy? In January and February 1972, at the very time former Attorney General John Mitchell was supposed to be flatly turning down Liddy's intelligence plans, Hunt met or corresponded with at least two former CIA colleagues about their participation in bugging operations planned for the Democrats' Miami convention. Hunt also was working with Miami realtor and Watergate conspirator Bernard Barker in preparing for Miami. Who gave approval for that planning? How were Barker, Hunt and others paid during this time? Was there a specific go-ahead given? When and how?

- On the night of June 17, Hunt fled from the Watergate Hotel where

he had been monitoring the break-in by walkie-talkie and crossed the street to the Howard Johnson motel after their arrests were made inside Democratic headquarters. He ordered the listening post in the motel shut down and arranged for a lawyer to represent those arrested. Did Hunt go back to his White House office that night to get \$8,000 in cash for the lawyer? Who did he call that night or the next day? What did he and Liddy hope or expect in the way of protection — and from whom? Who was his White House contact after the break-in? What was he ordered to do in those first few days?

- Hunt's name was on a check found in the Watergate Hotel; almost immediately he was a suspect. On June 19, 1972, the safe in his White House office was drilled open and one week later material taken from it was given to the FBI. On June 23, John Dean gave then acting-FBI Director L. Patrick Gray III additional files from Hunt's safe — files which were termed "political dynamite" and not to be made part of the Watergate case. Gray later destroyed them. What materials were in Hunt's safe that have not turned up since? In a court affidavit he referred to a notebook and an address book. What did they contain? What happened to them?

- According to testimony, Hunt and his lawyer, William Bittman, received substantial funds between July 1972 and March 1973 from the re-election committee and the White House to pay lawyers fees and salaries for those arrested or later indicted. Who talked to Hunt about those payments? How much was actually received and how was it distributed? Both Dean and Ehrlichman testified that Hunt wished some assurances from Colson the first week in January 1973, prior to pleading guilty. Hunt should be asked what he sought from Colson, who presented his pleas and what answer he received. Around March 19, 1973, Dean said he had received word that Hunt would talk about the "plumbers" if he did not receive additional funds before sentencing on March 23. Did Hunt send such a message? A \$75,000 payment was made to Bittman at about that time. When was that payment made and was it in response to the March 19 request to Dean?

Like an unfinished jigsaw puzzle, the Senate Watergate investigation contains some glaring holes. The public interest demands that the Ervin committee attempt to fill in the gaps before going on to other puzzles. Hunt is one witness whose carefully directed testimony could help enormously in that respect.

*The writer is associate editor of
The New Republic.*

of persons about Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) to donning a ted wig to question ITT lobbyist Dita Beard on the authenticity of her memo that caused a scandal.

Hunt also arranged for and received equipment and other assistance from the CIA which may have involved that agency, wittingly or unwittingly, in prohibited domestic operations. He was in on the planning and execution of espionage, sabotage and bugging operations involving not only the Democratic national headquarters, but also of Muskie and McGovern offices and the Democratic convention in Miami. He participated in the initial attempts to cover up the Watergate affair in the first days after the June 17 arrests. He received for himself and apparently redistributed funds allegedly aimed at buying the silence of those indicted. He has been alleged to have sought assurances from Colson that he would receive clemency and, according to former White House counsel John Dean, he sought a large amount of money in March 1973, just prior to sentencing, by threatening to disclose his past activities with the "plumbers."

In short, just by telling the details of what he has done that falls within the committee's interests Hunt could go on for days. Beyond that, as an individual Hunt is a ready and articulate talker, eager to justify his acts ideologically if it suits his mood and the opportunity presents itself. A former CIA operative for 20 years and a public relations man the past three, he knows how to handle questions and shape answers to meet his own rather than his interrogator's desires. In Hunt, therefore, the committee has a witness who, if not clearly directed,

NEW YORK TIMES
25 September 1973

Conspirator Quietly Buries Myth of the Superspy

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 24—The Watergate hearings, once the hottest ticket in town, reopened today to less than capacity crowds.

It was the same setting as before, the marble-walled Senate Caucus Room whose dated grace is defaced with television cables and lights. It was, in essentials, the same cast, from Senator Sam J. Ervin Jr., the committee chairman, to the anonymous but vaguely familiar underlings who scurry for glasses of water and the Capitol police who guard the corridors and doorways.

The crowds were different. There were fewer people than during the hearings' S.R.O. period, which happened to coincide with the height of Washington's summer tourist season. There were fewer family groups, almost no age children and, presumably because of the weather, not a single bare midriff. After the lunchtime recess, for the first time in the memory of the faithful spectator, there were more empty seats than occupied ones at times, and space between the standees.

But the crowd was still large enough to stir and murmur when the rather slight man in a wash-and-wear tan suit came in with an escort of lawyers and marshals and two of his children before the Senate Watergate hearings at 10 A.M.

It was E. Howard Hunt Jr., the day's first and only witness, perhaps the only man in the room whose face did not show a trace of exposure to the late-summer sun. In his day of testimony, to be continued tomorrow, Hunt, who pleaded guilty in the Watergate conspiracy, quietly demolished the superspy myth that has sold so many paperbacks—including some 40 of his own invention.

Hunt, a true believer, stated with what might have been pride and was certainly not apology: "To put it unmistakably, I was an intelligence officer—a spy—for the Government of the United States." But there was no resemblance between this almost fragile figure and the superspies of fiction, whose exploits he celebrated under such pen-names as David St. John.

Sitting straight in the witness chair, he twiddled a pen or laced his fingers under his chin and said, "Yes, sir," and "No, sir," and kept his light, rather high voice deferential to his questioners. He repeatedly put on his tortoise-rimmed half-glasses and took them off again.

The photographers "distracted" him as they clustered like flies around the witness table waiting for his long pale face with its downward-canted mouth to assume some revealing expression. His counsel asked that they be moved

to the sidelines, where they crouched behind their lenses, still waiting.

Two of Hunt's four children sat behind him, among the lawyers and marshals; Lisa, 22 years old, who wore turquoise polish on her toenails and fingernails, and St. John, 19, whose shoulder-length hair was held back with a barrette and who wore a blue and white button that said, "Watergate" on his lapel.

They were among those listening as the witness read, without emotion but with a fluency and timing that bespoke rehearsal, a brief outline of the life and times of E. Howard Hunt Jr., 55 years old, 21 years with the Central Intelligence Agency, briefly a special agent for the White House, and for the next 30 years, according to his sentence, a prisoner.

He spoke of what he had done as "a duty to my country," and later of his belief that Daniel Ellsberg was a traitor, that perhaps the Democratic National Committee was receiving funds from Hanoi, and that somehow all this made it all right. He was Walter Mitty rewritten to Graham Greene, who could still graciously autograph one of his books for a spectator as the hearing broke for lunch.

His language had the blandness that has been

characteristic of Watergate witnesses. People "indicated" and "responded" and a break-in was "an entry" to him. A "sterile telephone" was one that could not be tampered with—but there emerged from his matter-of-factness the notion that he believed no human being was above reproach.

When Hunt was asked whether it had been necessary to buy off a guard or guards in the Watergate complex to make the conspirators' "entry" into the Democratic headquarters there, he replied in the tone of an efficient second-in-command reporting to his superior: "No, sir, but there was money to do so."

Hunt's is a trade that, notoriously, demands entire obedience, which by his account he gave: "Having spent 21 years in the C.I.A. following orders without question," he said, "it never occurred to me to question that legality, the propriety of any orders of the Attorney General of the United States."

It is also a trade that, notoriously, repays failure with the harshest penalties.

"I cannot escape feeling that the country I have served for my entire life and which directed me to carry out the Watergate entry is punishing me for doing the very things it trained and directed me to do," said E. Howard Hunt Jr.

THE OREGONIAN

4 Sept 1973

Stupid intelligence

The decision by the Central Intelligence Agency at long last to identify the location of its Washington headquarters and permit photographs of the outside of the building complex reflects a concern that public support for the CIA may be diminishing.

Elaborate intelligence gathering operations have from the time of George Washington proved unworkable because the flood of information they gather is of such conflicting nature as to confuse those who must act on it.

At Brandywine, one man is credited with saving Washington's army when his elaborate intelligence operations failed. More recently there was the failure of intelligence at Pearl Harbor and the Bay of Pigs.

Prior to the December 7 attack, the military was getting a flood of information, much of it pointing directly to Pearl Harbor, but all of it contradictory.

Intelligence gathering can perform a role in determining what an enemy is capable of, but this does not say what he will do. The more

complex the world grows the more difficult it becomes to organize the "noise" even when computers are used. Ultimately, the noise has to be organized under a hypothesis reflecting the personal theory of the decision maker.

Throughout history these decisions have often proved wrong. David Halberstam's book "The Best and The Brightest" demonstrates just how disastrously wrong these decision-makers were when they tried to sort out the Vietnam noise and determine the intentions of the North Vietnamese.

History is replete with surprise attacks succeeding despite intelligence gathering. The battle of Midway was something of an exception, but this was a surprise blunted more by cryptographers who cracked the Japanese code than by intelligence gathering.

Congress has a duty to take a close look at the effectiveness of the intelligence agencies in the Department of Defense, including the CIA which has carried on activities far beyond simply seeking intelligence. A lean, less expensive operation may well be a lot more effective, as Gen. Washington found when he relied on Thomas Cheyney, than an overly sophisticated noise-gathering organization.

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
25 September 1973

Hunt: When Real Life Passes for

By JERRY GREENE

Washington, Sept. 24—To hear E. Howard Hunt tell it, he was the spy who never quite came in from the cold, and for him, there wasn't a great deal of difference between partisan warfare in China and the bugging at the Watergate 28 years later. Both projects were just a job.

In many ways, Hunt was the most fascinating witness yet to appear before the Senate Watergate committee, though he had little that was really new to say when the senators resumed hearings after a seven-week recess.

For the crowd in the Senate Caucus Room and the television viewers had the chance to see and hear a real-life espionage agent baring his secrets, or at least some of them. He had been retired from the CIA, to be sure, but it was clear in his own mind that he had never got very far away. James McCord, the former director of security for the Committee for the Re-election of the President and a convicted Waterbug, also has been a CIA man. But he gave the appearance of having been a mechanical man, a technician. Hunt was something else indeed.

"To put it unmistakably," Hunt testified, "I was an intelligence officer—a spy—for the government of the United States."

TIMES-ADVERTISER, Trenton
5 September 1973

Cleaning Up 'Dirty Tricks'

The Central Intelligence Agency apparently escaped serious complicity in the Watergate coverup, despite the efforts of some White House personnel, but it was a near miss. And, as the Ervin Committee hearings and other reports show, the CIA did get entangled in some domestic activities—supplying tools and a red wig for the "plumbers" for the breakin of the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist and a covert interview of ITT lobbyist Dita Beard, preparing a psychological profile of Ellsberg—that the agency had no business getting into.

That sort of veering close to the brink probably comes naturally to an agency whose "dirty tricks" division has for a quarter of a century ranged widely over the world, intervening in domestic politics of foreign nations, carrying on a secret war in Laos, overthrowing governments, controlling private corporations, financing private propaganda and special interest groups here and

He had all the traditional earmarks of the heroic mold of his trade. His testimony, that part of it dealing with Watergate, revealed all too clearly, as did John LeCarre's "Spy Who Came In From the Cold," that much of espionage is amoral, grubby, dirty work of uncertain intent and definitely questionable value.

Like LeCarre's fictional hero, Hunt would find himself in the end—as he saw it—"crushed by the failure of my government to protect me and my family as in the past it has always done for its clandestine agents."

Hunt could do for a Hollywood version of the professional spy. His face is lean and lined. He is Ivy League, and looked it. His voice today was low and, regardless of his manner cool and pos-

sessed—icy—and not as bitter as the words often sounded.

He was terse and factual in his own biography—his father was a judge, his mother a pianist, and he a graduate of Brown University, a destroyer officer (a volunteer, of course) before Pearl Harbor who was injured and received a resultant medical discharge on a North Atlantic convoy run.

An old Air Corps volunteer after Pearl Harbor, an intelligence officer, it was inevitable that he volunteer again, this time for the wartime OSS, fore-



runner of the CIA, a screwball outfit

Make-Believe

all wrapped up in espionage, counter-espionage, guerrilla warfare on a global basis. In spirit, it is obvious that Hunt never completely left the OSS, even when he joined the CIA for a 21-year hitch after the war.

His philosophy about being discovered while at work was simple:

"Such episodes have not been uncommon. When such missteps have occurred, it has universally been the practice (for this and other nations) for the operation to be disavowed and 'covered up.'"

So, retired from the CIA, Hunt obtained civilian employment with a firm "whose officials maintained a relationship with CIA." From there, he was recruited as a White House consultant, then a full-fledged member of the "plumbers."

There was hardly a break in the continuity, hardly a change. He shifted easily from the plumbers to the re-election committee, always assuming without question that his work and his "operations" were for the good of the country, with the approval of higher executive authority.

Somehow, it never occurred to Hunt that there was any particular reason to doubt the authority that handed down his assignments, or to doubt that a bugging and burglary in a domestic political campaign was any less crucial to the welfare of the nation than was a wartime espionage operation in enemy-occupied territory in Asia.

Hunt said he is learning the difference. It can get awfully cold out there in the darkness, alone.

NEW YORK TIMES
27 SEP 1973

CIA Foils Skyjacks

Rome, Sept. 26 (Special)—The United States has been using information gathered by the Central Intelligence Agency to warn other nations of possible skyjack attempts, informed sources said today. The sources said the warnings, made through the Federal Aviation Agency, have been credited with thwarting several skyjack attempts in Europe.

—Joseph Fried.

PROGRAM	ABC Evening News	STATION	WMAL TV ABC Network
DATE	September 25, 1973 7:00 PM	CITY	Washington, D.C.

COMMENTARY BY HARRY REASONER

HARRY REASONER: As I wrote this piece this afternoon, the wistful face of E. Howard Hunt was on television. It's a pitiful face, and he is a pitiful man. And I share the feeling that if only he and other losers like the Cubans and James McCord get put in jail, and it's not fair and not much of a triumph for justice.

But Mr. Hunt has some lessons for us that I'm glad are coming out. They have to do with the security apparatus that we have gotten saddled with since World War II and its general sordid incompetence.

I'm talking about security men, not policemen. I first had personal knowledge of the security agencies of the United States government in the early 1950s, and I've watched them at secondhand ever since. And my conclusion is that never have so many second-rate people spent so much of the public's money in the process of accomplishing so many failures.

Oddly enough, this is the kind of statement you can make right in the company of CIA or other intelligence types and not even start an argument. They just smile in a superior way and point out that only their failures become known.

This gambit used to be unanswerable. But I suggest that now, with what we know of their people and their methods, after Singapore and Guatemala and Laos and the Bay of Pigs and Watergate: I suggest that the volume of hidden successes could not possibly counterweight the colossal visibility of the failures.

The thing to do is not to abolish intelligence activities in an imperfect world; but it is to bring all of them back under the control of civilian officers responsible to overt supervision. The thing to do is to stop being afraid of them. They turn out to be embarrassingly imperfect human beings looking, for the most part, like unsuccessful salesmen.

The problem at the moment is not to ruin what is left of Howard Hunt's life; it is to get out of a dream world in which a man like Charles Colson could hire a man like Hunt to work for the American White House. It is profoundly humiliating to all of us.

WASHINGTON STAR

25 SEP 1973

Old Swashbuckler Has Lost His Swash

By Mary McGrory
Star-News Staff Writer

A gentleman-spook, fallen on hard times, was the curious first witness in the new Watergate hearings. E. Howard Hunt Jr. walked into the Caucus Room accompanied by three marshals and despair. His ashen face, watering pale blue eyes, his wretchedly fitting suit, his tired voice proclaimed a broken man.

His manners are good and his grammar is excellent. He is a man of letters, but six months of prison life have sapped his creative impulses and he could hardly find words for what has befallen him.

For 21 years, he roamed the world spying for the CIA. He waded ashore at the Bay of Pigs, he helped topple the government of Guatemala. He served in Japan, Austria, Spain. But none of these posts had quite prepared him for service at the White House, where they couldn't even handle a "sterile telephone" request.

HE DONNED a red wig to interview Dita Beard, he faked cables in the name of a dead president, he swaggered through the CIA demanding paraphernalia from his old comrades for the Ellsberg break-in.

The swash has gone out of the old swashbuckler. He has buckled under the hammer blows of the jailhouse. The master of dirty tricks has been the victim of the dirtiest trick of all. He has been abandoned by his patrons.

Hunt is a man caught between his code and his plight. His code tells him that he must never inform on his confederates.

The one flash of spirit that illuminated his lifeless testimony was the remembrance of his indignation at the "arrant disloyalty" of a member of the Watergate band — Alfred Baldwin, who was the first to sing to the press.

BUT HUNT faces 30 more years behind bars if he does not muster up some arresting new information for John J. Sirica the judge who handed him the provisional sentence. The stale tidbits he fed the committee under the disjointed questioning of chief counsel Samuel Dash will not get him out a day sooner.

Hunt was reluctant to implicate Charles W. Colson, a fellow alumnus of Brown University who recruited him for White House duty.

Colson, who had a "reputation as a man who gets things done" was straining for months to come to proclaim the nobility and innocence of Richard Nixon.

But indictment, presumably in the Ellsberg case, hovers over him, and in executive session last week, Colson took the 5th Amendment.

THE COMMITTEE, which once put the question, "how much did the President know and when did he know it," is reduced to trying to discover what Colson knew and when. The committee, like Hunt, is in a decline.

G. Gordon Liddy whom no threat has broken or even bent toward talking, told Hunt after the Watergate break-in, when Hunt asked about legal fees, "Don't worry about it. It is all going to be taken care of by the company."

The "company," in this instance, was the White House. It did provide what Hunt called "the cheapest commodity available, money," but although Hunt paid his former lawyer, William O. Bittman, \$156,000 for entering a plea of guilty, which Hunt is now trying to change, it has done little else.

HUNT'S WIFE, Dorothy, who picked up "the cookies" left by Tony Ulasewicz all over town for the Watergate defendants was killed in a plane crash last December. Two of his "motherless children" a boy, 19 and a girl, 22, who strongly resemble Hunt, sat behind him during his glum, vague, unfocused recital, looking as miserable as he did.

Hunt is not in a strong position to ask for justice; he gave little during his White House years. But all he ever really asked was CIA style justice, which is that the company takes care of its own.

"I am crushed by the failure of my government to protect me and my family as in the past it has always done for its clandestine agents," he said in his prepared statement.

This is the first "overt operation" of Hunt's life and blinking into the klieg lights, he seems to know he isn't going to do himself much good — or the committee, either.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

26 September 1973

Spy in the cold

He is not the spy who came in from the cold but the spy who is now left out in the cold. Or so it seemed as Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt's testimony unfolded before the Ervin committee. With a draconian prison sentence hanging over him to encourage cooperation with the law, his face and manner evidenced his human ordeal. Widowed by a plane crash, reportedly mistreated by fellow prisoners, endlessly questioned by various investigators, Mr. Hunt ironically

seems to be suffering more than the higher-ups he holds responsible for his guilt and his family's needs.

Was there a point at which he should have said no to these higher-ups? The answer is yes. And the climate of a system must be questioned when it can be used to justify Mr. Hunt's contrary answer: "Having spent 21 years in the CIA following orders without question and a prior five years with the armed services following orders without question, it never occurred to me to question the — if you will — the legality, the

propriety of anything that might be ordered by the Attorney General of the United States."

Obedience is necessary in government, but the danger in unquestioning obedience is turning out to be one of the central lessons of Watergate. Its results for Mr. Hunt at least expose the inanity of a young woman's line in one of the thrillers he wrote under another name: "It must be just *fabulous* to be a secret agent." And the book's epigraph now has a new twist, too: "The vandals are always the vandals, whatever their excuses and motives."

CHICAGO TRIBUNE

26 SEP 1973

Bob Wiedrich

E. Howard Hunt deserves a break



WE HOLD no brief for the architects of Watergate. If they are proven guilty, many American justice lift their scalps.

But surely there is room for some compassion in the case of E. Howard Hunt Jr., a broken, 55-year-old man who proudly declares he served his country well as an agent of the CIA and its cloak-and-dagger predecessor, the OSS, during World War II and for 21 years thereafter.

It is easy to see how he fell prey to the master conspirators of Watergate.

"SPY" TODAY is a dirty word in some quarters. However, when Hunt began his professional career, it was an honored one. As an OSS agent in South China, Hunt helped disrupt Japanese communications lines in enemy-occupied territory.

And after the war, before conducting a number of clandestine CIA operations for which he was cited, Hunt's training was refined in covert and counter-intelligence work, electronic surveillance, document forgery, and surreptitious entry into guarded quarters—all tools of an anonymous, often unsung trade.

Remember, these were the years of the Cold War, of high-strung international tensions.

Many of those who find it easy to condemn Hunt today are not old enough to recall the theft of atomic secrets from the United States that gave Soviet Russia a royal flush in the post-war world and led to a globe living under the threat of nuclear war for nearly three decades. There was no detente then in Peking or Moscow.

They forget the armed confrontations between nations—the Berlin crises, the Berlin Wall, the Korean war, the Cuban missile crises. They overlook the fact the other side has its intelligence agents, too—Col. Rudolf Abel and others who served their countries loyally, just as did Hunt. Spying was a job that had to be done. Somebody had to do it. And fortunately for this nation, Hunt and other men elected to do it.

Thus, Hunt became a well trained intelligence operative with deeply ingrained responses of obedience to command, a conditioned reflex essential in a profession where hesitancy can result in death or the failure of an operation. If we can accept his credentials, he was a dedicated patriot.

Now comes the end of a 21-year career with the CIA. There is little demand for retired spies. But then there is a call from Charles W. Colson at the White House. Hunt's covert intelligence expertise is once again needed by his country. He is told there are national security leaks that must be plugged.

Surely, one can understand this must have been heady stuff. In July of 1971, Colson is no slouch. He is the White House troubleshooter, special counsel to Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States. When Hunt is asked if he will serve again, it is difficult to resist a summons from on high, from the very top of the nation he has served faithfully for many years. It is an honor. He is given an office and his own safe at the White House.

Against a background of unquestioned obedience to his country, to whom can Hunt turn for confirmation of Colson's commands? Certainly, he cannot call the President himself to verify Colson's authority.

In 1972, Hunt is told there is strong suspicion the Democrats are getting campaign funds from Cuban Communist Dictator Fidel Castro. Again, this fits neatly with Hunt's background as a CIA planner of the Bay of Pigs invasion.

FURTHER, FROM Hunt's new found proximity to the executive branch of government, there is an aura of implied sanction of the intelligence-gathering plans by the Presidency and the then attorney general, John Mitchell, chief law officer of the land. In Hunt's mind, the Watergate break-in must be legal and on the square.

Unquestionably, spying has always been a dirty business. But in times of war and Cold War, it has often demanded of its practitioners the utmost in courage. Spies can easily cast themselves blindly in a heroic mold, especially when recalled in the name of the Presidency.

People forget that Nathan Hale was a spy. What if he had not been hung by the British? What if President Washington had used him as an agent against his political enemies in later years? How would Hunt's critics regard that 21-year-old today?

NEW YORK TIMES

2 October 1973

SIRICA RULES OUT LONG TERMS FOR 5

Says Watergate Burglars
Won't Get Maximums—
Segretti Pleads Guilty

By ANTHONY RIPLEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 1—Chief Judge John J. Sirica of United States District Court brought five of the Watergate burglars into his courtroom today and told them he did not plan to give them maximum sentences.

In the unusual move this morning, Judge Sirica told the five, all of whom had pleaded guilty at the beginning of their trial in January, that published reports of long sentences ranging up to 55 years were false. He said such sentences would be "not only unwarranted but unjust."

In another courtroom this afternoon, Donald H. Segretti, who was hired by President Nixon's White House aides to play tricks on the Democratic presidential contenders, pleaded guilty to three misdemeanor charges for his actions in the 1972 Florida Democratic primary.

The five men from the original Watergate case—E. Howard Hunt Jr., Bernard L. Barker, Eugenio R. Martinez, Frank A. Sturgis and Virgilio R. Gonzalez—were called to the court by Judge Sirica.

"I want to say at the outset that I have been disturbed lately over what appears to be a widespread misunderstanding relating to the sentences imposed upon these defendants last March after the trial," he said.

"I want to take this opportunity, therefore, to disabuse the public mind in this respect, and, in addition, fairness to these men also not only requires but demands that any misunderstanding that they may have with regard to the situation in which they find themselves be clarified."

The judge explained that under the law he is required to give the maximum possible sentences on a temporary basis while the court seeks more detailed information as a basis for final sentencing.

Under such maximum sentencing, Hunt faced a temporary sentence of 50 years and the other four 55 years each.

"In this case, such a disposition would not only be unwarranted but unjust," Judge Sirica said.

He said the sentences would be based on presentencing reports, on the law and on "fair-

NEW YORK TIMES
30 September 1973

Senate Hears a Chastened Spook and a Lively Ghost

ness, compassion, understanding and justice."

'Not the Fact'

He said it had been "widely reported" that the sentences were permanent and would run "30, 40 or 55 years."

"This is not the fact," he stated.

Part of the confusion was generated by Hunt in his appearance before the Senate Watergate committee on Sept. 24 when he said, "I was provisionally sentenced to prison for more than 30 years."

The word "provisionally" was not mentioned in some news reports of Hunt's appearance.

Of the seven original Watergate defendants, only G. Gordon Liddy has received a permanent sentence. Judge Sirica ordered his imprisonment for from six years and eight months to 20 years.

James W. McCord Jr., who has been cooperating with the prosecution, has not yet gone to prison. The other five who appeared in court today are all serving provisional sentences. All but Liddy have filed appeals seeking to set aside their guilty pleas and asking for new trials.

Segretti and his lawyers, Victor Sherman of Los Angeles and Plato Cacheris of Washington, appeared before Federal District Judge Gerhard A. Gesell.

Case Was Transferred

Segretti had been charged in an indictment originally brought by a United States attorney in Florida. The case was transferred here and expanded from two to four counts. Today he pleaded guilty to a conspiracy charge and to two charges of distributing campaign literature that failed to contain the names of those responsible for printing it.

The maximum penalty for conviction on the three charges is a \$3,000 fine and three years in prison.

However, Segretti has agreed to work with the special Watergate prosecutor, Archibald Cox, and his cooperation is expected to shorten the length of his sentence.

One of the charges against him was dropped as part of an arrangement with Mr. Cox. A letter explaining that arrangement was submitted to the court and sealed at the request of Segretti's lawyer.

"You tell me what you did," Judge Gesell said to Segretti, a California lawyer.

Segretti, speaking in a voice that at times was barely audible, spoke of giving \$50 to Robert M. Benz to work with him. He said that letters had been sent out on the campaign stationery of Senator Edmund S. Muskie of Maine "relating to" Senator Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota and Senator Henry M. Jackson of Washington.

All three Senators were Democratic Presidential hopefuls and were entered in the Florida primary. The letter alleged that Senators Humphrey and Jackson had been involved in sexual misconduct.

WASHINGTON—The Senate Watergate inquiry which in its first phase piled startling revelation on revelation, opened its second phase last week with testimony from a one-time master spy for the Central Intelligence Agency and a senior speech writer for President Nixon. It seemed to produce little more than a fizz and a pratfall.

E. Howard Hunt Jr., a sallow, sandy-haired ex-spy whose undercover work for the White House came to a sudden end at the Watergate, gave the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities a few morsels of new information about political espionage and, more pitied than scorned, returned to prison.

Patrick J. Buchanan, the smooth, sardonic ghost writer who counseled Mr. Nixon on a 1972 strategy intended to help assure the weakest Democratic opponent, accused the committee staff of a "covert campaign of vilification" to "malign" his reputation and, scorning the committee's inquiries as a "foolish exercise," went back to the

"At a later time Mr. Benz had a card printed relating to Governor Wallace," Segretti said.

Mr. Benz, named as a co-conspirator but not indicted in the case, went to one of Alabama Gov. George C. Wallace's rallies in Pinellas County, Fla., on Feb. 12, 1972, distributing cards that read, "If you liked Hitler, you'll love Wallace..." and urging a vote for Mr. Muskie.

Mr. Benz also distributed posters saying, "Help Muskie support our children now."

"Did you understand what you were doing and that you did it on purpose and not by mistake?" the judge asked.

"Yes sir," Segretti replied.

Dropped Charge

The charge dropped by agreement today involved sending letters on Senator Muskie's stationery saying that a Florida Congressman's office personnel and equipment were being used to support Mr. Muskie.

Segretti was released on personal recognizance. No date was set for sentencing.

He then moved to Judge Sirica's courtroom, where the judge signed orders granting him limited immunity from prosecution in testifying before Mr. Cox's grand jury and before the Senate Watergate committee.

The order protects him from having his words used against him later in a criminal case and also forces him to testify.

Also granted limited or "use" immunity for Senate committee appearances by Judge Sirica were Mr. Benz and another of Segretti's Florida associates, Martin Douglas Kelly. All three are among witnesses who may appear before the committee later this week. The hearings are scheduled to resume Wednesday.

White House.

The most notable development last week emerged, in fact, not from the televised interrogation of Hunt and Mr. Buchanan but from an almost unnoticed paragraph in a document the committee routinely made public. Dr. Bernard M. Malloy, a staff psychiatrist for the C.I.A., said in a May 9 affidavit filed with the committee that he had been told that Henry A. Kissinger, the newly installed Secretary of State, had asked to have the intelligence agency create a secret psychological profile of Daniel Ellsberg in 1971.

From previous disclosures it appeared that there had been a search for information that might somehow discredit Mr. Ellsberg for making public the Pentagon Papers, and that this had led to the Sept. 3, 1971, burglary of his psychiatrist's office by Hunt and other agents of a clandestine White House investigative unit. Mr. Kissinger quickly assured reporters at the United Nations on Wednesday that he "did not know of any request for a profile, I never saw this profile, and I never discussed the subject" with David M. Young Jr., the former White House official whose purported statement to the contrary was quoted in the affidavit by Dr. Malloy.

That matter aside, the Senate panel sought to wind up its long investigation of the Watergate burglary and cover-up and move on to the subject of 1972 campaign sabotage. The Senators had expected the new hearings would generate little of the excitement that characterized the earlier sessions, but even the Democrats on the panel professed disappointment at what they produced last week.

Hunt, who wrote some 40 spy novels during a career that spanned 21 years with the C.I.A., two at the White House and six months in prison, came across like the prototype of Graham Greene's "Burnt Out Case" during 10 hours at the witness table on Monday and Tuesday. He sighed. He sometimes lost the thread of questions. He apologized that a recent stroke caused him to tire easily. He repeatedly embraced two of his four children during the breaks. He voiced "regret" at his involvement in the Watergate burglary but belief that a 35-year provisional sentence was unjust and sorrow at "the failure of my Government to protect me and my family as, in the past, it has always done for its clandestine agents."

He reluctantly testified that Charles W. Colson, the former White House special counsel who recruited him to spy for the Nixon Administration, had spoken knowledgeably in January of last year of the "large scale" political intelligence scheme that led to the Watergate burglary. He complained that someone had stolen, from his White House safe, a notebook containing all his contacts' identities and other materials without which he

could not defend himself in court.

Hunt conceded that he had undertaken to persuade the White House to support the Watergate defendants and their families, but denied that he had threatened to reveal his "seamy activities" on behalf of the President if enough money were not provided.

Mostly, Hunt catalogued the failures of his brief venture into political espionage, mourning the contrast with a successful career at the C.I.A.: He wanted to call off the second Watergate burglary but was overruled, he said, and the consequences of that abortive mission still are being felt. He accepted Mr. Colson's instructions to "improve" on State Department cables to suggest President Kennedy's complicity in the assassination of South Vietnam's President Ngo Dinh Diem, he testified, but did not succeed in peddling the story the fabricated cables purported to show to Life magazine. He flew to Denver and, wearing a C.I.A. wig, offered assurance of "high level" interest in the welfare of Dita D. Beard, but failed to determine if the International Telephone and Telegraph Company lobbyist had written a controversial memo linking the company's \$400,000 pledge to the 1972 Republican National Convention with a generous settlement of a Government antitrust case.

Hunt even sought to float a theory that the Watergate burglars had been betrayed by a double agent and suggested it had been Alfred C. Baldwin, the lookout, because among other things he was the nephew of a Democratic judge in Connecticut. Senator Lowell C. Weicker shot down the theory, pointing out that Mr. Baldwin's only relative who had been a jurist was Raymond Baldwin, a former Governor, United States Senator and, to those who knew him, "Mr. Republican."

If Hunt's testimony produced little

to advance the Senate investigation, Mr. Buchanan's was even less helpful. The committee staff had intended to explore a number of White House and Nixon re-election campaign memorandums as indications of an attitude conducive to "dirty tricks" and sabotage of Democratic Presidential contenders.

"You're looking at the Buckminster Fuller of dirty tricks" the speech writer quipped in an aside just before he began his testimony. Then he publicly chastised the Senate panel's staff for leaking suggestions he had been the architect of the 1972 campaign sabotage, denied having proposed anything that was "illicit, unethical, improper—or unprecedented in previous Democratic campaigns," rebuffed each suggestion of wrongdoing by Chief Counsel Samuel Dash and sat back while the committee's Democratic majority and Republican minority sparred over procedures.

Of course, Mr. Buchanan said, he had recommended that the White House help eliminate Senator Edmund S. Muskie of Maine from the Democratic Presidential contest and "elevate" Senator George McGovern of South Dakota as the weakest potential opponent. Certainly, he conceded, he had ghosted advertisements and letters to the editor for "citizen" groups and willing individuals. Naturally, he testified, the Administration had attempted to take advantage of the benefits of incumbency in the campaign.

He declared that the Watergate burglary had been "a crime" and that electronic surveillance had no place in politics. But Mr. Buchanan insisted that none of the stratagems, overt or covert, which did have a White House imprimatur had exceeded the limits of time-honored tradition in American politics. His only regret was that the "exaggerated metaphors" in his pri-

vate memos ("we ought to go down to the kennels and turn all the dogs loose" on Senator Muskie) had become public property.

By the end of his appearance on Monday, Mr. Buchanan achieved what no prior witness had done. He challenged the committee, stood up to Mr. Dash, preened with the help of the Republicans, even one-upped Senator Sam J. Ervin Jr., the Democratic chairman whose conduct of the hearings had made him something of a folk hero. When Senator Ervin invoked Andrew Jackson, the witness riposted that President Jackson had been the "father of the spoils system."

When Mr. Buchanan left the witness table Wednesday, the White House celebrated what one worker there called "the only day of the hearings I've really enjoyed." Senator Howard H. Baker Jr. of Tennessee, the Republican vice chairman of the committee, pronounced it a fit beginning for the study of "not only what's illegal but what's immoral and fattening" in American politics. Senator Edward J. Gurney of Florida, the Nixon stalwart among the panel's Republicans, proclaimed it "one of the most amusing days" of his life.

The commercial television networks, having resumed their rotating live coverage of the Senate proceedings, found the hearings less worthy as entertainment. They decided after the hearings recessed on Wednesday that they would retreat to daytime soap operas and quiz programs unless some major figures take the witness chair.

For their part, the Democrats suddenly became interested in accelerating the "dirty tricks" phase of the inquiry. And two Democrats on the committee warned the staff to take pains that no one else like the White House speech writer gets sworn in as a Watergate witness.

—JAMES M. NAUGHTON

WASHINGTON STAR
28 September 1973



By ROBIN ADAMS SLOAN

QUESTION TOO FAR OUT FOR YOU TO ASK: Was Muskie on LSD when he broke down and wept during the 1972 campaign? This is the thesis advanced in an upcoming book by a former senior CIA official to be titled "Mike Copeland's Guide to Spies and the CIA." Copeland insists top CIA staffers are convinced Muskie's famous breakdown was assisted by a dose of a hallucinogenic drug (developed by the CIA, Bureau of Narcotics, and the Army) and "slipped into his lemonade" by E. Howard Hunt or one of the "Dirty Tricks" brigade.

WASHINGTON STAR
28 September 1973

Defense Fund Set By Hunt

By Barry Kalb
Star-News Staff Writer

Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt Jr., who received tens of thousands of dollars in alleged "hush money" following his indictment in the case, has had a defense fund set up to aid him and his family.

Hunt himself announced the existence of the fund in a letter to newspapers dated Wednesday, after his testimony before the special Senate Watergate committee.

"Following my testimony before the Senate select committee, I have received many messages from people who have indicated their sympathy and concern for my predicament and a desire to be helpful to me and to my children," the letter said. "I have been deeply moved by this response."

The letter, signed by Hunt, continued that "these offers of support have led to the formation of a small committee which, without fee, will handle inquiries and contributions."

THE LETTER lists the address of the Hunt Defense Fund as 150 E. 35th St., New York, the office of the National Review magazine. William F. Buckley Jr., the conservative columnist and head of the magazine, is a long-time friend of Hunt.

James McFadden, whose name also appeared in Hunt's letter, was reached at the National Review office yesterday. He said that he does a good deal of fund-raising work out of the magazine's offices, and at Buckley's request agreed to handle the Hunt fund.

According to McFadden, Buckley says the fund was begun by friends of Hunt. "I said certainly, I'd be glad to handle it, because I admire Hunt," said McFadden. "I'm supposed to handle it, but just what, I'm not sure."

Hunt, a former CIA agent, was a White House consultant during the time the Watergate plot was being hatched, and has admitted being one of the planners. On Jan. 11, three days after the Watergate trial began, he pleaded guilty to six counts of conspiracy, bur-

BALTIMORE SUN
1 October 1973

Notes and Comment

They Really Do Talk Like That

The language of the world of the clandestine fascinates us, and we wish we'd been taking more notes on it. In part, it goes like this:

To make a feasibility study and a preliminary reconnaissance does not mean, as you might think, to hire consultants at a zillion dollars a man-hour, and then send surveyors out, and then do what you had in mind, such as digging a canal or constructing a third parallel Chesapeake Bay bridge.

No. To make a feasibility study is to try to discover whether your project, or program—say to break into a psychiatrist's office—is possible at all. If it is found to be possible at all, that's when you do the preliminary reconnaissance, known at the lesser levels of surreptitiousness as casing the joint.

This is all covert, you understand, not overt. In the world of the clandestine, sometimes known also as the intelligence community, one almost never does anything overt. What fun would that be?

In this exciting world you indulge as little as possible in "face-to-face colloquy." When forced nevertheless into unavoidable face-to-face colloquy, you

glary, attempted illegal eavesdropping and illegal eavesdropping, a plea he now wants to withdraw.

IN TESTIMONY before the Senate committee earlier this week, he admitted that he received at least \$156,000 from persons connected with the White House, which helped pay his former attorney, William O. Bittman. Hunt said other money was passed through him and Bittman to others of the Watergate defendants.

Hunt, however, denied that the money was "hush money," or that he had demanded it in return for his silence about the Watergate plot and other questionable White House-sanctioned activities. Former Nixon administration officials have testified that Hunt was attempting to "blackmail" the White House.

Hunt has said that with continuing legal fees, he and his four children are financially strapped, although he said the notoriety he has received has created an interest in his books and spy novels, some of which have been reissued.

wear a wig; and surely there must be times when the other party to the colloquy is wearing a wig himself or herself.

How you get the wig is, you ask the Central Intelligence Agency to give you a wig, or to give a wig to whoever's name you are using on your forged documents of the moment, and the CIA, after having established your bona fides, gives you a wig.

Bona fides in the circumstances we are talking about does not necessarily mean what bona fides means in real life.

Maybe the CIA doesn't actually give you the wig. Maybe it just lends the wig to you, for which you sign a receipt in some name or other, to insure the wig's return.

Granted that the CIA's supply of wigs must be considerable, still it can't be expected to give a free wig to any Tom, Dick and/or Harry who comes along and asks for one. Those wigs are purchased with public funds, and the CIA must ultimately be held accountable to the taxpayers of the United States for its wigs.

If you want to get your hands on some documents from the State Department files, so's to slip in some other documents falsified in the interests of a more

enthralling narrative, you have to establish your bona fides at the State Department, too.

The way that's done is that the State Department calls up the White House and says, "Has So-and-So, or somebody purporting to be So-and-So, got a bona fides?" And the White House says, oh, yes, no problem, and there you are, with an opportunity to alter history.

No, the State Department doesn't call up. It makes telephonic contact. Whether the State Department and the White House slip out to corner booths to make telephonic contact we do not profess to know.

Since in the world of the clandestine it usually takes more than one person to do a job, or carry out a mission, naturally somebody has to be responsible for the "human resources portion of the budget," which means he has to hire the sub-thugs.

Nobody ever filches actual objects from psychiatrists' offices or political headquarters. You merely provide yourself with "photographically stolen materials." If you get caught anyway, and are tried and convicted, you do not go to jail, like some common criminal. In keeping with your status in your chosen profession, you are incarcerated.

WASHINGTON POST
8 September 1973

Industrialist Named New Director of AID

Associated Press

John A. Hannah is resigning as director of the Agency for International Development and Daniel Parker of the Parker Pen Co. will be nominated to succeed him, the White House announced yesterday.

Hannah, former president of Michigan State University, has headed the agency since 1969. His resignation will be effective Sept. 30, the White House said.

Parker, 48, is board chairman of the Janesville, Wis., pen company and has been with the firm since 1950.

Parker is a Republican and supported the 1972 Nixon re-

election campaign but White House deputy press secretary Gerald L. Warren said in response to a question that he didn't believe the manufacturer "would characterize himself as a major contributor."

General Accounting Office records list \$15,075 in contributions to Nixon re-election committees under the names of Mr. and Mrs. Daniel Parker of Janesville, Wis.

The White House also announced the resignation of John Davis Lodge as ambassador to Argentina.

Lodge, who has held the post since May, 1969, plans to return to private life.

Eastern Europe

THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, Sept. 20, 1973

Move to Ease Tariffs on Soviets Stirring Liberal Storm

By Marilyn Berger
Washington Post Staff Writer

In some congressional offices, the mail volume on the subject is second only to that on Watergate or the rising cost of living.

It has engendered full-page ads in newspapers and brought together liberals in the Soviet Union with American conservatives, Russian traders with U.S. capitalists, and it has pitted businessmen against Jewish organizations in the United States.

It is an issue that has become so hot that the House Ways and Means Committee has decided to postpone consideration and may even drop the issue altogether.

The issue that has caused all the uproar is trade with the Soviet Union; more specifically President Nixon's request to grant nondiscriminatory tariff treatment to Moscow.

In the jargon of Washington it is known as MFN—most-favored-nation—a term that stipulates equal tariff treatment for those countries receiving it. In the administration trade bill the President requested congressional authority to grant MFN to "non-market economies"—meaning Communist countries—with which the United States concludes trade agreements.

The trade bill is currently going through its second reading in the House Ways and Means Committee. Acting Chairman Al Ullman (D-Ore.) said yesterday that he has told the House leadership that he hopes to be able to report it out by Oct. 11, "although there might be some slippage." Whether it will contain provisions for granting MFN, however, is entirely up in the air at this point.

Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) introduced an amendment to withhold MFN—and credits, which are far more important in developing trade with the Soviet Union—from countries denying free emigration or imposing more than nominal fees for emigration.

The amendment, which won majority support in both houses, had first been introduced in connection

with another bill which was never acted upon. On the House side, Reps. Wilbur D. Mills (D-Ark.) and Charles Vanik (D-Ohio) introduced a similar amendment.

Organized Jewish groups—concerned both about human rights and the emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union—rallied behind Jackson, whose name has become synonymous with efforts to use trade as a lever to force liberalization of Soviet policies. Organized labor weighed in with its support, ostensibly to call for human rights, but some think to scuttle a trade bill which was not protectionist enough for AFL-CIO tastes.

Jackson and his supporters then got an enormous boost when Soviet intellectuals urged that detente be accompanied by some basic respect for human right for the Russian people. Soviet physicist Andrei Sakharov, one of the developers of Soviet nuclear weapons, and Nobel Prize novelist Alexander Solzhenitsyn asked for help from Washington.

As Soviet repression became more widely publicized, new questions were raised in Congress about Moscow's intentions in moving toward detente.

"There is some genuine concern about whether MFN should be given to the Russians at all," said Ullman. Beyond that, said Ullman, is the "Jewish issue," or the question of human rights.

But first, Ullman noted, the question has arisen as to whether there are the proper ingredients for giving MFN to a state-owned economy.

To rescue MFN, the nation's major corporations and smaller businesses were urged by their trade associations to lobby members of Ways and Means in support of MFN. But with trade and human rights now linked in the public mind, a vote for MFN begins to appear like a vote against human freedoms.

Two signers of the House version of the Jackson amendment, Reps. Jerry Corman (D-Calif.) and Jerry Pettis (R-Calif.), drafted a compromise that would allow granting MFN and its

continuation if there is "reasonable progress" toward more liberal emigration and human rights policies. It was immediately branded a "sellout," Corman said.

"I got calls until 1 a.m. from constituents saying they didn't know what I'd proposed but they'd gotten word that it was out, to destroy Jackson-Vanik," said Corman, adding, "I'm meeting with the Jewish community out there [in his Los Angeles district] Friday, but I'm not hopeful I can do anything."

Jewish groups and others lobbying for human rights have let other congressmen hear about their views. Said Hugh Carey (D-N.Y.), "The volume of mail is second or third only to Watergate or the cost of living." The burden of the message, said Carey, is to hold fast to his support of the Jackson-Vanik proposal.

Rep. Herman T. Schneebeli (R-Pa.), the ranking minority member of Ways and Means, said he had received 200 to 300 letters and telegrams about six months ago when the committee first took up the trade bill and 40 to 50 letters more recently. Most of the mail, he said, was coming from the wealthy and politically active Harrisburg Jewish community, which gives the highest per capita contributions to the Israel bond drives of any community in America.

Word from the business community in favor of MFN has failed to keep pace, and its mail volume to committee members is nowhere near that coming from Jewish and human rights groups. A spokesman for the National Association of Manufacturers said the NAM had sent out 200 letters to its members urging them to telegraph their congressmen. A similar message went out from the Emergency Committee for American Trade.

One of the chief spokesmen for doing business with the Soviet Union is Donald Kendall, a friend of President Nixon and head of PepsiCo. Kendall recently con-

cluded a multimillion-dollar deal with the Soviet Union to sell Pepsi-Cola to the Russians in return for vodka. He has made numerous trips to the Soviet Union and last weekend entertained Soviet Deputy Trade Minister Vladimir Alkhimov at his Connecticut estate.

Kendall argues that the Soviet Union has made "tremendous progress" and that "the liberal community opposing MFN are the same ones who have been saying we're spending too much militarily, that defense costs are too high." He maintains that opposition to MFN will weaken Soviet opinion favorable to detente.

Alkhimov, called from the Kendall tennis courts to the telephone, launched into a comparison of Soviet treatment of Jews and intellectuals with U.S. treatment of women. The United States, he said, did not give women status equal to men, but that was not cause for the Soviet Union to refuse to trade with it.

As the atmosphere heated up, the Senate earlier this week passed a resolution by voice vote calling on the President to "use the medium of current negotiations with the Soviet Union as well as informal contacts with Soviet officials in an effort to secure an end to repression of dissent."

Moscow Radio yesterday branded this gross interference in Soviet domestic affairs.

The Soviet Union has made some moves toward conciliation. Moscow has stopped imposing its emigration tax. It has lifted the jamming of the Voice of America. Jews are emigrating at just above the rate of last year, with the eight-month total for 1973 at approximately 20,000. A total of 32,000 were permitted to leave in 1972.

But these slim signs of conciliation have been insufficient to blunt the drive for the Jackson amendment.

Now some members of Ways and Means are considering dropping MFN entirely from the trade bill. According to one scenario,

NEW YORK TIMES
18 September 1973

Trade and Freedom

In calling on President Nixon yesterday to give voice to American concern over Moscow's latest assaults on individual liberties, the Senate emphasized that progress toward détente with the Soviet Union need not and should not involve sacrifice of this country's right to speak out in behalf of human freedom.

An improved relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, the two nuclear superpowers, is of profound importance to both nations and to the peoples of the earth. And the initiatives begun by the Nixon Administration toward the Soviet Union as well as toward China, etc., as we have often noted, highly significant and constructive moves in the unrelenting effort to build a peaceful world.

Since an increase in trade would be a logical part of any improved relationship, the Administration is seeking authority in the pending foreign trade bill to grant most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union. "Most favored nation" is actually a misnomer since it suggests that the Russians would be granted some preferred treatment. In reality, they would receive at the President's discretion tariff treatment no less favorable than that granted any other nation.

Too much ought not to be expected from trade by itself as a factor for peace, but a policy of political détente can hardly hope to succeed if it has no economic counterpart. For that reason alone, it would be desirable that Congress grant to the President the authority he seeks to establish "most-favored-nation" terms of trade with Moscow. Quite apart from immediate political considerations, the step is important on the general economic

principle that it is to the long-run advantage of all parties that the channels of international trade and commerce be opened as widely as possible.

The trade issue has, however, become intertwined with the persistent denial of human rights within the Soviet Union. Many another nation with which the United States has close trade relationships also represses civil liberties; but it is one thing to maintain existing trade ties with such a country and quite another to augment the relationship just at the moment when human rights appear to be under particular pressure, as they are in the Soviet Union today. Yesterday's Senate action, which strikes us as especially appropriate at this moment, underlines the strength of the popular feeling in this country on this complex issue.

The Soviet leadership would do well to recognize that American moral indignation over the fate of the Russian dissenters is a fact of political consequence. We would like to see this concern also expressed openly and at the highest levels of the United States Government. The recent trip to Moscow of H.E.W. Secretary Weinberger and the scheduled visit of Secretary of the Treasury Shultz suggest, on the contrary, that the Administration is so intent on trade and détente that it is willing to shunt aside the equally important concern of the American people for human rights everywhere.

Under these circumstances, the kind of Presidential statement urged by the Senate is entirely in order. But so is passage of the "most-favored-nation" bill without strings or crippling amendments. We do not believe that it is appropriate, in a foreign trade or in any other kind of bill, for Congress to legislate on the internal affairs of another country.

WASHINGTON STAR
29 September 1973

AIR BABY'S PARENTS CALLED DEFECTORS

LONDON (AP)—A Soviet woman who gave birth to a baby in an American airliner over the Atlantic yesterday and her husband were defectors returning voluntarily to the Soviet Union, the Daily Telegraph said today.

The newspaper said Arthur Oganysian, 36, was a lieutenant in the Armenian state security forces when he fled with his wife to Turkey in July 1972. The couple lived recently in Los Angeles, until Margretta Oganysian became homesick, the Telegraph said.

The couple, accompanied by a Soviet doctor and Soviet vice consul L. Butkin, arrived at London's Heathrow Airport from Washington aboard a Delta Airlines jumbo jet. Mrs. Oganysian gave birth to a boy 800 miles out over the Atlantic.

The party almost created a diplomatic incident by refusing to leave the aircraft unless provided an ambulance from the Soviet Embassy. The embassy said it didn't have one. A short time later the family left for Moscow on an Aeroflot plane.

The Soviet Union has now shelved the taxes and is allowing Jews to leave at the rate of about 30,000 a year. However there is a large backlog of would-be emigrants.

While the easing of the exit tax spring appeared for a time to dampen the chances for Congressional approval of the proposals by Representatives Mills and Vanik and by Senator Jackson, the highly emotional issue flared again in recent months, with evidence of renewed Soviet repression against such dissenting intellectuals as Andrei D. Sakharov, the physi-

cist, and Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, the novelist.

As recommended today, the House amendment would prohibit the President from giving most-favored-nation tariff treatment—the allowing of any favorable agreements extended to any other country—to a nation that denied Jews or other citizens the opportunity to emigrate, that imposed more than nominal emigration fees or that imposed fees strictly on the basis of the country to which a person wanted to emigrate, such as Israel.

NEW YORK TIMES
27 September 1973

HOUSE PANEL TIES SOVIET EMIGRATION TO TRADE BENEFITS

By MARJORIE HUNTER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 26 — The House Ways and Means Committee voted today to deny any new trade privileges to the Soviet Union until it eases its emigration policies for Jews and other minorities.

The committee's action was a major setback to the Nixon Administration and to spokesmen for American business. The restriction, adopted by voice vote, was attached to a

major foreign-trade bill that is now under consideration by the committee.

Kissinger Plea Undercut

The committee acted about an hour after Secretary of State Kissinger, at a news conference in New York, repeated the Administration's contention that over the long run more could be accomplished to ameliorate the lot of Soviet Jews and others by quiet diplomacy.

The amendment would deny President Nixon the right to grant "most-favored-nation" status to the Soviet Union or any other Communist country until he certified to Congress that the country involved did not restrict emigration.

While the restriction would apply to all Communist countries, including China, it is principally directed at emigration policies of the Soviet Union.

The amendment was co-sponsored by Representative Wilbur D. Mills, Democrat of Arkansas, the committee chairman, and Representative Charles A. Vanik, Democrat of Ohio. It is similar to one proposed in the Senate by Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington.

The dispute over Soviet emigration policies intensified in the late summer of 1972, when Moscow imposed heavy exit taxes, ranging into the tens of thousands of dollars, on Jews seeking to leave the country, for Israel.

the Senate could then be expected to approve a trade bill with MFN provisions, as limited by the Jackson amendment. Then in conference some compromise could conceivably be worked out if Moscow had by that time loosened up. Jackson, insists, however, that he wants to see the provisions of his amendment written into law to establish a prohibition on granting trade concessions unless there is free emigration.

Western Hemisphere

THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER
19 September 1973

The echoes of Allende's

death

'The Chilean experience has united almost all the strands of the European Left — from the Communist Party to the International Socialists to the Socialist International, representing 58 social democratic parties.'

JUDITH HART, Labour spokesman on Overseas Development, on the aftermath of Allende's fall

THE IMMEDIATE wave of anger and distress which swept through Europe a week ago at the news of the military coup in Chile and President Allende's death was extraordinary in its spontaneity and its depth. Its significance must be absorbed and noted.

For when demonstrations of many thousands gather at short notice in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark and Britain—where almost every city has made its protest—it is because reactions run strong, and deep.

For Socialists of this generation, Chile is our Spain: and it is even more than that. It seems now that all over the world, we have been holding our breath, waiting and watching to see if the Chilean experiment could succeed in creating a Socialist society within a completely democratic framework and on the basis of cooperation between Socialists and Communists within the Popular Unity coalition. For the very few of us who knew Chile, there was clearly so much—even in the setting of Latin-American under-development—which was directly relevant to our own plans and hopes for our own countries.

I still hope that we have not yet seen the end of the affair. The brutality and sheer fascism of the style of this coup is such an enormity that the Centre in Chilean politics—which I define as the Left—within the Christian Demo-

crats—is itself alienated; the official reactions of all but the Guatemalan-type puppet states of Latin America are entirely hostile; and European governments with democratic socialist majorities have already indicated their condemnation.

I doubt if it will prove feasible, in these circumstances, for the right-wing democracies of the world—and I include the United States and Britain—to follow the normal convenient pattern of de facto recognition, followed by a resumption of the flow of credits and loans which have always been Chile's economic lifeline (until the dispute with the American copper companies halted both American and World Bank aid). They will have a great deal to lose and very little to gain.

Yet without full recognition and a massive flow of American help, it will be impossible for the military junta in Chile to have any success. That is why the call for non-recognition is not a despairing slogan, but a constructive and important proposal. Yet, with the news of the arrest and probable court-martial of the 4,000 "extremists" who are behind barbed wire in the Santiago Stadium, who must certainly include all our friends and colleagues, and the junta's announced intention to persecute the "foreigners" who have sought in Chile their sanctuary from other military governments, the anger deepens. This is the most vicious fascism we have seen for generations.

The questions it provokes are fundamental, as the correspondence columns are already making clear. Indeed, one of the first letters on the subject, in last Saturday's Guardian, crystallised the new dilemma for democratic Socialists: "I am a Socialist and a democrat. I abhor the use of violence for political ends. Some of my Socialist friends maintain that we will never be allowed to achieve socialism by peaceful means, but must impose it by force and then keep it by repression."

"What can I answer them now when they say 'Salvador Allende'? It is a ques-

tion underlined by the views from the Right here, which seem so far to indicate that the overthrow of democratically elected governments, bloody death and destruction, and violent repression are for them infinitely preferable to the toleration of socialism.

It is, of course, a question of direct relevance for European and British socialism. For there are clear parallels with Chile. Our press is almost completely owned and dominated, as was that of Chile, by the Right. We too assume a universal respect for our constitution and parliamentary system, and our assumption may well be complacent and outdated.

We too take for granted the political neutrality and loyalty to the elected government of the day of our armed forces and police. (Yet should we remember that one—possibly hypothetical—question which arose during the Rhodesian crisis of 1965 was whether, should the British Government have decided to use force, the armed forces would have been loyal to such a decision?) We dismiss as eccentric the recent argument by Brigadier Kitson that the army should make itself ready to deal with "insurgency" at home.

We too have a fifth column of City and financial interests which were ready enough to sabotage the national economic interest during the last reformist Labour Government. Would a future Labour Government intent upon a Socialist programme really be as secure as we assume? The question is provoked as much by the reaction of the Right in Britain to the events in Chile as by those events themselves.

It could be argued that there was in Chile the special X-factor of dependence, in common with the rest of Latin America, upon external financing; and that Britain is herself a neo-imperialist power rather than a victim of neo-imperialism. But we are no longer an island, and our economy is intensely vulnerable to external factors and to financial support from the world community. The difference, such as it is, does not invalidate the current European

Socialist identification with Chilean Popular Unity.

The second aspect of parallelism concerns cooperation on the Left. It has already occurred in France; and Socialist journals in Britain have recently begun to explore the prospects of dialogue on the Left. In practice, reaction of Conservative policies have already very considerably promoted a degree of unity within the trade union movement. The Chilean experience has united almost all strands of the

European Left—from the Communist Party to the International Socialists to the Socialist International, representing 58 social democratic parties.

I think it every likely that an important consequence of the Chilean tragedy will be an intensification of dialogue on the Left to maximise areas of possible agreement. Again this is likely to be further stimulated by the observation of the behaviour of the Right.

There will certainly be a re-examination of the Socialist analysis of democracy, and of the essential elements which we must create in our society to make it more secure against its enemies. It was not only Marx but also Tawney who believed that economic democracy was the essential precondition for full political democracy, and without it, democratic institutions were unreal.

The best defence against intervention here with the democratic process by interests who feel themselves threatened by Socialist policies is the active commitment and involvement of working class and middle class supporters of those policies. But at the end of the day, there is still a question-mark. Chile was, we all thought, a gentle and highly civilised society; its democratic institutions, everyone said, were as firmly established as our own; its army could never be a threat, they said to us in Chile.

The political parties of the Left had large memberships and were very effectively mobilised into a cohesive political force. And yet they are destroyed. I hope it is not the end of the matter for Chile. I am sure it is by no means the end of the matter for us.

WASHINGTON POST
21 September 1973

'Centaur Plan' to Oust Allende Called Hoax

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

U.S. intelligence sources have branded as a "hoax" the so-called Centaur plan to overturn the Allende government in Chile.

They attribute the plan and its circulation through Latin America to an American parole violator named Richard Alexander Zander, who is said to have "peddled" it commercially in Mexico.

Centaur has created ripples of mystification since it was first mentioned in Mexico City on Monday by Hugo Vigorena, Chile's former ambassador to Mexico.

Vigorena, in an interview with the Mexican daily Excelsior, charged that the anti-Allende plan was conceived and executed by the Central Intelligence Agency. Although it was first put into motion two years ago, he said, the Chilean government did not discover it until six weeks before the coup that ousted Allende and led to his death.

Until now the CIA, White House and State Department have steadfastly denied any U.S. involvement in the Chilean coup.

U.S. intelligence sources said Wednesday that a plan such as the one described by Vigorena was being distributed in Latin America by the American named Zander.

"This guy was selling a cock-and-bull fabrication," said one Government official. "He is a fugitive from justice."

At a hearing yesterday of the House foreign affairs inter-american affairs subcommittee, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Jack B. Kubisch testified yesterday he understood the Centaur plan "was a spurious document."

Kubisch said he would prefer to discuss the plan with the subcommittee in executive session but he testified publicly that he understood there "was an individual in Mexico who claimed he had a document" showing that CIA was involved in the coup. Earlier this week State Department officials said the only information they had on the Centaur plan had come from U.S. intelligence sources, presumably the CIA.

The Federal Bureau of In-

vestigation confirmed Wednesday that a Richard Alexander Zander, 21, is wanted as a parole violator and that a warrant was issued for his arrest last Aug. 27.

The Zander on the FBI's wanted list was convicted in Portland, Ore., of the interstate transport of stolen goods on May 9, 1972, and given a 10-year sentence and \$10,000 fine. The sentence was reduced to three years last November 21 and Zander was released on probation. He was listed as "self employed."

Intelligence sources here claim to have no documentation on the Centaur plan but are nonetheless convinced that it is a bogus scheme with which the CIA has no connection.

It was understood that State Department officials were apprised of the "Hoax" aspects of the plan in the event that any news inquiries about it arose at the Department's Tuesday briefing.

State Department spokesmen were reportedly apprehensive about dealing publicly with the matter without corroborative documents or other evidence.

Zander has reportedly left Mexico and there is no current information on his whereabouts.

The Centaur affair is laden with potential embarrassment for the administration, in the view of some officials, unless it can be conclusively established as a hoax. "What's at stake here is credibility," said one government officer.

Last March the CIA acknowledged, in Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings, that it sought to promote economic distress in Chile during 1970 in an effort to prevent Allende's election. The testimony was given by William V. Broe, at the time the CIA's chief of clandestine services for Latin America.

It is for that reason the CIA is now vulnerable to public suspicions of intervention in the upheaval that ousted Allende from office last week and led to his death.

Officially the CIA has no comment on the Vigorena allegations.

THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER
17 September 1973

The ugly new face of Chile

The new Chilean junta and its supporters can no more claim to have liberated their country than Stalin could claim to have liberated Poland. When General Augusto Pinochet, the head of the junta, said yesterday that fewer than 100 people died in last week's coup he supposed, no doubt, that this excused everything. His numbers are suspect and his argument is empty.

There can be no excuse for the way in which the Chilean armed forces and the likes of Mr Thieme (leader of the Fatherland and Freedom movement) overthrew the Allende Government. This does not mean, however, that the state in which Chile found itself before Tuesday was tolerable or could last. The armed forces intervened in a situation in which both the main political groups had lost control of their extremists. Members of the Fatherland and Freedom movement were certainly armed. So were some members of the Left wing, though the size of their arsenals was probably much exaggerated by the Right-wing press. The Poujadist lorry-owners and the shopkeepers were or had been on strike. Even the doctors were punishing their patients for what they considered to be Allende's misdeeds. Food was scarce and inflation was increasing at the rate of 1 per cent per day.

This situation—which must have been nearly intolerable—probably had many causes. The lorry-owners and the shopkeepers must bear a lot of the blame. The evidence that American corporations like ITT wanted to bring Allende down is convincing, whether they helped to do the actual deed or not. Another reason, though, must be that Allende as President had failed to master a menacing economic outlook.

This was not, however, the main charge brought against him by a hostile Congress. The Congress, which had unanimously voted to nationalise the copper industry, later accused him on August 23 of contravening the Constitution by introducing socialist measures which were outside the law. The Government, the Congress Opposition said, would have to "rectify its course of action." Otherwise "the national and professional nature of the armed forces and police would be compromised." The charge of unconstitutional behaviour was made but it has never been proved and no attempt was made to press it constitutionally. Instead, on Tuesday, the junta acted with unconstitutional force.

NEW YORK TIMES
28 September 1973

Repression in Chile Protested By Writers and Publisher Here

By ERIC PACE

The Authors League of America, representing 6,000 writers, and Grove Press, the publishing house, sent separate cablegrams to Chile yesterday decrying what were described as acts by the ruling junta against writers in Chile and their works.

Jerome Weidman, the writer,

who is president of the Authors League, cabled the Chilean Writers Society the text of the following resolution, which was adopted Wednesday by the league's council:

"The Authors League of America deplors the book burning and suppression of writers by the Chilean Govern-

ment. We join with the Chilean Writers Society in affirming the principle of free expression without censorship."

Barney Rosset, the president of Grove Press, sent the following cable to Gen. Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, the head of the military junta that overthrew the Marxist Government of President Salvador Allende earlier this month:

"Humanity stands aghast at your infamous sacking and butchery of the literary testa-

ment of Pablo Neruda. Your act recalls the worst days of Hitler's Third Reich.

"The entire civilized world is watching you and hoping that your desecrations of the human spirit will cease immediately."

The cablegram referred to a New York Times report from Santiago that a house owned by Mr. Neruda, the Nobel Prize-winner who died of cancer Sunday, had been sacked and badly damaged.

A co-signer was Fred Jordan,

the senior editor of Grove Press, which has published three collections of poems by Mr. Neruda.

Harvard Group Protests

A group of 44 university officials and professors has appealed to the United States Government, to Congress and to the United Nations to "exert the strongest pressure" on John P. Lewis, Dean of the new military government of Chile "to stop its reign of terror and to restore funda-

mental human rights."

The appeal was made in a statement sent to The New York Times by the Committee on Latin-American Studies at Harvard University. Among the signers are Jerome B. Wiesner, President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Woodrow Wilson School of International Affairs at Princeton University.

NEW YORK TIMES
26 September 1973

Salvador Allende: In Memoriam

By Regis Debray

PARIS—Within him [Allende], will-power vibrated stronger than ideas. Salvador was first of all a man of heart, for whom all that this expression holds—courage, faithfulness, emotion—counted more than everything else. A man who spoke to you using the familiar *tú* [an intimate form of address in Latin languages equivalent to the archaic "thee" in English], and you would have to make an effort to keep from answering him in the same fashion. One acknowledges the political animal in him but that was his twin—his role, his fateful image—which sometimes made him bitter. Because he had quite another image of himself, disarming and disarmed, which he kept secret, without speaking about it.

Moved by a childlike sense, silent and stubborn about "what was done" and "what was not done," about the noble and the base, he saw himself as a knight of hope, Robin Hood of the Mountains.

This discrepancy, this glorious incoherence, there is all the man. And that is why Allende was quite different from the colorless political doctrine that bore his name: why he had so many non-Allendist friends; why it was out of the question that he sign his capitulation alive. Allende did not have the political strategy to match this personal sense of decision. He had only scorn for those who possess strategy and not decision, but those who had both at once fascinated him: Fidel, "El Che"—who he saw at work. He wasn't at all happy down deep, nor proud of being the conventional president, the "skilled politician," the expert in conciliatory tactics.

He had dreamed of something and he didn't accept renunciation of his dream; the military wrested verbal concessions from him in the last months, but he made them furious by sitting on the decrees that were all ready to outlaw the M.I.R. [Movement of the Revolutionary Left, which brought more and more criticism upon the Popular Unity because of its stand in favor of tougher action]. There is a rule that says a reformist held hostage by bourgeois power will sooner

or later have to give the order to fire on the people to pay his ransom. He wanted to be the exception to the rule, and he was. When the police fired in 1972 on the residents of a *bidonville* during a night search and killed a worker, he went the very next day on foot and without any guard to apologize to the *pobladores* and speak to them man to man.

It will have to be told one day, though his enemies may profit by it, all that this man did to lift from the rut the armed continental revolution that fascinated his heart, though his mind refused it. As president of the senate, he gambled his political future several times to help and sometimes materially save clandestine individuals in difficulty in his own country. He went to welcome the survivors of the Bolivian guerrillas who crossed the Andes on foot with all the police of the continent in pursuit, and took them personally to Easter Island. For the Chilean press, these men were "bandits" and "stateless terrorists."

As President of the Republic, he risked the present: there isn't a Latin-American guerrilla who approached him without obtaining the means to carry on the struggle that he asked for, on condition he be responsible and sincere. For example, and to stick to known facts, he would have a hundred times preferred that Argentina upon whom he was vitally dependent for food supplies of wheat and meat, declare war upon him rather than be obliged to surrender the fugitives of Trelew to the military dictatorship a year ago. A matter of honor. Of principles. Alive, "El Che" knew that he could count on him [Allende] personally to do anything, including carry suitcases. And he carried some.

It was not his policy but the man was made this way, that above policy, and his policy, he placed moral standard, intuition, fraternity.

Outside his office, he wanted to breathe another atmosphere. He needed to contradict himself, split as he was between his political objectives and certain "ideals of the ego" from which he could not and would not depart. A word of encouragement from Fidel, or a word of reproach from "Tati," his daughter Beatrice, a militant revolutionary long

involved in difficult tasks and who was in charge of his secretarial staff at La Moneda, all these had more importance than a motion of congress or a resolution of a central committee.

I saw Salvador for the last time on Sunday, August 19. Before my departure for Cuba, he had invited me to spend the day with him at his country house, with the whole household, the family, the half dozen friends, always the same ones, including "El Perro." A fine winter day among the trees, a fire in the fireplace, red wine. It was, as always, jovial, warm, relaxed. Moderate pace, in spite of the crisis. At morning's end, we read and commented upon the press (already, there was no other way of staying informed). Salvador thus discovers that on Friday The New York Times was relating in extensive detail the workings of a "crisis" within the army which, in point of fact, only broke out on Saturday... [author's ellipsis, a French literary device inviting the reader archly to draw his own conclusions].

Thus an "honorable correspondent" [editor: agent] of the C.I.A., ostensibly a journalist, knew more than the president about the intentions of the military. Furious, Allende demands that the "journalist" be identified and localized as soon as possible on Monday, to expel him. But Monday, there will be many other things to do, another general to resign, another coup to dismantle, and the "journalist" will continue to do his work. Then Salvador, in excellent spirits, arranges a small chat, calls a few of us over in a corner to sit down with a Camembert cheese, tells us about his meeting the day before with this *putschiste* general, commander of the Air Force, that he made his Minister of Transportation in order to neutralize him. He asks questions, takes notes, draws up his plans for the next days.

These are excerpts from a 4,000-word article by Regis Debray commenting on the overthrow of President Salvador Allende Gossens. Debray is a French writer who was imprisoned in Bolivia where he had been in contact with Che Guevara, Fidel Castro's Argentinian companion in the Cuban revolution. Translation by The New York Times.

LONDON TIMES
28 September 1973

REPRESSION IN CHILE

The news from Chile gets worse. The junta which took power to save Chile from a totalitarian threat has banned all left-wing media and parties, outlawing the trade union movement and imposing censorship on the remainder of the press. The military leaders, while constantly proclaiming themselves "non-political", have nonetheless promised to rid Chile of the "malign tumour of Marxism" and to govern the country for an indefinite period without the help of politicians.

They have abolished the Congress, whose votes of censure on Dr Allende's government gave their intervention its only legal sanction, and the constitution in whose defence they were supposed to have acted. What they will put in their place is not yet clear but General Leigh, the airforce commander who appears to be the political brain of the junta, has already outlined plans for a corporatist state and an assembly in which the armed forces would have permanent representation.

The generals intervened, they said, to prevent civil war, and some of their repressive measures have undoubtedly reflected their anxiety to forestall such a war. So far their intervention has produced a death-toll which they themselves reckon in hundreds but which independent observers estimate in thousands. Sports stadia all over the country have been turned into temporary detention camps for thousands of left-wing

militants—or people presumed to be such, among whom are included the foreigners who came to Chile as refugees from military dictatorships elsewhere. From Americans and Swedes who were held in these camps we have eye-witness accounts of summary executions as well as of prisoners being beaten up during interrogation. There is little room for doubt that this is the bloodiest political upheaval Latin America has seen since the Mexican revolution. To which must be added the cheap attempts to blacken the late President's private life, the ransacking of private houses (including that of the poet Pablo Neruda, only days before his death from cancer), and the bonfires of "Marxist" books.

That a country so recently a model of democracy and moderation should be reduced to this situation is deeply distressing, even to those who live in a different hemisphere. Critics of *The Times* will no doubt accuse us of weeping crocodile tears, since we neither supported President Allende in his lifetime nor condemned the coup d'état when it occurred. It remains our view, however, that Dr Allende himself, however good his intentions, bears a large share of responsibility for the present state of affairs. His policies produced a polarization of Chilean opinion into two camps so intensely hostile to each other that a violent dénouement of some sort was almost inevitable, and a rate of inflation so rapid that probably no

political system in the world could survive it.

That does not mean that a coup d'état was the right way to deal with the situation, either morally or politically. Undoubtedly a preferable solution would have been some kind of compromise between Dr Allende and his more moderate opponents—a compromise which he appeared to be seeking during his last months in power, and which the Christian Democrat leaders may now regret not having tried harder to achieve. But objectively the coup d'état was not a surprising outcome of the situation which Allende had got the country into. The European left should reflect on that before adopting him too uncritically as its martyr.

Nothing is so likely to make him a martyr, however, as the present behaviour of his successors. Already they must have forfeited the confidence of many of their democratic countrymen, including the moderate opposition to Dr Allende. Their reputation in the outside world will depend on their willingness to use their power as the basis for a return to constitutional government.

The British Government has recognized the new régime—a gesture which is no more than realistic. It should be followed up, as suggested in our columns yesterday by a group of distinguished Cambridge professors, by determined persuasion from Britain in the direction of justice and restraint, and towards the early release of political detainees.

MIAMI HERALD
13 September 1973

Peru Press Calls Coup 'Triumph for CIA'

By DON BOHNING
Herald Latin America Editor

LIMA, Peru — Peru's nationalistic military government, that proclaims itself neither capitalist nor Communist, remained officially silent on events in neighboring Chile Wednesday but the Peruvian press had plenty to say, much of it in bold headlines.

Expreso, a morning daily expropriated by the military shortly after it seized power in 1968 and now run by a leftist workers cooperative, blamed it all on the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. "Coup of the CIA Triumphs in Chile," blared one front page headline, in even larger type Expreso declared that "They Killed Allende."

Extra, its sister afternoon tabloid proclaimed in equally large type that "The People (of Chile) Do Not Surrender." Below the headline an arrow pointing to a picture of Chile's deposed Marxist President Salvador Allende identified him as

an "heroic symbol."

INSIDE IN ITS NEWS columns, Extra carried declarations from various leftist labor, professional and student organizations and leaders in Peru condemning Allende's overthrow, repudiating the "fascist military coup" and expressing solidarity with the Chilean people.

The independent, but leftist, tabloid Correo proclaimed that "Allende Died Like a Man," then in smaller type below said that "he did not surrender . . . he killed himself in the palace."

La Prensa and Comercio, the most prestigious Lima dailies, devoted extensive, mostly matter-of-fact, coverage to Allende's overthrow and death. They carried stories on such diverse subjects as the 1891 suicide of Chilean President Juan Balmaceda while in asylum in the Argentine Embassy in Santiago and on Chinese Premier Chou En-lai predicting in a 1971 interview with the Mexican newspaper Excelsior that

Allende would have problems.

IN THE INTERVIEW, Chou told Excelcior's correspondent that, "For us, in accord with our concepts, it is impossible that a democratic government can successfully consolidate itself without the support of the armed forces. The election (of Allende) does not by itself consolidate power. All governments, democratic or proletarian, must count on their armed forces to insure themselves in power."

Neither La Prensa nor El Comercio, both under pressure from the military government, commented editorially on events in Chile.

Meanwhile, hundreds of Chileans who had been abroad when the coup occurred found themselves stranded in Lima Wednesday with Santiago's Pudahuel Airport shut down since early Tuesday morning. Hotels began filling up and airline

reservation counters were flooded with requests for seats on the first available flights to Santiago.

A WEDNESDAY MORNING Braniff flight from Miami had been expected to continue on to Santiago but announced cancellation of the stop 10 minutes before landing in Lima.

The border between Chile and Peru also remained closed Wednesday as did Chile's borders with Bolivia and Argentina.

Two flights arrived in Lima from Santiago Tuesday morning but both departed Chile before the coup occurred. Chileans aboard first learned of the military takeover from local newsmen on hand at Lima's Jorge Chavez airport to interview them.

The Chile situation was the principal topic of conversation among politically aware Peruvians with reactions as mixed as the local press stories.

NATIONAL GUARDIAN
26 September 1973

CIA 'coup teams' active in Chile takeover

By North American Congress on Latin America

On various occasions during the past 20 years, the U.S. government has employed "coup teams" as one of its main weapons to combat strong anti-imperialist governments. Such special teams are composed of CIA operatives with special skill in overthrowing popular governments.

Coup teams were employed in Guatemala in 1954, Brazil in 1964, Bolivia in 1971, Uruguay in 1973 and now in Chile. In fact the Chilean coup provides a classic example, drawing on operatives who played roles in earlier coups and U.S. interventions, and suggests links with Watergate principals.

The following items provide background on the team employed in Chile, including its previous experience:

—The U.S. Embassy in Chile from the time of Allende's election to the present has utilized at least 10 CIA agents. The 10 are Arnold M. Isaacs, Frederick Latrash, John B. Tipton, Raymond A. Warren, Donald H. Winters, James E. Anderson, Deane Hinton, Daniel N. Arzac, Joseph F. McManus and Keith W. Wheelock.

—Nathaniel P. Davis, the U.S. ambassador, is rumored to have served under the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the CIA's World War 2 predecessor.

Davis is an expert in anti-communist affairs, having headed the Soviet desk in the State Department at the height of the cold war.

Davis' career crosses that of E. Howard Hunt (of Watergate fame) in several situations. Both Hunt and Davis were operatives in Eastern Europe during the late 1940s. Davis was stationed in Caracas, Venezuela, in 1960, a key city for CIA activity in the preparation of the Bay of Pigs invasion which Hunt coordinated. Hunt was in charge of the "plumbers" squad in the White House, alleged to have staged the raid on the Chilean Chancellery in Washington in 1972. The raid was designed to obtain information about the ITT affair, of which Davis, as ambassador, must have been well informed. E. Howard Hunt was also sent by the White House to silence Dita Beard on the ITT affair. Charles Colson (another Watergate figure), Hunt and Davis were all active in Brown University

alumni activities. In fact, this is how Colson and Hunt originally met.

Davis served in Chile as a high official in the Peace Corps during the period leading up to the CIA-backed election in Chile of Eduardo Frei in 1964.

Davis and Deane Hinton served in Guatemala together during 1968-1969. This was a peak period in the "pacification" program under which 20,000 people were murdered. The U.S. Embassy, which Davis headed from 1963 to 1971, maintained close relations with the National Police and right-wing terrorist groups which carried out his policy, as well as with CIA operatives working under Hunt.

—Deane Hinton, who in 1963 had moved from Guatemala to Chile, was transferred back to Washington in 1971 to serve as Deputy Director of the Council on International Economic Policy, an agency of the National Security Council. This agency directed the strategy of the "invisible" blockade of Chile which has produced economic chaos during the past two years.

—Of the 10 CIA agents, 2 agents, Latrash and Warren, were involved in the 1954 Guatemala coup.

—John E. Anderson, one of the CIA agents now in Santiago, was stationed in the Dominican Republic in 1965 at the time of the U.S. invasion which toppled the constitutional government. Harry Shlaudeman, now Deputy Chief of Mission in the Santiago Embassy, was in Santo Domingo at the same time.

—Daniel N. Arzac, a member of the U.S. Embassy staff in Chile and a CIA agent, served in Montevideo in 1957 when E. Howard Hunt was CIA station chief for Uruguay.

—Keith Wheelock, a CIA agent attached to the U.S. Embassy during the Allende election campaign, is reported to have been the Embassy contact with the fascist terrorist group, "Fatherland and Liberty."

LONDON TIMES
13 September 1973

THE FAILURE OF A MARXIST

The end of Dr Allende's regime in Chile is a tragedy, though largely one of his own making. However bungling his methods, his aim to build socialism by peaceful and democratic means was a sincere one, and deserved respect even from non-socialists. The world is too much tormented these days by the activities of doctrinaire socialists determined to impose their creed by violence not to be grateful to any socialist who attempts to lead his fellows along a non-violent path. The death of Che Guevara was interpreted by many Latin American socialists as showing that the Cuban revolutionary model could not be exported. It is all too likely that the death of Salvador Allende will lead Marxists in Latin America and elsewhere to despair of the peaceful road to socialism and turn once more to revolutionary violence.

The failure of the Presidency of Allende was also a tragedy for Chile herself, not because the coup put an end to a government which never had a majority either in the country or in Congress, but because it marks the end of a long period during which Chile's peaceful and democratic political traditions were the envy of her neighbours. To apportion the blame for this is no easy matter. Many Chileans will argue that the *Unidad Popular* government had itself made a coup inevitable by its hopeless mismanagement of the economy leading to a break-

down of public order, and at the same time had provided justification for it by its own unconstitutional acts. On the whole this would be our judgment; there is a limit to the ruin a country can be expected to tolerate.

Yet against this the supporters of Dr Allende can argue that the economic stalemate was produced partly by the systematic obstruction and sabotage of the government's economic policies by the opposition inside and outside Congress, and that long before the coup the regime's right-wing opponents had shown no excessive respect for the niceties of the constitution in their efforts to destroy it. They can point out that the President often leant over backwards to observe the letter of the constitution—at least as interpreted by his own legal advisers—thereby infuriating many of his supporters and perhaps sowing the seeds of his ultimate failure. They can point too to the efforts which he made during his last weeks to reach an understanding with the opposition, and especially to his final concession on the major point at issue between himself and Congress, when he agreed to sign the law revoking all those nationalizations that had not received congressional approval.

No doubt Chileans will continue to be bitterly divided on the issue for many years, if not decades. At this stage what a foreign commentator can say is that, whether or not the armed forces were right

to do what they have done, the circumstances were such that a reasonable military man could in good faith have thought it his constitutional duty to intervene. Dr Allende himself had taken the initiative in politicizing the army by bringing senior officers into his cabinet, and the majority in Congress had repeatedly denounced the government for acting unconstitutionally, while reminding the armed forces of their duty to defend the constitution.

Assuming that they are able to establish control of the country, the new leaders must be judged by their actions in the next few days. What we have heard so far is not encouraging. The indefinite suspension of Congress, the statement that "Marxism will be totally eradicated", the abrupt severance of relations with Cuba, the assumption by the armed forces of the title "Movement of National Liberation" and their claim to a special vocation to "watch over the destinies of youth"—all these suggest a classic right-wing military regime rather than a reluctant caretaker government anxious only to restore order, amend the constitution and then return power to the civilians. A regime on these lines is likely to have not only the whole left against it but also the Christian Democrats, Chile's largest single party. In a country which remains intensely political, that prospect should give the generals pause.

THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, Sept. 25, 1973

Two Assert Chilean Junta Is Killing Many Prisoners

By Terri Shaw

Washington Post Staff Writer

An American graduate student taken prisoner after the Chilean coup said yesterday that he was stripped, beaten, interrogated with a rifle at his head and threatened with being put before a firing squad during the week that he and his wife were held prisoner by the new military government.

Adam Garrett-Schesch, 31, and his wife Patricia, 30, gave newsmen a detailed description of their experiences as prisoners in Santiago's National Stadium where the military junta has said 7,000 persons are being held. The two had been in Chile nearly three years doing research to earn doctorates at the University of Wisconsin.

When they arrived in Miami from Santiago Sunday night, the couple told newsmen that they saw 400 to 500 persons executed in the stadium. Yesterday,

they said they had not actually witnessed executions, but had seen that number of prisoners marched onto the playing field from the dressing rooms where prisoners were held, and then heard bursts of gunfire from the playing field. They said none of the prisoners taken away under those circumstances returned.

"We are firmly convinced that these people were executed there," Garrett-Schesch said.

Other foreigners who have been released from the stadium have also reported hearing gunfire within it.

The military leaders who overthrew the leftist government of President Salvador Allende on Sept. 11 said that no one has been executed in the stadium. The junta has announced a few executions of persons resisting the military takeover.

The couple, still tense after their ordeal, told newsmen they had decided to describe only things they had seen personally—"no rumors, no hearsay." They emphasized that as trained scholars, they had tried to make careful and exact observations while they were inside the stadium, taking particular care to make accurate estimates of the number of people they saw being led off to the playing field.

Mrs. Garrett-Schesch said hearing the sounds of beatings in neighboring cells and watching the people being led onto the playing field was "the most horrible experience I have had in my life."

She said one of the first people she saw taken onto the playing field was a Chilean friend who was arrested with the Garrett-Schesches at their home four days after the coup. His hands were tied behind his back and a guard put a cigarette in his mouth, she said.

"The group walked out singing the 'Internationale,' then the shooting began . . . heavy, sustained automatic weapons fire . . . It lasted a minute or two," she said.

"I heard fewer and fewer voices singing. And then the singing stopped."

Her husband, who was studying agrarian reform under the Allende government for his doctoral dissertation in history, said he was interrogated for hours about his research, particularly two maps found in their apartment—one showing working class districts of Santiago and one with symbols indicating a breakdown of election results around the country.

The Garrett-Schesches said they were arrested when neighbors complained to police after they had tried to organize orderly lines at a small food store which was being mobbed by customers.

Asked about their politics, Garrett-Schesch described himself and his wife as "progressive people" who were "sympathetic" to the AL-

lende government.

A friend of the couple in Madison, Wis., said that Garrett-Schesch was a founder of the Wisconsin Alliance, a radical political party, and once ran unsuccessfully for mayor of

Madison "on a radical program."

Mrs. Garrett-Schesch, a sociologist, was doing research on the changing status of women in Chile, and was affiliated with the University of Wisconsin's Land Tenure Center there.

The couple has an 18-month-old son, Aaron, who was born in Chile. He was staying with the maid's family when they were arrested, and returned to the United States with them.

WASHINGTON POST
5 October 1973

Human Rights in Chile

A somber numbers game is being played out in Chile over the total of Chileans killed in and since the coup of Sept. 11. The junta tends to minimize the toll—its latest count is 284 deaths nationwide. Others, without the junta's interest in advertising its popular acceptance and control, have produced much larger figures. One journalist who visited the Santiago morgue on two successive days counted some 270 corpses. A CIA estimate made toward the end of September put the total at 3,000 deaths, of which a third were soldiers. A toll of soldiers on this scale would indicate a measure of popular resistance considerably greater than the junta has conceded so far.

The civilian casualties seem to fall in two categories. First, there are officials and followers of the deposed Allende government. The junta has conceded executing some of these people summarily; additional executions have been reported unofficially. Then, there are nameless workers, supporters of Allende, in the slum districts in Santiago and other cities; pitched battles as well as indiscriminate shooting and bombing by the junta have been reported. Some high Allende aides have been stashed away on a remote island, without trial. For others, military trials have begun.

The junta has been at least partially responsive to human rights appeals from the international community. A mission from the International Committee of the Red Cross is currently in Chile; unfortunately, Red Cross reports must be made privately to the host government, which need not reveal the results. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees has set up some 20 havens for the numerous foreigners who were admitted

to the country by President Allende but who are now subject to being designated as "criminals"—a status that would make them ineligible for the junta's safe-conduct guarantees. Some of these foreigners have feared to come out of hiding into the "havens." There are disquieting reports that Brazilian police have arrived in Chile to reclaim some Brazilian refugees.

The State Department reported this week that the American ambassador in Chile had expressed to the junta the United States' concern for the protection of human rights. Otherwise, such concern has been largely muffled by a hands-off position concealing evident satisfaction that the Allende government is out of power. If the administration is to keep in this position on human rights, it could at least ensure that no moves are made in unseemly haste to allow development loans to start flowing again to the new Chilean government; the United States had forced a virtual suspension of such loans in order to put pressure on Chile in negotiations over expropriated American firms.

Of immediate effect, we trust, in letting Santiago know that Americans hold Chile to recognized standards in human rights, are actions in Congress. The Senate, by voice vote with no audible objections, has approved a sense-of-Congress resolution, written by Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.), asking the President to deny economic or military aid until he can certify that Chile is fulfilling its human rights obligations. The House is working on its own resolution, which, while it lacks an aid suspension, makes plain the House's concern. Enough legitimate anxiety has been stirred by reports from Chile to make House action essential now.

THE NEW REPUBLIC
22 September 1973

Exit Allende

In the fall of 1970 a senior Central Intelligence Agency official by the name of William V. Broe proposed a plan to "accelerate economic chaos" in Chile as a way of blocking Marxist candidate Salvador Allende Gossens, who was then running for president in a three-cornered election. According to a Senate subcommittee, which recently revealed that information, the Nixon administration finally abstained from putting the plan into effect. But it was economic chaos that led to the downfall and death of Allende last week, and so the suspicion is bound to arise that his collapse partly resulted from the kind of covert political maneuvers the CIA has been carrying out in Latin America for years. It would be foolish for the US government to deny involvement in the coup, since it hasn't been accused, and anyway denials are usually construed as backhanded confessions of guilt. It would also be foolish for the International Telephone and Telegraph Company and other US firms, whose holdings in Chile were nationalized by Allende, to attempt

to regain their positions, since such efforts might be interpreted as support of or complicity in what happened.

The fact that Allende was toppled by a military junta is a tragedy for Chile, which for decades has been one of Latin America's most stable and prosperous democratic nations. The tragedy is compounded by the likelihood that the country may not soon regain its equilibrium. Just as Allende's leftists were opposed by right-wing elements, now the conservatives who have come to power face the hostility of revolutionaries, and this polarization portends more violence and turmoil. The coup, moreover, may inspire soldiers elsewhere in Latin America to attempt to take over fledgling democracies.

Underlying the upheaval in Chile was a growing conflict over economic measures. The leftists, who have been strong for years, backed Allende's program to put Chile on the road to socialism; some believed that he was moving too slowly. The middle class, in contrast, resented his nationalization of private enterprises, and it found sympathizers among ambitious

military officers. The difficulties that led to the coup began this summer with a strike of truck owners protesting Allende's alleged intention to merge their small operations into a large, state-run firm. The strike paralyzed the movement of supplies into Chile's cities and was aggravated by severe shortages despite attempts to purchase wheat from Argentina and the United States. There is no reason, however, to forecast that the generals who have supplanted Allende will improve the economy, whose growth rate has been falling since the early 1960s. They are apt to be as nationalistic as Allende in order to satisfy Chilean public opinion, and

hence their chances of attracting foreign investment are limited. Nor are they any more experienced in the management of economic affairs than the civilians they have replaced, and they could be a good deal more inept.

The United States shares in the larger responsibility for Allende's failure. For the many grand designs aimed at Latin American development put forth in Washington over the years have come to little. As a consequence Chile suffered from neglect as much as it did from its own internal tensions, and its troubles may be repeated in other states south of the border.

NEW YORK TIMES
1 October 1973

CHILEAN MILITARY WORRYING CHURCH

Junta's Authoritarian Acts Is Causing Unease

Special to The New York Times

SANTIAGO, Chile Sept. 30 — Chile's Roman Catholic bishops have offered to cooperate with the ruling junta in the "reconstruction" of the country, but there is deep malaise in church circles over the continuing violence and the authoritarian actions of the military since it seized power nearly three weeks ago.

At least two priests have died in the wave of repression against sympathizers of the former leftist Government. A number of Chilean priests, particularly in the provinces, have been arrested, warned not to engage in politics and released.

Foreign priests have been a special target of the military. Some have been expelled — at least two Americans, two Canadians and several Dutchmen and Spaniards. Strong pressure has also been put on four French priests to leave the country.

Some in Hiding

"They hold us responsible for

bringing Marxism and class struggle into the country," a foreign priest ordered to leave the country, declared bitterly.

Christians for Socialism, a group of some 200 priests and other church people who supported the social aims of the late President Salvador Allende Gossens, has gone into recess and some of its leaders are in hiding.

Gonzalo Arroyo, the group head, has twice been interrogated by the military authorities but declines to make any public statement.

One of the gravest acts of the new military authorities, according to sources close to the Catholic hierarchy, is the decision a few days ago to name military men as rectors in all universities. The move was expected to bring protests from the Vatican.

Help for Prisoners

The Catholic University of Chile has always enjoyed special status, even under the President Allende, a Marxist. The university chancellor, who was approved by the Pope, had the power to ratify the nomination of the rectors.

The Archbishop of Santiago, Raúl Cardinal Silva Henríquez, has publicly supported the military in their declared aim of "achieving a true social justice."

At the same time, however, he is known to be working

quietly to help prisoners and to obtain guarantees for foreign refugees. He has visited the national stadium, where up to 7,000 people are detained, and taken help and transmitted messages for prisoners.

Cardinal Silva Henríquez ardently supported discussions between President Allende and the dominant opposition party, the Christian Democrats, and until the end played the role of mediator in an attempt to spare the country from violent confrontation.

However, most Christian Democrats, led by former President Eduardo Frei Montalva, opposed any compromise with President Allende, according to church sources.

"They favored a white coup — a peaceful intervention by the military, with the ousting of Allende — and sincerely thought the armed forces would call for elections in a month or so," an aide of the Cardinal said, critical of such "naiveté."

Many priests and staunch Christian Democrats who disapproved President Allende's hurried moves toward socialism, have been dismayed by the new regime's use of force and its arbitrary measures, such as the closing of congress, the outlawing of leftist parties, the turning of Marxist books and the dissolution of the Labor Federation.

The permanent committee of the Chilean episcopate, led by

Cardinal Silva Henríquez, visited the junta Friday to offer its "cooperation in the spiritual and material development of Chile." A communiqué issued at the close of the audience stressed the wish of the church to participate in "the pacification of spirits and in guaranteeing and developing the social gains of the workers."

Alarmed by Repression

The bishops are said to be alarmed over the repression that has been unleashed since the coup, often by lower-ranking officers and apparently without the knowledge of the junta.

An office has been set up within the church to look into abuses of human rights and acts of violence toward workers, who generally supported the Allende Government, as well as toward religious missions.

One case involved the Rev. Juan Alcina, a Spanish priest of the Catholic Action Workers Movement, who was arrested on Sept. 18. The Archbishop was notified of the priest's arrest but could not contact him.

Several days later a body with 10 bullet holes in the back, was found in the Napocho River. A Spanish consul identified the body as that of father Alcina.

NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1973

Jobs Are Sought Abroad for Chilean Intellectuals

By ERIC PACE

Jobs are being sought outside Chile for intellectuals who, prefer not to live there now that the country is under military rule, experts in Latin American Affairs reported here over the weekend.

One expert critical of the new junta said, "We're probably going to have many thousands of Chileans who want to leave the country — or have to."

The junta is openly hostile to left-wing intellectuals and yesterday announced it would replace all university rectors in Chile with military appointees.

Even before the announcement, the experts said, several organizations, including the

Military Take-Over Expected to Bring the Exodus of Many Thousands

Argentina-based Latin American Council of Social Science, had been trying to learn how many Chileans would be harried by the new Government, which came to power through a coup d'état that overthrew President Salvador Allende Gossens earlier this month.

The People Affected

Critics of the junta say four kinds of people are involved: Scholars and others who have taken refuge in foreign embassies; persons in hiding; persons

who are expected to have difficulty practicing their professions — notably experts in sociology, a discipline which, these critics report, the regime has openly criticized; other professional persons, such as economists and political scientists, who will prefer not to continue working under the new regime.

Organizations that are understood to be seeking ways to help them include the Latin American Studies Association, a professional group that includes more than 1,000 scholars in the United States, Amnesty International, and the office of Senator Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts.

Universities where departments have indicated an interest in employing Chilean ex-

patriates include New York University, the experts said, although they added they hoped that many of them would find jobs in Latin America so that the area would not suffer a "brain drain."

GUARDIAN/LE MONDE WEEKLY
29 September 1973

Allende's sad bequest

Recognition does not imply approval; that is true. But only two weeks have passed since the armed forces overthrew civilian rule in Chile and replaced that country's faltering but proud democracy with, for the present, an authoritarian and apparently vengeful regime and, for the future, a long period of doubt. The Western countries which have hastened to recognise the generals' coup would have done better to reflect for a few weeks on the tragedy for Chile, on the slide from the high ambitions of three years ago to the stadia full of political prisoners today.

Tempting though it may be (especially in France and Italy where the Communist parties are strong) it would be wrong to draw the swift conclusion that radical reform is impossible by democratic means. The anti-democrats among us, those on the extreme Left, have been preaching for years that only revolution can achieve radical change. This may have been true of Chile and it may be true of other Latin American countries but it is not true of (forgive the phrase) the older and more developed democracies. Since 1945 Britain has seen many radical changes in its social structure, all of them superintended by an elected parliament. Many more, and more radical, changes are needed if Britain is to approach more closely to the unattainable state of total justice, but they too can and

will be brought about by the same democratic means.

Attempts to compare Allende's fate with that of Dubcek are also misleading. The world was not astonished when a Marxist was elected president of a democratic country because that is always a possibility. But the world was astonished when Czechoslovakia decided to throw off the Russian yoke, because that is not a possibility. The universal horror when Soviet tanks moved into Prague was genuine, but the mental preparations had already been made. Russia could not allow any of its subjects to experiment with social democracy because if she did they would all want to join the bandwagon of freedom. It would be best to regard the Chilean experience as distinctively Chilean and not to draw from it wild and illogical conclusions about what might happen elsewhere.

Salvador Allende was a good man and an idealistic member of the bourgeoisie. He decided to improve the lot of his most impoverished fellow-countrymen by Marxist means. His idealism led him to try this through the ballot box instead of by the gun (against Castro's advice). But he made two mistakes, one fundamental and one accidental. A people in its right mind does not vote itself the loss of its liberties. Allende was a minority president (36 per cent of the votes) with a hostile Congress. It was a

basic contradiction to assume that from this slender power base he could construct in Chile the apparatus of a Communist State. This is what he tried to do, in spite of the censure of the Congress and the courts.

The tactical error was in the handling of the economy. No doubt he had a large majority behind him in nationalising the copper mines. But he failed to profit from the boom in copper. Production slumped and the miners went on strike. Agrarian reforms, as in the early Soviet Union, led to a shortage of food. He antagonised the middle class whose acquiescence he needed if his programme was to succeed. Most importantly he antagonised the lorry drivers in a country more than 2,500 miles from top to bottom which depends on road transport. Threats to nationalise this industry effectively halted the economy, with the grotesque shortages and inflation (some sources estimate more than 300 per cent a year) which inevitably followed. In calling in the Army to join his Cabinet he put political ideas into the generals' heads — or at least encouraged those that were there. It is a tragedy that so well-meaning a man should have brought his country to ruin, but let it be admitted that that is what he did. And by ruin is meant totalitarian rule in a country which for most of this century has shown Latin America that it is possible to work by constitutional means.

NEW YORK TIMES
26 September 1973

Off Course in Chile

Despite their tradition of noninvolvement in politics, Chile's armed forces are apparently following the dismally familiar pattern of other military dictatorships since their violent overthrow of President Allende. They have even added a few distinct—and distinctly unsavory—trappings of their own. While the reports of large-scale executions of alleged leftists may not be true, the junta's avowed aim to return Chile to peaceful, constitutional government sounds more hollow with every passing day.

The junta has not only outlawed all Marxist parties in a country where these groups commanded nearly 44 per cent of the votes in congressional elections last March, but has suspended all other political parties and dissolved the freely elected Congress.

It has carried out a public burning of books, periodicals and documents of all kinds on a scale seldom seen since the heyday of Hitler, evidently in the naive belief that this crude operation would—in the words of one of the ruling generals—help "extirpate the Marxist cancer from Chile."

Perhaps even more ominous for the long haul in Chile, General Gustavo Leigh, commander of the Air Force and one of four junta leaders, indicates that a new constitution is being prepared which will broaden the role of the armed forces and give them "representation in legislative bodies." He has added that there

will be no popular referendum on the constitution.

There may be countries where the military could impose such a system. Chile, with its democratic tradition and political sophistication, is not one of them.

If the military leaders had evidence of Cuban and North Korean involvement in arming and training Chilean guerrillas, it is not surprising that they would immediately break relations with those two Communist regimes. That, however, is quite a different thing from trying to "extirpate" the Marxist idea by force.

It may have been expected that the military regime should return to their owners and managers those Chilean enterprises "intervened" by the Allende Government through illegal or underhanded means. But they must know that they cannot turn the clock back in a country that was headed for moderate socialism and national ownership of its natural resources long before Dr. Allende came to power.

Furthermore, to keep 7,000 persons, Chilean and foreign, confined in the national stadium in Santiago two weeks after the coup is an inhumane act that only invites the condemnation it is receiving around the world.

The junta needs all the help it can get if it is to avert civil war, pacify the country and create the conditions for political and economic recovery. It will not get that help if it persists along the sterile if familiar path of military dictatorship in what was one of the Americas' few remaining strongholds of democracy.

NEW YORK TIMES
26 September 1973

LEFTISTS MOURN NERUDA AT RITES

Poet's Funeral in Santiago
Turns Into Demonstration

By MARVINE HOWE

Special to The New York Times

SANTIAGO, Chile, Sept. 25—The funeral service for the poet Pablo Neruda turned into a left-wing demonstration today, the first since the military junta overthrew President Salvador Allende Gossens two weeks ago.

A crowd of about 1,800 workers, writers and other intellectuals, mostly communists and Socialists, sang the "Internationale" and cheered the Chilean Communist party and Communist youth movement in front of the mausoleum, where the coffin of the Communist poet was placed. Mr. Neruda

NEW YORK TIMES
27 September 1973

died of cancer on Sunday.

"With Neruda, we bury Salvador Allende," the mourners cried. Mr. Neruda was a close friend of the Socialist President, who died during the military coup d'état and was buried secretly in the presence of only close members of his family and representatives of the military.

Outside the cemetery, heavy contingents of troops and carabineros, or paramilitary police, stood on the alert with machine guns and rifles. But the crowd dispersed rapidly after the service and there was no incident.

The military junta paid homage to Mr. Neruda yesterday, calling him "one of the sources of pride in our national culture." Mr. Neruda won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1971, and served as Chilean Ambassador to France under President Allende.

State Funeral Barred

However, the Government barred a state funeral on the ground that the country was still under state of siege and therefore large gatherings could

not be permitted.

Nevertheless, the Government-censored press was allowed to print the time and thousand people turned up at place of the funeral, and several the cemetery. But many of them remained outside, apparently afraid to enter the cemetery and be photographed by the many cameramen on hand.

A number of Communist and Socialist militants came out of hiding to attend the service and planned to disappear from view again afterward, according to left-wing sources.

The military junta has arrested 30 of Dr. Allende's closest aides and ministers and is holding them on an island in the Strait of Magellan. Thirty-six other leftist leaders have been declared "wanted" by the military and thousands of left-wing militants and sympathizers, including foreigners, have been arrested and are under interrogation.

Thus the leftist songs and cheers at the funeral today appeared to be a daring act of defiance to the military junta.

The funeral cortege began

shortly after 10 A.M. at Mr. Neruda's home in Santiago's artists' quarter at the base of San Cristóbal Hill. The house, which had not been lived in for about a year, had been sacked and badly damaged. Windows were shattered, carpets ripped up, furnishings destroyed, and all the poet's books seized.

Denial by the Junta

Gen. Herman Brady, a spokesman for the Junta, issued a statement last night calling the damage to the Neruda house "regrettable" and denying that the military or the carabineros, had been responsible.

Despite the official denial, public opinion is generally convinced that the poet's home, like many others, was raided by the military in search of arms, leftist leaders and Marxist literature.

The Ambassadors of Sweden, Mexico and Rumania attended the funeral service. Also present was Radomiro Tomic, a former Chilean Ambassador to the United States, who was the Christian Democratic candidate against Dr. Allende in the 1970 presidential election.

Neruda Manuscripts Missing, Publisher Here Says

By ERIC PACE

Pablo Neruda, the Chilean poet, had substantially completed writing his memoirs before he died of cancer in Santiago on Sunday, a New York publisher said yesterday, but the whereabouts of the manuscript is not known.

The publisher, Roger W. Straus Jr., president of Farrar, Straus & Giroux, said that Mr. Neruda, who won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1971, had also left behind the manuscripts of dozens of recently written poems as well as a valuable personal library that was housed in a wing of the poet's seaside home at Isla Negra, outside Santiago.

The fate of this material is also not known here, Mr. Straus

reported in an interview, although a New York Times correspondent reported from Santiago Tuesday that a house in Santiago that belonged to Mr. Neruda, an avowed Communist for many years, had been sacked and badly damaged.

Santiago's new ruling junta has called the damage regrettable and denied responsibility for it, but there is a widespread belief that the Santiago house was raided by the military in search of leftist leaders' arms, and Marxist literature.

Contract Was Signed

Mr. Neruda, who was 69 years old, was a friend of Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens, the Marxist President who was overthrown by the military Sept. 11.

Last summer, Mr. Straus reported, Mr. Neruda signed a contract under which Farrar Straus was to have the world

English-language rights to the memoirs and to six other books. He said the poet had been hurrying to finish his autobiography in time for it to be published on his 70th birthday, July 12, 1974.

"Now what we are all sweating out is where we are in terms of the memoirs," Mr. Straus reported.

Mr. Neruda had suggested that in their completed form they might amount to 80,000 to 90,000 words. Mr. Straus declined to divulge the financial details of the contract except to say that the sums involved "won't change the economy of Chile — under any administration."

The eventual royalties are expected to be paid by Mr. Neruda's literary agent, Carmen Barcells, to his widow, Matilde, who appear at his funeral in Santiago Tuesday. The poet's

only child, a daughter, died in 1942.

What disclosures Mr. Neruda makes in his memoirs are not known here, but besides writing reams of poetry he had been active in politics from the time of the Spanish Civil War through recent tenure as Chile's Ambassador to France. He resigned the post in February because of health.

Since then, his friends have reported, he lived and worked in the Isla Negra house, a two-story brick structure with picture windows looking out to sea.

A journalist and friend, Mrs. Rita Ghibert, reported in "Seven Voices," published by Knopf this year, that Mr. Neruda had given the house and the books in the library to the Chilean Communist party.

NEW YORK TIMES
17 September 1973

Cuba Says Envoys Halted Attack on Embassy in Chile

HAVANA, Sept. 16 (Reuters).

Cuba's Ambassador to Chile, ousted as a result of the military coup d'état last week, said yesterday that foreign diplomats in Santiago intervened to halt armed attacks on the Cuban mission during the uprising.

In the face of an assault by troops on the building, Ambas-

sador Mario García Incháustegui said, the Swedish, Soviet, Mexican and Peruvian envoys insistently demanded that the embassy's diplomatic immunity be respected.

He said that the leaders of the coup finally bowed to the demands.

The Ambassador charged that Chilean troops opened fire on the embassy staff Tuesday night despite a safe-conduct agreement that a political counselor, Luis Fernández, the husband of President Salvador

Allende Gossens' daughter Beatriz, be permitted to attend the dead leader's funeral. Mr. Fernández Ona and another diplomat were wounded, he said.

Cuba has asked for a meeting of the United Nations Security Council tomorrow to examine the charges.

Tuesday, Oct. 2, 1973 THE WASHINGTON POST

Embassies, U.N. Provide Help to Refugees From Chile Coup

By Lewis H. Diuguid

Washington Post Staff Writer

SANTIAGO, Oct. 1—"The Chilean coup has made the old Latin custom of political asylum obsolete," said U.N. official, throwing up his hands after almost three weeks of fielding urgent pleas from Chileans and foreign exiles for safe passage out of Chile.

The Chileans for the most part were major figures in the government of the late President Salvador Allende or in the Marxist parties that formed his coalition. By now, most of them are under arrest or have taken asylum in Latin embassies from which they will be flown abroad.

But for thousands of other Latin Americans here, the situation is far more complicated, and often equally grim. To handle them, the U.N. High Commission for Refugees has sought and received the cooperation of the military junta in setting up havens for foreigners cast adrift by the coup.

Chile, historically hospitable to exiles, is showing its xenophobic side as a result of charges by the junta that foreigners who entered the country illegally took an active part in the Allende government.

The fact that Chile was such a free and easy place contributes to the confusion. By the junta's count there are 13,000 foreigners—"for the most part extremists"—in the country without proper documentation.

Another 4,000 employees of various international organizations and their families are quite secure legally, but suspect in the eyes of many Chileans who have been urged to denounce any suspicious acts by foreigners.

Enrique Iglesias, secretary general of the main U.N. organization based here, the Economic Commission for Latin America, spent the first week after the coup establishing the inviolability of U.N. offices.

The military generally accepted the immunity of the diplomatic corps with the exception of the Cuban mission, which was accused of intervention in Chilean politics. U.N. people, including a couple of Cuban doctors, went through some harrowing expe-

riences before their status was sorted out.

Most non-Latin foreigners' situations are now close to normal. About two dozen Americans who were detained after the coup have been released through the efforts of the U.S. consulate, and have left the country.

Some 2,500 Americans are registered with the embassy, and most of their relatives at home sent cables asking about their whereabouts. As of now, the embassy lists no Americans dead, and two missing.

The United States and European nations did not sign the Treaty of Caracas that establishes the principle of asylum and safe passage abroad for victims of political upheaval.

Nevertheless, several European embassies opened their doors to Chilean Marxists and other refugees fearing reprisals from the military. The Swedish ambassador has taken up this role quite openly and has accused the United Nations of doing too little to help the refugees.

Another European embassy is more discreet. After the Chilean staff has left for the day, the wife of the ambassador starts cooking curried chicken for half a dozen Chileans who are called to dinner from the closets where they pass the daylight hours.

The junta appears to be relenting to diplomatic requests for safe passage for refugees in these few cases even though no treaty obligation exists.

At the Latin embassies, where the right of asylum is well established, thousands have sought refuge. The Panamanian embassy, which is about the size of a large dining room, took in 600 people.

Down the street at the Venezuelan embassy, Ambassador Orlando Tobar estimates that 2,000 have passed through the gates. A Hercules transport from Caracas has flown out more than 300, and at least that many Chileans and foreigners are camping on the grounds, sleeping on the floors, and lunching on the food that the transport plane brought from Caracas.

Some of the cases remaining are very ticklish. Seven Venezuelans here with out-of-date or inadequate documents took refuge in their embassy even though they are on the wanted list at home for involvement with that country's violent

left.

Many in embassies are leftist intellectuals who moved to Chile to take part in its experiment in democratic socialism. With the recent military takeover in Uruguay, and Argentina's new President Juan Peron offering no hospitality to Marxists, their problem now is where to go.

One of the first leftist intellectuals to leave after the coup was Spaniard Joan Garces, who was a close adviser to Allende. His departure proved difficult and embarrassing because it turned out that he was here under UNESCO sponsorship.

In general, though, the bigger names have fewer troubles getting permission to leave the country. A lot of penniless Chileans and foreigners may have more difficulty. Hence the feverish establishment of the U.N. refugee program to help the non-Chileans.

Working in conjunction with the churches, U.N. representative Oldrich Haselman supervised the establishment of 26 processing centers and two havens—where refugees may live safely until they leave the country.

Ads are running in the newspapers offering help in obtaining documents or renewing expired ones, and in leaving the country if necessary. On the first day, some 600 people responded to the ads.

The U.N. officials emphasize that the junta has been most cooperative with their efforts and they show optimism that the problem of the refugees will soon be solved.

One more group will still be without help: the unknown number of Chileans in hiding who fear reprisals. There is some feeling that the junta now believes that purposes would best be served by letting them go without prosecution.

In all, it has been a most delicate operation, with many surprises at the wrong moments. There is the case of the European woman married to a Bolivian. He went out through an embassy, and she got diplomatic assist-in boarding a subsequent flight along with their child.

As the mother reached the critical police check point at the air terminal, her three-year-old broke into an exuberant rendition of the marching song of Allende's Popular Unity coalition.

WASHINGTON POST
30 September 1973

Soviet Sailor Accuses

Chileans of Abuses

MOSCOW, Sept. 29—A Soviet seaman said today that crew members of a Russian research vessel were stabbed, tortured, beaten and insulted during the Chilean military coup.

The seaman, First Mate S. Stevayev, said the research vessel Eliptika was undergoing repairs in Valparaiso harbor at the time of the coup Sept. 11, and its crewmen were ashore.

"On the day of the mutiny, rioting soldiers broke into our hotel," Stevayev told the armed forces newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda.

"The captain was struck with a rifle butt when he tried to protest. The mutineers insulted and beat all the sailors and stole their personal belongings," he added.

"Then we were all rudely dragged to the quay where... under threat of violence, our sailors were forced to lie face down on the ground. Several of our comrades had open bayonet wounds."

In breaking off diplomatic relations with Chile last week the Soviet government cited specific hostile acts against Soviet citizens, including ill treatment of seamen.

NEW YORK TIMES
20 September 1973

2 Britons Freed in Chile Report Brutal Conditions

By MARVINE HOWE
Special to The New York Times

SANTIAGO, Chile, Sept. 19—Reports are spreading here of the arrest, ill treatment or disappearance of foreigners, mainly those who came here as political exiles from other Latin-American countries. Some reports have been confirmed, others not.

Two British citizens said they had been held for two days in the national stadium along with thousands of other foreigners and Chileans and reported what one termed "systematic brutality."

A couple from the United States, Mr. and Mrs. Adam Schesch have been seen in a cell in the stadium and have according to Richard Barbor-Might, a British journalist and lecturer. Mr. Schesch was reported to be a researcher from the University of Wisconsin.

A United States Embassy spokesman confirmed that Mr. and Mrs. Schesch were being held in the Stadium on charges of possessing leftist propaganda and "other material."

Priests Are Detained

Six other Americans, including two Maryknoll priests, have been detained in the arrests that followed the overthrow of

the Government of the Socialist President, Salvador Allende Gossens, according to United States Embassy sources. The identification of the prisoners was not available.

This afternoon, Marlise Simons, correspondent for The Washington Post, was detained by two plainclothes men in her hotel, according to a witness. Miss Simons was one of the few foreign correspondents here during the coup. It was learned that Miss Simons had been taken to the fifth floor of the Ministry of Defense "for questioning of her copy."

She was released tonight after four hours of questioning.

This morning a spokesman for the military junta promised to give newsmen all that they needed "to report the truth."

The spokesman charged today that there were 14,000 armed foreigners living in the country and that many were training leftists.

Helicopters have been dropping leaflets warning the population that "foreigners have come into the country to kill Chileans" and called on the people to denounce all foreigners engaged in "subversive activities."

There is no figure for the number of foreigners who have been arrested on suspicion of subversive activities.

The United States Consul, Fred Purdy, has tried four times to see Mr. and Mrs. Schesch in the stadium.

The German and Swedish Embassies have also been refused authorization to see their nationals being held in the stadium. Accounts on the number of prisoners in the stadium vary from 3,500 to 15,000.

An account of conditions in the stadium was given by two Britons, Mr. Barbor-Might and Adrian Jansen, who is doing research at the University of Chile. They told a group of correspondents in a hotel here that they had been arrested last Thursday as suspects and marched at gunpoint to a police station, then taken by bus to the stadium.

"There were Bolivians, Haitians, Nicaraguans, Brazilians, Uruguayans, Paraguayans, Guatemalans and Paraguayans in our cell and they were terrified," Mr. Jansen said.

"Adrian and I weren't ill-treated personally but many others were," Mr. Barbor-Might said.

Another Briton with them, a businessman, was rammed in the stomach with a gun butt when he refused to sweep the cell, saying he was a British subject, according to Mr. Jan-

sen. "We saw systematic brutality," Mr. Barbor-Might declared. "We saw prisoners, mostly Latins, kneeling on the ground with their hands up in the air, being kicked and beaten on the calves. Another group came into our cell and appeared to have been badly beaten up."

Mr. Jansen said he had heard firing while they were in the stadium "which could only have come from inside." He described one Latin-American doctor who had received five or six bruises on the back and stomach.

The Britons said the prisoners had asked them to appeal for help from Amnesty International, a private London-based organization that concerns itself with political prisoners.

The junta issued a statement yesterday declaring that many foreigners had contributed to Chile's development and that the Government's coercive action was directed against those foreigners who intervened in politics and those extremists who entered the country in recent years.

Under President Allende, Chile had become a haven for leftists from many Latin countries. There is deep concern here among the embassies about their fate under the new military Government.

NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 1973

Swedish Ambassador Extends Shelter To Refugees of Chile's Political Storm

By MARVINE HOWE
Special to The New York Times

SANTIAGO, Chile, Sept. 28—Virtually alone, Harald Edelstam saved the Cuban Embassy from being stormed and provided protection to Chilean, Brazilian and other political refugees. He is a prime mover behind an international effort to win guarantees for security for opponents of Chile's new military rulers.

Mr. Edelstam, the Swedish Ambassador here, became known as "The Black Pimpernel" in World War II when he served in the Norwegian Resistance while he was his country's Vice Consul in Norway. Today, he presented to the Chilean Foreign Minister, Vice Adm. Ismael Huerta, an offer from the Swedish Government to receive 200 refugees from Chile on "humanitarian" grounds.

"Our role, the role of the Swedish Embassy, is humanitarian—to try to save the lives of people who are in danger," Ambassador Edelstam said in an interview.

"We know there are lists of people who supported the former regime and who are considered by the new military

authorities as criminals and therefore could be executed," Mr. Edelstam said.

He criticized both the United Nations and the International Red Cross, saying neither had acted firmly. "The United Nations has been very weak; one would hope that the world organization and the Red Cross would take more interest in those who are suffering," he said.

The United Nations High Commission for Refugees had sent a representative here to seek to persuade the junta to agree to establishment of a secure area for foreigners who were living here under the Government of President Salvador Allende Gossens as political exiles.

The junta has accused foreign exiles here of supporting what it describes as left-wing plots against the armed forces and has made mass arrests. There are about 14,000 foreigners here, most of them leftist exiles from the neighboring right-wing military dictatorships of Brazil, Uruguay and Bolivia.

This week, Chile's military rulers informed the United Nations representative, Oldrich Haselman, that they supported

the international conventions on refugees but that refugees "who have committed criminal acts here will be tried in Chile."

Ambassador Edelstam told of the military's action against the Cuban Embassy and his role there.

He said that on the afternoon of Sept. 11, the day the coup began, "we saw a lot of soldiers coming to the Cuban chancery," near his residence, that there was firing "and the Cubans put up a good resistance."

The next day, he said, he tried to enter the Cuban premises and a Chilean colonel finally gave him permission to do so for 10 minutes. "I went in and stayed and it was fortunate for the Cubans that I did," he said, "because the military were preparing to storm the embassy."

The Cuban Ambassador, Mario Garcia, asked him to assume protection of the Cuban mission and he accepted, Mr. Edelstam said. He continued:

"At 8 P.M., the Chileans gave the Cubans three hours to leave the country. I helped them pack, get buses and arranged for the Soviet Union's Aeroflot plane, which happened

to be at the airport, and 147 Cubans left that night, a half hour before the deadline."

The Swedish Ambassador has assumed charge of all Cuban property and of about 20 political refugees in the Cuban chancery. Among the refugees is Max Marambio, the leader of Dr. Allende's personal guard and a man wanted by the junta. "To protect our guests," the ambassador sleeps nightly at the Cuban Embassy.

Ambassador Edelstam's chief concern now is to obtain safe-conduct passes for the refugees in the two embassies in his charge and other diplomatic missions here.

There are more than 1,000 political refugees in Santiago embassies and hundreds more are trying to get into the embassies. The Argentine Embassy is said to be having serious problems with some 400 refugees who are crowded into tight quarters, with only three bathrooms. There are also large numbers of refugees in the Panamanian and Venezuelan Embassies.

The Mexicans have gotten two plane loads of refugees, including President Allende's widow, out of the country, and still have 170 refugees on their hands waiting to leave. Most of the 170 are Chileans.

"The trouble now is that the military refuse to give safe-

conduct passes to exiles until their cases have been examined," Mr. Edelstam said. Sweden, like most European countries, does not have an agreement with Chile on political asylum, but can offer protection to persons whose lives are in danger.

In addition to his Cuban charges, Mr. Edelstam must look out for another score of refugees in the Swedish chancery. These are mostly Brazilian and Chilean intellectuals who were militant Allende supporters.

A young American woman

from Madison, Wis., with a 2-year-old baby, said she had first gone to the American Embassy for help. The woman, who would not give her name, said she was told at the embassy to see the Chilean police. "And so I came to the Swedish Embassy for help," she added.

Thursday, Sept. 27, 1973

THE WASHINGTON POST

Chilean Junta Frees Suspected Right-Wing Terrorists

From News Dispatches

SANTIAGO, Sept. 26—Chile's new military junta today released leaders of a neo-fascist movement jailed by the former government of President Salvador Allende for allegedly staging a wave of violence.

Roberto Thieme, 30, secretary general of the Fatherland and Freedom movement, and four of his top aides, were freed on bail by a magistrate's order endorsed by the Supreme Court.

They were arrested Aug. 27, two weeks before the military coup which toppled Allende's left-wing Popular Unity government and brought the president's death. They were awaiting trial on charges including involvement in an unsuccessful coup attempt last June and offenses against state security.

Thieme, a tall, stocky businessman, told journalists at a clandestine meeting here a week before his arrest: "We will get rid of President Allende even if we have to burn this country down."

His movement went underground in July, vowing to topple the Allende government

by violence, following the failure of the June 29 coup.

More than 600 terrorist attacks followed, including dynamiting of television transmitters, oil pipelines, roads, railway lines and bridges—all accompanying a crippling road transport strike which caused economic chaos in the weeks preceding Allende's overthrow.

Some of the sabotage attacks were believed to be the work of left-wing extremists but Thieme personally claimed responsibility for the major incidents at the meeting with journalists. The campaign of violence appeared to subside rapidly after his arrest.

The charges leveled against him by the Allende government could have brought a possible 15-year prison sentence. It was not immediately known whether the new authorities would press the charges.

The military is continuing a search for leftists and former

leaders of the Allende government. The capital remains under a dusk-to-dawn curfew and the country is still under a state of siege, a form of martial law, two weeks after the coup.

Police and military continued widespread arrests and raids on private homes throughout Santiago. Agence France-Presse reported that in some cases private citizens joined the troops in roughing up the suspects who were arrested.

Chilean and foreign leftists trying to avoid being caught in the police dragnet were reportedly having difficulty finding places to stay during the nighttime curfew.

Chilean newspapers again printed photographs and personal data of a list of most wanted men, all leaders in the former government.

Diplomatic sources reported that talks between Chile's new military rulers and ambassadors seeking safe conduct for about 600 left-wing political refugees have broken down.

According to the sources, the government insisted that only those with no criminal records prior to the Sept. 11 coup would be allowed to leave Chile. This condition was rejected by the ambassadors, they added.

Meanwhile crowded embassies were barring their doors to any more former Allende supporters trying to escape arrest.

An International Red Cross mission investigating the welfare of prisoners at Chile's national soccer stadium said it had not yet come to any conclusion.

"There are so many reports that need checking. It will take at least a few weeks," a spokesman said. The government has said there are 5,630 prisoners at the stadium.

Meanwhile, the military junta said it was working on an economic plan "to save Chile," and warned citizens of austerity to come. No details of the austerity program were given.

NEW YORK TIMES
2 October 1973

REFUGEES IN CHILE HARBORED BY U.N.

Monastery Near Capital Is
Sanctuary for Foreigners

By MARVINE HOWE

SANTIAGO, Chile, Oct. 1.—A large rambling monastery used for spiritual retreats has become a haven for political refugees caught up in the turmoil since the military takeover here nearly three weeks ago.

The sanctuary was set up by the National Committee for Aid to Refugees under the auspices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The committee was formed by all churches in Chile and other voluntary organizations and has the support of the international Red

Cross.

"We're better here than on the streets but we don't have any guarantees for our safety," a Brazilian refugee said, adding that he had tried to get asylum in an embassy but that they were all full.

The monastery—in the village of Padre Hurtado, about 15 miles south of downtown Santiago—was opened to refugees Friday night and by Sunday night was harboring 180, mostly Brazilians, Uruguayans and Bolivians. More were arriving all the time.

More Sanctuaries Planned

Other sanctuaries are to be set up in the next few days, according to United Nations officials.

The military junta has given oral assurances that they will be respected and is to issue a decree on the subject, according to Margaret Anstee, resident representative of the United Nations Development Program, who has been nego-

tiating guarantees for the refugees.

The refugees said they were being well cared for but all expressed fear that the military or the carabineros, the paramilitary police, might invade the monastery.

"What we would like is a Uni Nations guard," a spokesman for the Brazilian refugees said. He and others spoke of their panic when troops came to the monastery Sunday at 1 A.M., saying they were looking for Cubans.

"Fortunately there was a courageous priest who refused to let them in but they could force their way in at any time," the Brazilian said.

'Foreign Extremists' Denounced

A Uruguayan refugee urged that the Uni Nations obtain guarantees of inviolability for the monastery, or the same status as that of a foreign embassy. "We are in danger just because we're foreigners," he declared.

There are more than 13,000 foreigners here, mostly leftist exiles from Latin-American countries who sought asylum under the Government of the late President Salvador Allende Gossens.

The new military junta has outlawed Marxist parties, arrested many leaders of the former regime and begun a witch-hunt against "foreign extremists."

Radio broadcasts and leaflets dropped by helicopter have called on Chileans to denounce "foreign extremists who have come to kill Chileans."

Only for Foreigners

The National Committee for Aid to Refugees has reached an agreement with the Government to establish 15 reception centers in Santiago and 11 in the provinces where refugees will be helped in putting their identification papers in order or in leaving the country. Those who are homeless or

whose lives are in danger are to be transferred to the sanctuaries.

"One problem is that we don't know the dimensions of our task," Miss Anstee acknowledged. She said that the United Nations Development Program was requesting food for 3,000

people for three months initially.

United Nations officials emphasized that they could protect only foreigners and not Chileans, who under international law are not considered refugees until they leave the country.

Large numbers of Chileans

who actively supported the Allende regime have sought political asylum in foreign embassies or are in hiding and hope to leave the country. However, the military authorities refuse to grant safe-conduct passes to those on wanted lists.

WASHINGTON POST
23 September 1973

Chile's Christian Democrats Hit Junta Constitution Plans

From News Dispatenches

SANTIAGO, Sept. 22—The new Chilean military junta received its first political setback today when the powerful Christian Democratic Party severely criticized its proposals for a new constitution.

The party, the largest in Chile, has opposed the Socialist-led government of President Salvador Allende, who died in last week's coup. At first, the Christian Democrats supported the military takeover, but today party leader, Patricio Aylwin told a news conference:

"The Christian Democrats do not accept directives concerning changes in the constitutional Chilean regime that do not come from the people. Nobody, and certainly not by force of arms, can impose a constitutional regime."

Aylwin also warned that his party was "categorically and clearly against" any attempt to use the military government "to turn back history and establish the model of a permanent reactionary dictatorship."

The party leader, who belongs to a moderate faction of the Christian Democrats, also

criticized the junta's decision to outlaw Marxist political parties.

"We do not believe that political parties can be suppressed by decree, nor do we believe that ideas can be suppressed by governmental decisions," he said.

The junta also ordered the non-Marxist parties to suspend their activities, but Aylwin was not prevented from holding the news conference.

The junta's forces continued to search the country for supporters of Allende who might offer resistance to the new government. A man was killed while resisting a raid on his home.

Military authorities announced that two men were executed by a firing squad for manufacturing 2,000 bombs in a plot to assassinate military officers. They said the pair was sentenced by a military court in Antofagasta, 800 miles north of here.

The junta issued a list of its 10 most wanted men, including the leaders of the Socialist, Communist and Leftist Revolutionary Movement parties. The list also included a grandson of Allende's, Andres Allende, editor of a leftist

party newspaper.

The junta announced that it had authorized priests to act as intermediaries for people who wished to hand over weapons to the armed forces. Raul Cardinal Silva Henriquez had told the junta's interior minister that many priests had been approached by people who wished to surrender arms, but feared they would be arrested.

Relief flights carrying food and medicine from neighboring countries began arriving today, and some international commercial flights were resumed.

The junta announced that farm workers who received land under Allende's agrarian reform program would receive deeds to it. The government also allowed 14 magazines that had been closed to resume publication, but announced a crackdown on "pornographic publications."

Air force commander Gen. Gustavo Leigh told newsmen that businesses that had been legally nationalized under the Allende government would remain the property of the state, but that factories that had been illegally occupied by he work-

ers should be returned to their owners.

Responding to a question by an American journalist, he said that Chile hoped to have the best possible relations with the U.S. government.

"We admire that country very much," he said, calling the United States "an example of organization, progress and success."

East Germany, Bulgaria, Romania and North Korea broke relations with Chile, following the lead of the Soviet Union. Britain announced that it would resume relations, as have many West European and Latin American nations.

The British Foreign Office said that Britain had received assurances that the junta would treat political prisoners and adversaries humanely and with respect for the law.

A Foreign Office spokesman said that the British ambassador in Santiago had "explained to the Chilean government the very strong feelings that exist in many quarters in Britain over the death of President Allende and the many people arrested."

WASHINGTON POST
3 October 1973

Chile Death Toll Said 750

By Lewis H. Diuguid
Washington Post Staff Writer

SANTIAGO, Chile, Oct. 2—The number of violent deaths in the Chilean capital over the three weeks since the military coup appears to have been approximately 750, on the basis of checking today at the central morgue.

This contrasts both with the latest official count of 284 for the whole country and with a report by John Barnes in the current issue of Newsweek, saying that the total number of deaths registered at the central morgue in the two weeks after the coup was 2,796.

This reporter visited the morgue today and was told by the woman who has kept records there for several years that 2,796 was indeed an accurate count—of all the deaths recorded by the morgue from Jan. 1 to Sept. 25, rather than during the brief period after Sept. 11.

Assuming that to be accurate, and it would apparently be hard to falsify if the system is as foolproof as was explained to me, then there have been about 750 more bodies processed through the morgue

so far this year than one would normally have expected.

Under normal circumstances, all violent deaths in the Santiago metropolitan area must by law be processed through the central morgue.

If the 750 estimate is correct, deaths in other parts of the country would not, most probably, raise the total for the country to a very large degree. By most accounts, fighting in the provinces was limited compared to Santiago.

WASHINGTON POST
25 September 1973

'Leftist Propaganda' Put On Bonfires in Santiago

By Marlise Simons
Special to The Washington Post

SANTIAGO, Sept. 24 — Chile's new military government is clearly determined to purge "the cancer of Communism" from the nation, and every day brings new signs of its far-reaching and efficient campaign.

Bookstores, schools and leftist party headquarters have already been "freed of extremist literature," and now the military is meticulously combing neighborhoods to stamp out subversion in private homes.

This weekend, for example, it was the turn of the San Borja district of Santiago, a middle-class neighborhood of several square miles near the center of town.

Soldiers in jeeps mounted with American-made anti-tank guns cordoned off Santiago at dawn this morning. Loudspeakers ordered people to stay inside their homes and to offer no resistance.

Shortly thereafter, some 3,000 soldiers moved into homes and apartment buildings. They broke the doors wherever they could not enter.

They searched for hiding "extremists," arms and "subversive" propaganda. Eyewitnesses said that the military arrested several dozen civilians earlier in the morning.

For the rest of the day, inhabitants of the neighborhood watched the spectacle of soldiers throwing books, newspapers and magazines out of the windows of 20-story buildings. Underneath, other soldiers collected the spoils and turned them into bonfires that lasted for the best part of the day.

A young sergeant heading toward one of the burning piles with an armful of literature explained that Chile's military would "not stop until we've finished with the Marxists and their propaganda. But today we have orders to burn everything that is connected with politics. No matter whether it is right, left or in the middle."

The soldiers in effect seemed to need little or no encouragement and they happily warmed themselves around the fires, tearing up volumes too thick or heavy for the flames. The selected works of Mao Tse-tung lay burning next to old copies of Time magazine, Che Guevara's diary, a John Kenneth Galbraith treatise on the military, Sherlock Holmes and "A Socialist Approach to the Economy" all went on the same burning heap.

There was no clemency for the collected works of Pablo Neruda, Chile's Nobel Prize-winning poet who died of cancer in a Santiago hospital late last night.

Neruda, one of the greatest voices of Latin American poetry, was a Communist, a known friend and sympathizer of Marxist President Allende, who preceded him in death two weeks ago when a military coup overthrew Allende's government.

A spokesman for the military junta said the deceased poet had been "a great artist" but that no "great funeral" could be held because public gatherings are still forbidden by the military government.

At a briefing for the foreign press, the spokesman also denied that a nationwide witch-hunt against leftist literature had been ordered by the military. But the spokesman added later that some books had to be burnt because they might contain code.

Meanwhile, the campaign continues all over the country, with schools and universities reportedly searched and rid of "leftist texts."

At the Jose Marti bookshop in downtown Santiago, a truck was seen pulling up outside and loading hundreds of unsold volumes. Asked where he was taking his load, one of the collectors said, "to the incinerator."

At the Book Fair, another usually well-stocked store in the center of the capital, the "political section" has alto-

gether disappeared. A quick survey showed this morning that only two volumes by Marxist philosopher Herbert Marcuse and a collection of Black Panther essays had escaped the censor.

A campaign to wipe out slogans and graffiti painted on walls is going full steam. The military have reportedly donated paint and brushes to speed the cleaning process. High school students all over the country are said to be volunteering to scrub off paint and whitewash walls. Sunday in Santiago, for example, a teenager was struggling to wipe out a large red sign reading "Jakarta Goes," a warning presumably painted by the right to remind the Allende forces of the 1965 massacre of Communists in Indonesia. Nearby, a housewife peeled from a wall a leftist poster saying "Soldier, Do Not Obey Your Superiors."

Although there have been no official announcements about long hair being forbidden, barber shops have been overrun with clients who had beards two weeks ago and suddenly are clean-shaven.

The San Salvador Hospital, for example, is demanding that its male staff wear "manly hairstyles." At a checkpoint on the road to Valparaiso, police took advantage of identity checks to give long-haired motorists instant haircuts by the side of the road.

The five newspapers published in the capital are also censored for undesirable appearances.

Some of the censorship practices are puzzling to local journalists. Last week the Christian Democratic newspaper La Presna appeared with several blank spaces on its pages. When asked what they had contained originally, one of the papers' employees explained, "you got me there. It was a statement by one of the junta members. The censor crossed it out and said, 'Such a thing my general would not have said.'"

News agencies filed the following further reports:

Col. Pedro Ewing, secretary-general of government for the military junta that seized power Sept. 11, said in an interview published Monday that book stores "must eliminate Marxist texts if they don't want to be sanctioned."

In some areas, frightened people started their own fires in the street to burn offensive literature before the troops arrived. During the raids, churches were asked to suspend their services so that "extremists" would not be able to take refuge inside them.

In Vina del Mar, 100 miles northwest of Santiago, the military authorities fired the municipal library director and ordered the shelves cleared of Marxist titles.

In the southern city of San Antonio, six dissidents were shot dead by troops while being transported from one detention center to another. The city commander, Col. Manuel Contreras, said the six "extremists" were shot when they tried to escape from an army truck which had broken down.

The Swiss government announced in Bern that its embassy in Santiago will be open to grant asylum to anyone seeking refuge from political persecution. The junta has arrested thousands of suspected extremists since the coup.

Commenting on reports of large-scale executions at the international soccer stadium here, a spokesman said the junta would give figures and reasons for any executions.

"If there were executions I will give you the figures and reasons why they were executed," he said. But asked whether he could say there had been no executions at the stadium the spokesman said, "I cannot say that."

More than 100 Soviet diplomats and technicians left Chile last night following the Soviet Union's decision to break diplomatic relations with the military junta.